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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I argue for anti-colonial constructions of the non-Aboriginal self.  I 
take as my starting point that members of the invader/settler society in Australia 
must place them/ourselves in “an embodied awareness of ‘being in Indigenous 
sovereignty’” (Nicholl, 2004: 17) and name them/ourselves accordingly.  An 
anti-colonial construction of non-Aboriginality formed within the locus of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty undermines the potency of ‘post-colonial’ processes of 
identity formation, which privilege the colonialist centre, and the concomitant 
marginalised position of Indigenous people.  Thus, an anti-colonial construction 
of non-Aboriginality constitutes a radical recentring for processes of identity 
construction within invader/settler societies. 
 
This work responds to critical whiteness studies and post-colonial discourses of 
‘belonging’. I acknowledge both whiteness studies and work on invader/settler 
belongings have gained traction in recent years as a means to problematise the 
whiteness of the settler/invader group and the legitimacy of their/our belongings.   
However, I argue they continue to operate within colonialist paradigms and 
perpetuate (neo)colonial power relations.   
 
In this thesis, I argue anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality are 
constructed in dialogue with Aboriginal people. I conceive non-Aboriginality as 
a political identity that rejects ‘race’ and ‘colour’ as markers for identity.  ‘Non-
Aboriginality’ enables members of invader/settler societies to articulate support 
for Aboriginal Sovereignty and Aboriginal claims for social justice and human 
rights.    
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They were standin' on the shore one day, Saw the white sails in the 
sun 
Wasn't long before they felt the sting, white man, white law, white 
gun 
Don't tell me that it's justified, 'cause somewhere, someone lied 
Yeah well someone lied, someone lied, genocide 
Well someone lied.  
 
And now you're standing on solid rock 
Standing on a sacred ground 
Living on borrowed time 
And the winds of change are blowin' down the line 
(Shane Howard and Goanna, 1982)  
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Protocol 
“The protocol for introducing one’s self to other Indigenous people is to provide 
information about one’s cultural location, so that connections can be made on 
political, cultural and social grounds and relations established” (Moreton- 
Robinson, 2000: xv)
1∗.  Increasingly, non-Aboriginal people are also observing 
this protocol (see, for example, Curthoys, 2000: 22).  While there is some 
concern that this observance of protocol has become perfunctory (Haggis, 2004a: 
48), I argue it is a powerful indication of the growing recognition that we live in 
relationship with Aboriginal people on their land.  It illuminates the desire non-
Aboriginal people have to learn how to live on this land with respect and in 
accordance with the appropriate protocols.  When we observe this protocol, we 
make a public declaration of our non-Aboriginality.  When we come together 
with Aboriginal people and declare our non-Aboriginality we affirm that we 
want to forge our own inter political, social and cultural relationships.  We 
indicate that we understand that the basis for connection is respect of Indigenous 
Sovereignty.  This thesis is about such matters so, in this spirit, I will introduce 
myself. 
 
My name is Michelle Carey.  I’m a (around-about) sixth generation white 
Australian of mainly Irish decent.  Some of my mob were from England, but like 
                                                 
1 Aileen Moreton Robinson is a Geonpul woman and Professor of Indigenous Studies at 
Queensland University of Technology.  She is a leading Australian academic in critical whiteness 
and race studies and was the founding President of the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness 
Studies Association.  Professor Moreton-Robinson has published in the areas of Native Title, 
whiteness, race and feminism in Australia and abroad.  She has also worked and advocated for 
Indigenous rights in Australia and internationally. 
∗ Throughout this thesis, I provide short biographies of some of the scholars whose work I draw 
on in the development of this work.  The biographies indicate the authors and scholars who are 
influential in the development of my thinking on this matter and inform the basis of my 
argument.  
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many of us who consider ourselves ‘Irish’ we don’t acknowledge this too often!  
To the best of my knowledge, on my father’s father’s side, the Careys, came form 
County Cork. Out of curiosity, I did a web search on the Gaelic spelling and 
meaning of Carey.  Apparently, it’s O’Ciardha; the O meaning descendent of, 
and Ciardha meaning dark.  I must confess that despite my denial of Anglo 
ancestry that my Anglicisation is complete.  I look at the word ‘Ciardha’ and 
wonder about the spelling.  How does one sound inform the next? How do I make 
this configuration of letters say CAREY? It’s my name but I don’t recognise it as 
mine. 
 
On my mother’s mother’s side, the McCurdies are from Derry and the Mays are 
from Belfast.  On my Mother’s Mother’s Father’s side, the Poulters come from 
Sussex, England.  To the best of my knowledge, my ancestors migrated here of 
their own free will.  There are no hidden convict stains, stories of Fenian rebels 
or famine victims. There are no grand romantic narratives to explain the 
presence of my family in Australia.   
 
I went to Ireland when I was 19, to check if I was Irish.  A bus driver in Limerick 
set me straight.  He said the Americans were tourists and Australians were 
guests.  At first I thought he was flattering me.  It soon clicked though that he 
thought I was only marginally higher up in the pecking order than those loud 
Americans who developed sudden penchants for wearing tweed caps and walking 
with the aid of a blackthorn stick.  I was just a guest.  An Australian guest. 
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I was born at St. George’s hospital in Kew, Melbourne on the 7
th of April 1967. I 
am the eldest daughter of Terence Richard and Heather Maree Carey.  The early 
years of my life were spent between my parents and my grandparent’s house in 
the eastern suburbs of Melbourne.   
 
In the year that I was born, they held a referendum to see if the federal 
government could have constitutional jurisdiction over Aboriginal people and to 
see if they could be counted in the Australian census, as one of ‘ us’.  On May the 
27
th over ninety percent of white Australians said yes.  A cynical response might 
be that it was never up to whitefellas to make such decisions about those whose 
land had been stolen from them in the first place.  There is truth in this.  But, I 
am thankful that I was born in optimistic times.  I wish I could say the same of 
the times I am living in now. 
 
Having been born in Melbourne, I was born on the land of the Wurunjeri people 
of the Kulin Nation.  Many years later, I moved to Sydney, and lived on the land 
of the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation.  I currently live in Western Australia.  
As I write this now, I do so knowing I am a Wadjula living on Nyungar Boodja. 
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Introduction 
The Thesis: 
In this thesis, I argue for an anti-colonial construction of the non-Aboriginal self.  
I therefore take as my starting point that members of the invader/settler society 
must place them/ourselves in “an embodied awareness of ‘being in Indigenous 
sovereignty’” (Nicholl, 2004: 17)
2 and name them/ourselves accordingly.  For 
me, naming and claiming our non-Aboriginality necessitates an irrevocable 
recognition of being in Aboriginal Sovereignty and demands that invader/settler 
belongings are negotiated from this standpoint.  I argue anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality formed within the locus of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty undermine the potency of ‘post-colonial’ processes of identity 
formation, which privilege the colonialist centre and the concomitant 
marginalised position of Aboriginal people.  Thus, anti-colonial constructions of 
non-Aboriginality constitute a radical recentring for processes of identity 
construction within invader/settler societies. 
 
This work is positioned as a response to critical whiteness studies and post-
colonial discourses of ‘belonging’.  I acknowledge whiteness studies and work 
on invader settler belongings have gained traction in recent years as a means to 
problematise the whiteness of the settler/invader group and the legitimacy of 
their/our belongings.  However, I argue they continue to operate within 
colonialist paradigms and perpetuate (neo)colonial power relations.  Therefore, 
alternative processes of identity problematisation must be sought, and connected 
to this, an alternative premise to invader/settler belongings devised. 
                                                 
2 Fiona Nicholl lectures at the University of Queensland.  Her recent publications address 
whiteness and Indigenous sovereignty in Australian and the racialisation of ‘perspective’.  
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I argue the urgency of my position is exemplified by the present social and 
political milieu in Australia where there is a real denial of the particular rights of 
Indigenous people.  At best, the diminution of Indigenous rights is a paternalistic 
move back to the cultural assimilation practices of the mid-to-late 20
th century. 
At worst, it constitutes a (re)colonisation of Indigenous people and land, one that 
winds back the social, cultural and political successes achieved by Indigenous 
people towards the end of the 20
th century.  I argue the ideological position of the 
current political regime in Australia is further revealed when we consider 
Australia’s international alignment with the neo-colonial, foreign policy 
objectives of the United States.  I argue there is a compelling need for members 
of invader/settler societies to address the (neo)colonial paradigms by which 
our/their identities are constituted and this begins by reconceiving identity within 
the locus of Indigenous Sovereignty. 
 
Defining Terms: 
Here I define several terms I rely on to explain contested power relations 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people throughout this thesis: 
‘Indigenous and/or Aboriginal Sovereignty’ and ‘white sovereignty’; 
‘Aboriginal’ and ‘non-Aboriginal’; and, ‘invader/settler’.   
 
I take the terms ‘Indigenous and/or Aboriginal Sovereignty’ and ‘white 
sovereignty’ from Fiona Nicholl (2004).  My reading of Nicholl leads me to 
understand white sovereignty as inextricably linked to white national identity, 
legitimacy and authority, and Indigenous/Aboriginal Sovereignty as the  
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conglomeration of rights that are inalienable to the overall goal of self-
determination for Indigenous people, and which, moreover, is denied every time 
white sovereignty is asserted (Nicholl, 2004: 19).  As Nicholl writes: 
There is an important difference between white people knowing what 
Indigenous sovereignty is, on the one hand, and knowing what white 
sovereignty does to Indigenous rights, on the other…whenever…[we] 
…deny the existence of Indigenous sovereignty, we effectively deny the 
collective rights of Indigenous Australians (2004: 19). 
 
In this text, I draw broadly on Nicholl’s work on the dynamic between white 
sovereignty in relationship to Indigenous Sovereignty.  However, I am mindful 
that while Nicholl seeks to problematise the whiteness of the settler/invader 
society, I seek to problematise whiteness as a site through which the relationship 
between white sovereignty and Indigenous Sovereignty is considered.  My 
concern is to critique discourses of whiteness, including those that seek to 
deconstruct the power of whiteness, within the locus of (neo)colonial power 
relations.  As Larbalestier (2004: online) writes, whiteness is a “metaphor for 
relations of domination”.  As such, I suggest that whiteness ‘metaphorically’ 
speaks to the signifier of whiteness while potentially evading that which is 
signified – colonisation – and the perpetuation of (neo)colonial power relations.   
 
Therefore, I also read Nicholl’s work on white sovereignty and Indigenous 
Sovereignty with Lisa Strelein’s (2002)
3 analysis of Aboriginal Sovereignty, 
Australian sovereignty and the Treaty making processes.  This allows for a more 
focused consideration of colonisation, nation building and the negation of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty.  Strelein argues that in legal terms, the recognition of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty does not challenge the legitimacy of the State in 
                                                 
3 Lisa Strelein is a Research Fellow at AIATSIS, in the Native Title Research Unit.  Dr Strelein 
has published on Native Title, Treaty processes and Indigenous land and sea rights.  
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international law.  However, internal, national insecurities inhibit the recognition 
of the inherent Sovereignty of Aboriginal people because it undermines the 
Imperialist assumptions underpinning the construction of the modern nation 
state.  Indigenous sovereignty compels a recognition that processes of nation 
building not only failed to serve and protect the Sovereign rights of Indigenous 
people in the first moments of colonisation, but continues to serve the rights of 
individual citizens over and above the ongoing collective “political, socio-
cultural, and economic aspirations [and rights] of Indigenous people” (See 
Strelein, 2002: 5, also see 2, 6, 9-11).   
 
Further, I define the ways I use the terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Aboriginal’, and 
‘non-Indigenous’ and ‘non-Aboriginal’.  It is generally understood that the terms 
‘Aborigine’ and ‘Aboriginal’ are colonial impositions that homogenise the 
multiculturalism and multilingualism of Aboriginal people, denying the 
complexity of Indigenous societies and negating the legitimacy of Aboriginal 
peoples’ connections and responsibilities to their distinct geopolitical regions 
(see Collard et al, 2004: 8-10).  The Murri academic Eve Fesl
4 confirms this 
when she writes: 
An examination of the history of British colonisation and slavery 
throughout the world reveals that one of the first acts in the process of 
oppression has been the de-identification of the intended victims and a 
replacement of their names with labels such as “indian”, “aborigine”, 
“native”, “black” or “nigger…. The general noun “aborigine” has been 
used to replace our names which the colonisers never had the courtesy to 
use (1993: n.p.). 
 
                                                 
4 Eve Fesl is a Gubbi Gubbi Elder and an academic.  In 1988 Dr Fesl was awarded an Order of 
Australia medal for her work in the ethnic community and her maintenance of Aboriginal 
languages.  Fesl’s PhD is a sociolinguistic study on language and policy implementation.  Fesl 
currently works in Gubbi Gubbi language preservation and maintenance.  
  9 
I concede that given this historical context, proposing that we name non-
Aboriginality as ‘non-Aboriginal’ is a risky task.  There is a level at which such a 
name communicates a willingness to redeploy nomenclature that are 
automatically encoded with essentialised, racialised, hierarchialised and dualistic 
understandings of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations.  Certainly, Palmer
5 
and Groves
6 make this point when they write: 
Terms such as ‘Aboriginal,’ ‘non-Aboriginal,’ ‘white,’ ‘black,’ ‘European’ 
and ‘Indigenous’ all have their limitations.  Settling on any fixed set of 
terms such as ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘non-Aboriginal’ may serve to imply an 
acceptance of binaries or implicate us in problematic essentialisms (2000: 
21; also see Palmer, 1999: 28-32). 
 
However, I argue we can resist the colonialist connotations associated with 
contemporary naming conventions if we relocate the current terminology out of 
colonialist knowledge paradigms and invest old terms with new meanings that 
are antithetical to the original ones.  To elaborate this point, I refer to Moreton-
Robinson’s work on Indigenous belonging, which she defines as an ontological 
relationship to land.  She writes: 
It may be argued that to suggest an ontological relationship to describe 
Indigenous belonging is essentialist or is a form of strategic essentialism 
because I am imputing an essence to belonging.  From an Indigenous 
epistemology, what is essentialist is the premise upon which such criticism 
depends: the Western definition of self as not unitary or fixed.  This is a 
form of strategic essentialism that can silence and dismiss non-Western 
constructions, which do not define the self in the same way.  The politics of 
such silencing is enabled by the power of Western knowledge and its 
ability to be the definitive measure of what it means to be human and what 
does and does not constitute knowledge.  Questioning the integrity and 
legitimacy of Indigenous ways of knowing and being has more to do with 
the power to be a knower and whether their knowledge is commensurate 
with the West’s ‘rational’ belief system.  The anti-essentialist critique is 
commendable but it is premised on a contradiction embedded within the 
                                                 
5 David Palmer is senior lecturer in sociology at Murdoch University.  His research interests 
include community development, Aboriginalities and cultural influence, community service 
provision to Indigenous communities and youth studies. 
6 Denise Groves is a Yinjibarndi woman and lecturer at Murdoch University in Aboriginal 
women’s issues, politics, popular Aboriginal culture and Indigenous film.  
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Western construction of essentialism; it is applied as a universal despite its 
epistemological recognition of difference (Moreton-Robinson, 2003: 32). 
 
As I understand Moreton-Robinson, claiming Aboriginal belonging as an 
ontological relationship to land speaks to Aboriginal Sovereignty, and the status 
of Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects because of their ontological 
relationship to land.  Moreover, because Moreton-Robinson claims this 
ontological relationship as essential to Aboriginal belongings without being 
essentialist, it provides a space to articulate non-Aboriginality as a relationship to 
Aboriginal Sovereignty without redeploying essentialist, binary relationships 
between Aboriginality and non-Aboriginality as they are constructed within 
colonialist frameworks.  That is, to be ‘non-Aboriginal’ is to acknowledge our 
way of being is not commensurable to Aboriginal ontological experiences, but 
that it is possible to construct our own ontologies that co-exist and support 
Indigenous ways of being.  Thus, I conceive non-Aboriginality as a marker for 
identity that is formed in relationship to Aboriginal Sovereignty, and that stands 
in sharp contradistinction to white sovereignty, which, as I have already 
discussed, works to limit, contain and negate the legitimacy of Indigenous 
Sovereignty.  It is in this context that I use the terms ‘Aboriginal’, ‘non-
Aboriginal’ and ‘Indigenous’, ‘non-Indigenous’ within this thesis. 
 
Finally, in this thesis I use the descriptor ‘invader/settler’ to name those 
Australians who do not identify with their non-Aboriginality as I have defined it 
above.  The term invader/settler disrupts the hegemonic language of whiteness, 
placing the ‘whiteness’ of those who benefit from the invasion of Aboriginal land 
into a colonial context.  The term/s ‘invader/settler’ disrupts the grand narrative  
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of Australian colonisation, pointing out that colonisation was not so much the 
peaceful settlement of untamed lands, but the invasion of Aboriginal lands.  As 
the Aboriginal author Ruby Langford Ginibi
7 succinctly puts it: 
We are invaded people, and have been since 1788…. We have always had 
to conform to the laws and standards of the invaders.  Our tribal laws mean 
nothing to the white man, our traditional people were classified as heathens 
and vermin to be cleared off the face of the earth.  Assimilate us or wipe us 
out was the order of the day (c.f. Brewster, 1996: 2). 
 
Further, the term invader/settler signals that Aboriginal people continue to 
contest this invasion.  While I appreciate that current generations of Australians 
may not perceive themselves as either ‘invaders’ or ‘settlers’ (such is the nature 
of their settledness), I argue many Australians continue to embody the beliefs 
and values of the early settlers vis-à-vis their attitudes towards Aboriginal people 
(Morton-Robinson, 1998: 11).  Moreover, current generations of Australians 
continue to benefit (socially, politically, culturally and economically) from the 
fact that we live in an invaded land.  Therefore, the term ‘invader/settler’ is an 
appropriate one.  In conjoining the terms invader and settler to produce a single 
term, I simultaneously privilege the Aboriginal experience of being invaded over 
the invader/settler story of settlement and reveal the tension between the two 
concepts.  I further explore this tension in Chapter Three with reference to Gelder 
and Jacobs’ notion of the ‘uncanny’ (1998). 
 
The Political Intent of the Thesis 
The political intent of this thesis is to theorise and articulate non-Aboriginal 
obligations in achieving co-existence with Aboriginal people on their land.  I 
situate my argument for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality as a 
                                                 
7 Ruby Langford-Ginibi is a Bundjalung woman and author of several books including her 
autobiography, Don’t Take Your Love to Town (1988).  
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political engagement with the role and responsibilities of non-Aboriginal people 
in achieving substantive reconciliation with Aboriginal people, and as such, 
make this offering in the spirit of furthering the broad aims and objectives of 
reconciliation.  
 
In this thesis, I conceive of substantive reconciliation as a political idea that 
stands in contradistinction to the current program of ‘practical reconciliation’ as 
it was promulgated by the Howard conservative government and builds on the 
original objectives of reconciliation as they were devised in the early 1990’s 
under the Labor Government with bipartisan support.  The original objectives 
included achieving real social justice outcomes for Aboriginal people; producing 
a formal document (possibly a Treaty) of understanding between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people; and, fostering a greater understanding of Aboriginal and 
Australian history within the mainstream community
8 (Tickner, 2001).  I argue 
my notion of substantive reconciliation extends these objectives, and the 
discursive frameworks through which reconciliation is usually constructed, by 
asking mainstream Australians to observe and critique their commitment to white 
sovereignty; place non-Aboriginal identity construction processes and 
concomitant political responsibilities towards Aboriginal people within a history 
of colonisation; and, to cultivate a politicised sense of their non-Aboriginality as 
it exists in relationship to Aboriginal Sovereignty.   
 
By way of elaborating my position on substantive reconciliation, I refer to the 
pre-eminent scholar on Australian/Aboriginal history, Henry Reynolds. In 2000, 
                                                 
8 I offer further discussion on the difference between the initial objectives of reconciliation and 
‘practical reconciliation’ in Chapter Two.  
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he wrote that one of the advantages of the reconciliation movement was that it 
provided a forum for non-Aboriginal Australians to express their support for 
Aboriginal political, cultural and social justice objectives.  Impressed by the 
intensity, optimism and focus of non-Aboriginal participants at reconciliation 
gatherings, Reynolds wrote: 
It is that feeling, which I sense in audiences all around Australia, which 
converted me to be a supporter of reconciliation.  It is a powerful social 
movement, and for the first time since 1967 has given white Australians a 
means and an instrument to get involved in the cause (2000: 55). 
 
Indeed, this broad community support was most evident in the various ‘bridge 
walks’ that occurred as part of the Corroboree 2000 ceremony in May of that 
year, and arguably, the overwhelming support for Cathy Freeman in the Sydney 
2000 Olympic Games.  However, despite this support for reconciliation, there is 
little evidence that this mass movement culminated in a correlative shift in 
personal identity and self-awareness for mainstream Australians.  Various texts 
on reconciliation produced during this time bear this out.  Documentaries such as 
Whitey’s Like Us, White People’s Business and Michael Gordon’s book 
Reconciliation: A Journey (2001), reveal a commitment to learning more about 
Aboriginal culture, post-invasion history, apologising for the ‘mistakes’ of the 
past, Aboriginal disadvantage, supporting the integrity of Native Title and the 
High Court’s Wik decision and challenging the Howard Liberal Government’s 
program of ‘practical reconciliation’.  They do not, however, indicate a 
commitment to individual and collective self-reflection and identity development 
in the face of this ‘new’ knowledge.  In this light, the intent of this project is to 
redress this issue by offering a theoretical and discursive framework through 
which such matters might be explored.  
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To this end, this thesis comprises both a written text (the exegesis) and a thirty-
minute radio documentary containing interviews with ‘non-Aboriginal’ people.  
The purpose of the documentary is to include personal stories and testimonies by 
non-Aboriginal people who, in the contexts of their personal and public lives, 
reveal an engagement with the salient themes of this thesis. 
 
Storytelling and autobiography are well-established methodological and 
pedagological conventions in critical engagements with anti-racism (Clark and 
O’Donnell, 1999: 6).  In part, the stories offered in this project are a response to 
the paucity of positive stories available on meaningful intercultural and 
intersubjective exchange between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, from a 
non-Aboriginal perspective.  In this sense then, I understand these stories to be 
political in their own right, challenging the dominant discursive convention of 
negating both the existence and the value of these stories.  However, I also 
recognise that storytelling and autobiography, combined “with critical and 
reflective analysis” creates a pathway for raising “critical [political] 
consciousness” (Clarke and O’Donnell, 1999: 6).  In this sense then, the 
theoretical work presented in this thesis, and the stories offered in the 
documentary, intersect to produce possibilities for articulating anti-colonial 
notions of non-Aboriginality both within the academy and more broadly, within 
‘grass-roots’ political and cultural practice.  Moreover, this approach is 
consistent with the dialogic relationship I seek to establish between Indigenist 
theory/ies and praxis and the formulation of anti-colonial constructions of non- 
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Aboriginality.  I develop this below, in both the theoretical context for this thesis 
and in the methodology. 
 
Contextualising the Aims of the Thesis, Part One: Moving from 
Whiteness to non-Aboriginality. 
There are several confluent aims to this thesis.  Primarily, my focus is to argue 
for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality and to develop a theoretical 
and methodological framework that supports this objective.  Secondly, my aim is 
to locate my argument for anti-colonial constructions of the non-Aboriginal self 
within the broad context of Australian Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations 
towards the end of the twentieth century.  This includes identifying Aboriginal 
protests against the re-enactment of invasion in the 1988 bicentenary 
celebrations; the Mabo decision in 1992, which overturned the legal principle of 
terra nullius; and, the reconciliation movement throughout the 1990’s as land 
mark events in Australia moving towards ‘decolonisation’ and investigating the 
implications of these events for the invader/settler society.  Thirdly, my purpose 
is to situate my argument as a critical response to whiteness studies and recent 
discourses of ‘belonging’ in Australia.  
 
In this thesis, I acknowledge that some elements of critical whiteness studies are 
influential in the ways I construct my argument for anti-colonial constructions of 
non-Aboriginality. During the mid-late 1990’s, critical whiteness studies was a 
burgeoning area of academic enquiry, and it played an important role in getting 
me to think about the issues raised in this thesis (see Carey, 1998; Brady and 
Carey, 2000).  My interest in critical whiteness studies was a genuine response to  
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those calls by ‘women of colour’ and Aboriginal women for white identifying 
people to deal with their fixation with blackness and investigate their whiteness 
instead.  I understand the proliferation of work in critical whiteness studies by 
other white identifying people to be similarly motivated, and I appreciate the role 
this corpus of work has played in producing new frameworks for thinking 
through ‘race’ privilege and anti-racism.  However, I also argue that the request 
to investigate our whiteness is a dated one, and in the intervening years many 
Aboriginal scholars have worked to develop their own Indigenist frameworks for 
critical investigation.  While this corpus of work began as a reaction to the 
colonisation of Indigenous knowledges, increasingly, it presents itself as a bold 
assertion of Indigenous Sovereignty (see Rigney, 1999 and Martin/Mirraboopa, 
2003).  As with ‘whiteness’, there are requests by Aboriginal people to 
investigate the implications of working within Indigenous/Indigenist 
frameworks.  For example, Curtin University’s Centre For Aboriginal Studies 
Aboriginal Terms of Reference document insists:  
…this paper has significance for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
practitioners.  This paper offers the non-Aboriginal practitioner information 
on principles and values that guide ethical (and appropriate) practice in an 
Aboriginal context and/or when interacting with and working with 
Aboriginal people.  I would encourage non-Aboriginal practitioners to very 
carefully consider the matters raised in this paper and urge them to 
critically reflect on possible boundaries and limitations for their own 
practice when working in cross-cultural contexts (Oxenham, 2000: 2-3). 
 
My concern is that there is no corresponding body of literature theorising the 
implications of such requests by the invader/settler community.   
 
In advocating anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality, I demonstrate 
how I am able to move through ‘whiteness’ towards ‘non-Aboriginality’.  An  
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example of what I mean here can be found in my argument for ‘naming non-
Aboriginality’, which I pursue in Chapter Four.  In part, this borrows from the 
idea that we can name whiteness in order to expose its supposed normativity and 
neutrality as manifestations of power.  However, I also note that ‘naming’ is an 
Indigenist epistemological priority, and serves to assert Indigenous ways of 
knowing land, people, places and events.  Therefore, naming non-Aboriginality 
serves as a counterpoint to naming whiteness, an affirmation of Indigenous 
knowledges as it manifests through Indigenous ontological relationships with 
land, and non-Indigenous responsibilities to this knowledge and ontological 
relationship.  I also argue that legitimising the belongings of the invader/settler 
society is dependent on respectful observation of Indigenous knowledge and 
ontological relationships with land.   
 
Beyond the broad insights I am able to bring to this thesis because of whiteness 
studies, I also argue contemporary discourses of whiteness and belonging 
continue to operate within colonialist paradigms and they reinscribe and 
perpetuate pre-determined ideological structures.  In general terms, I argue 
critical whiteness studies (re)centres whiteness because it relies on the pre-given 
binary relationship between white and black.  Concomitant to this is the 
maintenance of the hierarchialised relationship between white and black.  
Additionally, because white and black are key signifiers within the overall 
discourse of race, this outdated and fallacious mode of taxonomy is kept in play.  
Consequently, both whiteness and blackness retain their status as signifiers for 
Aboriginality and non-Aboriginality respectively.  This compromises recognising 
the cultural affiliations of Aboriginal people who are ‘cosmetically white’, their  
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experiences of cultural racism and Aboriginal peoples’ use of ‘strategic 
whiteness’.  I develop this argument below, and again in Chapter Two. 
 
In Chapter Two, I focus my critique of whiteness with reference to the American 
anti-whiteness movement, the New Race Abolitionists.  I argue the New Race 
Abolitionists make a useful case study for a number of interconnected reasons.  
Firstly, unlike other forays into whiteness, New Race Abolitionists offer both a 
theorisation of, and methodology for, anti-whiteness.  Secondly, Australian work 
in critical whiteness studies is informed by American scholarship and self-
identified Abolitionists have been invited as keynote speakers at Australian 
whiteness conferences.  For example, David Roediger, an Abolitionist, presented 
a keynote paper at the Whiteness and the Horizons of Race conference in 
Brisbane, 2005. In focusing on the New Race Abolitionists as a case study, I 
highlight the pitfalls of mimicking processes of academic inquiry without first 
scrutinising its applicability in the Australian context.  I argue that while the New 
Race Abolitionists assert a radical, anti-whiteness agenda, their particular modus 
operandi produces several worrying outcomes that are antithetical to the anti-
colonial objectives of this thesis. I argue New Race Abolitionism negates 
Aboriginal strategic interventions into whiteness; essentialises Aboriginality and 
non-Aboriginality as blackness and whiteness respectively; undermines the 
original objectives of reconciliation and in so doing supports the most punitive 
features of ‘practical reconciliation’; and, prevents meaningful dialogic 
relationships with Aboriginal people because it advocates dialogic relationships 
between anti-whiteness and pro-white groups. 
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In Chapter Three, I focus on contemporary discourses of belonging in Australia.  
By way of revealing the operation and function of colonialist ideologies within 
these discourses, I shape my discussion around a number of key texts, including 
Germaine Greer’s
9 Whitefella Jump Up: The Shortest Way to Nationhood (2003); 
Peter Read’s
10 Belonging: Australians, Place and Aboriginal Ownership (2000); 
Anthony Moran’s
11 As Australia Decolonizes: Indigenizing Settler Nationalism 
and the Challenges of Settler/Indigenous Relations (2002); John Moloney’s
12 
The Native Born: The First White Australians (2000); and, David Tacey’s
13 Edge 
of the Sacred: Transformation in Australia (1998a).  In my exploration of these 
texts, I identify several recurring themes.  I argue that within these texts, 
Aboriginality is appropriated in order to appease anxieties about settler 
belongings; negate the experience of colonisation by repositioning white 
Australians as the dispossessed and by continuing to employ colonialist 
constructions of Aboriginality that lock Aboriginal people into a cultural stasis, 
emphasizing pre-colonial primordiality. 
 
                                                 
9 Germaine Greer is best well known for her 1970 publication The Female Eunuch and is 
regarded by some as one of the most significant feminist voices of the 20
th century.  She is an ex-
pat Australian and a retired academic.  Her last academic post was as Professor in the Department 
of English Literature at the University of Warwick. 
10 Professor Peter Read is an historian and works at the National Centre for Indigenous Studies at 
the Australian National University.  In the 1980’s, Professor Read worked in collaboration with 
Coral Edwards to bring the story of the stolen generations to mainstream public attention and was 
instrumental in the formation of the organisation ‘Link Up’, reuniting members of the stolen 
generations with their families.  Professor Read works extensively with oral histories, and has 
published widely in Australian/Aboriginal histories. 
11 Anthony Moran is a Lecturer in sociology at La Trobe University.  His research interests 
include Australian political culture, Indigenous politics, multiculturalism, ethnicity and race, and 
globalisation.  
12 John Moloney is a former priest.  He began his association with the Australian National 
University in 1964.  He has held the Manning Clark Chair in Australian history and on his 
retirement in 1990, the ANU appointed Moloney as an Emeritus Professor of History.  He has 
also held the positions of Keith Cameron Professorship of Australian History at University 
College, Dublin and the Foundation Research Professorship at the Australian Catholic University 
in Canberra. 
13 David Tacey lectures at La Trobe University in Jungian and post-Jungian theory, masculinity, 
literature and theory concerned with the sacred and ecopsychology.  
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In Chapter Four, I develop my notion of ‘creating the non-Aboriginal subject’.  I 
position this as an anti-colonial response to the discursive problems I identify 
within critical whiteness studies and ‘belonging’.  In this chapter, I argue the 
creation of the non-Aboriginal self is an integrated three-part process that 
necessitates recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginality; naming the ontology 
as ‘non-Aboriginal’; and, defining non-Aboriginality as an anti-colonial process 
of identity formation.  I argue non-Aboriginality is formed out of a profound 
awareness of being in Aboriginal Sovereignty and in relationship with 
Indigenous people as Sovereign subjects.  As an anti-colonial process of identity 
formation, I conceive non-Aboriginality as a political identity that rejects claims 
to white sovereignty and white Indigeneity as a means to legitimate belonging in 
Australia; denies the validity of whiteness and blackness as a means to assign 
cultural affiliations; truthfully recognizes and responds to the dispossession and 
disenfranchisement of Aboriginal people; affirms Indigenous peoples’ legitimate 
grievances and claims to social justice and human rights; and, moreover, 
understands that that invader/settler Australians’ legitimate belonging is 
contingent on all of the above occurring. 
 
Finally, by way of ‘giving voice’ to my understanding of anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality, I include a thirty-minute radio documentary 
featuring interviews with ‘non-Aboriginal’ people. 
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Contextualising the Aims of the Thesis, Part Two: Struggling with 
‘Post-colonial’ Belonging 
White Australians’ ‘belonging’ (so named after a well known book published by 
historian Peter Read, 2000) became a salient social and academic concern 
towards the end of the 20
th century.  Perhaps not surprisingly, contemporary 
manifestations of non-Aboriginal Australians’ nervousness about the status of 
their/our belonging began to emerge in 1988, around the bicentenary 
‘celebration’ (of a nation!) and Aboriginal protests demanding recognition of the 
initial invasion and the depth of insult felt by its glorified re-enactment.  
Reinvigorated demands for the recognition of land rights and human rights by 
Aboriginal people was a direct response to this imperialist pageantry (see for 
example, Australia Daze, circa 1988; Turner, 1994: 66-92; Hodge and Mishra, 
1991: ix-x, Macintyre, 2004: 93-118).  
 
More specifically though, this nervousness coincided with the 1992 Mabo 
decision, which overturned the myth of terra nullius and allowed for the 
potential recognition of Indigenous property rights, and the issues raised for 
mainstream Australians within the reconciliation agenda during the 1990’s.  
Indeed, recognising “the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples as the original owners and custodians of lands and waters”, which were 
“… settled as colonies without treaty or consent” (Australian Declaration 
Towards Reconciliation, 2000: online) was always going to present a profound 
challenge for Australians. Why wouldn’t it, when most of us grew up learning 
the paradoxical (if not schizophrenic) lesson that Aboriginal people were not  
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here/were here but died out/are here but are not real Aborigines/were and are 
here and are the first Australians, or any configuration thereof.   
 
Ostensibly, ‘belonging’, as a field of inquiry explores (if not resolves) the “moral 
implications of recognising the depth of attachment felt by settler Australians to 
an invaded land” (Bonyhady and Griffiths, 2002: 9). On a psychological level, 
reckoning with ‘belonging’ compels ‘settler’ Australians to acknowledge the fact 
of violent invasion and Aboriginal dispossession.  It asks us to consider the 
legitimacy of our occupation of land in the light of these facts, and think through 
their implications for co-existence with Aboriginal people.   
 
On an emotional level, ‘belonging’ also affirms ‘settler’ Australians’ love of 
land.  On one hand, claiming this love speaks to the very real feelings ‘settler’ 
Australians have for the places they/we call home (Carey, 2004: 22).  To speak 
of loving the land asserts our belonging to the land: being in and of the land we 
love.  However, to speak of loving the land can also constitute a way of speaking 
back to the primacy of Aboriginal spiritual and sacred relationships with the 
land, and the way this informs their respective ontologies.  As Gelder
14 and 
Jacobs
15 observe, the recognition of Aboriginal property rights, alongside the 
recognition of their sacred belonging to the land, produces a deeply disturbing 
effect for many white Australians
16.  They write: 
                                                 
14 Ken Gelder teaches in the English Department at the University of Melbourne.  His research 
interests include contemporary and colonial fiction, post-colonial studies and cultural studies. 
15 Jane Jacobs is Professor of Geosciences at the University of Edinburgh.  Her research interests 
include post-colonialism, Indigenous rights and identity, race and racism and the cultural politics 
of urban space. 
16 While I take Gelder and Jacobs’ point, I also argue they overestimate the ‘property rights’ that 
accrue to Aboriginal people as a consequence of the Mabo decision.  Under the Native Title Act 
(1993), The potential for ‘property rights’ only occurs when Aboriginal people are able to 
demonstrate unbroken and sacred belonging to their country in non-Aboriginal courts.  Just as  
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…when modern Aboriginal people have spiritual beliefs and property 
rights…a certain form of resentment materialises.  Aboriginal people 
become the same as non-Aboriginal people in that they, too, are identified 
through property…. But they also have more than non-Aboriginal people in 
that this identification is premised upon spiritual beliefs, which secular non-
Aboriginal people now lack.  The entanglement of spiritual beliefs and 
property rights within a modern Aboriginal framework gives those property 
rights an intensity that secularised non-Aboriginal people simply cannot lay 
claim to (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 64).  
 
I argue that ‘belonging’, as it is articulated in this context, is to speak of an 
intangible, omnipresent and immeasurable connection to ‘country’ that 
supposedly equates to Indigenous connections to their sacred and spiritual places.  
It is a way of legitimatising our relationship to land, of making our belonging as 
legitimate as any Indigenous claim to sacred belonging.  Peter Read refers to this 
in his analysis of white Australian country music and belonging.  He writes “the 
once implied and now explicit Aboriginal moral claim to the land perhaps is 
being answered, not by contentious or aggressive assertion, but by a statement of 
countering values” (2000: 117), including love of land, working the land and the 
masculine bonds of mateship cultivated through working the land.  As Read 
explains:   
Attachment is being born out of labour; the harder the labour, the greater is 
the implied right of attachment…. In contemporary country and western 
songs, the right to work confers, or generates, the right to belong…. (2000: 
118-119).   
 
The significance of Read’s observations is underscored in a number of ways.  
Firstly, it invokes the binary of settler/employed/hard working and 
Aboriginal/unemployed/lazy and, through this valorises the white, masculine 
                                                 
courts have the power to recognize Native Title, they can also find that Native Title no longer 
exists in the area when Native Title is being claimed.  This may be because traditional owners are 
not able to satisfy the criteria for ongoing connection to country or because other types of 
property title take precedence over Native Title.   
  24 
version of loving land over Aboriginal spiritual relationships with the land.  This, 
in turn, places Aboriginal labour outside Australian economic development. 
 
Secondly, Read’s analysis speaks to the primacy of a specific rural, Anglo-
Australian masculinity that is the embodiment of quintessential Australian values 
such as mateship, a fair go and egalitarianism.  In contrast, Andrew Lattas’ 
analysis of Redneck Thought: Racism, Guilt and Aborigines (2001) reveals that 
contemporary, populist notions of egalitarianism works to ‘disembody’ 
Aboriginal people, preventing them from expressing their Aboriginality in 
corporeal terms
17. In Australia, egalitarianism is configured to stand for 
sameness, as opposed to equality in difference. When Aboriginal people assert 
their difference through their Aboriginality, using their  “bodies as the site of 
their identities, culture and history” (Lattas, 2001: 108), populist articulations of 
egalitarianism repositions Aboriginal people as racists, and as violators of the 
“moral norm of equality” (Lattas, 2001: 107).  As such, populist notions of 
egalitarianism demand a denial of Aboriginality and a silencing of Aboriginal 
peoples’ experiences of racism and discrimination.  This is the process of 
disembodiment. As Lattas writes:  
The moral imperative that everyone be equal before the law operates to 
deny specific histories, circumstances and forms of suffering.  This new 
disembodied form of ‘racism as equality’ demands that minorities leave out 
the history of their suffering bodies from the field of public debate.  Indeed 
when Aborigines dare to mention their suffering and suggest they be 
compensated, they are denounced as threatening to keep alive the very 
biological categories that have oppressed them (2001: 109). 
 
                                                 
17 While Lattas’ argument in productive in this context, I am also mindful that ‘colloquial’ 
expressions of reconciliation have employed the language of egalitarianism and a ‘fair go’.  That 
is, reconciliation is conceptualised and articulated within a nationalistic discourse of 
egalitarianism.    
  25 
In extension to Lattas, I also argue that the process of negating Aboriginal 
peoples’ rights to assert their Aboriginality is a way of rendering Aboriginal 
people un-Australian – or, non-Australian – fundamentally challenging their right 
to ‘belong’.  In corollary then, I argue that it perpetuates the myth of terra 
nullius; supports the notion of white sovereignty; and, protects white Australian 
claims to Indigeneity
18. 
 
In this sense then, ‘belonging’ does not address the moral implications of living 
in an invaded land.  It negates these concerns by refiguring and re-centring white 
proprietorial-ship over land and re/claiming white Indigeneity at the expense of 
Aboriginal people. Thus, this critique reveals the intimate links between the 
power of whiteness and belonging.  It indicates that white claims to belonging 
can be understood as claims for white sovereignty over Aboriginal Sovereignty 
as Aboriginal Sovereign rights continue to be displaced, rendered a marginal 
claim from a minority group challenging the authority of the self-appointed white 
indigenes. In short, it reveals the link between whiteness and belonging as a 
potent combination in the (re)colonisation of Aboriginal bodies and land.  This 
critique is the cornerstone of my discussion in Chapters Two and Three. 
 
In claiming non-Indigeneity as a marker for identity for non-Aboriginal people, I 
am clearly seeking to decentre the means by which non-Aboriginal people 
construct their epistemological and ontological relationships with Aboriginal 
people and their land and bring these relationships into a more equitable 
discursive realm.  This necessarily requires working within anti-colonial 
                                                 
18 Here I am developing a point previously made in “From Whiteness to Whitefella: Challenging 
White Race Power in Australia” (Carey, 2004: 17).  
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theoretical frameworks and making critical interconnections with Indigenist 
epistemologies and research approaches.  In the first instance, I draw on 
Rigney’s
19 argument that Indigenist research is emancipatory for Indigenous 
people because it liberates them from colonialist ontologies and epistemologies 
(Rigney, 1999: 114-115).  Similarly, I argue that non-Indigenous people also 
need to liberate our/themselves from colonialist knowledges and ways of 
interacting with Aboriginal people and their land and articulate a concomitant 
anti-colonial, non-Indigenous theory and praxis.  This discussion is pursued 
below, in my elaboration on the broad theoretical context for this thesis.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
In the following section, I discuss the overarching theoretical framework for this 
thesis. I establish my theoretical position with a brief critique of post-colonialism 
and propose that Langton’s notion of anti-colonialism provides a more 
productive theoretical site for thinking through constructions of non-
Aboriginality.  I subsequently move to Lester-Irabinna Rigney’s consideration of 
Langton’s work on anti-colonialism and the ways this informs Indigenist 
research paradigms.  This, I argue, provides a critical launching place for anti-
colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality because it goes to the heart of 
producing epistemologies that challenge colonialist constructions of identity, of 
both ‘Others’ and ourselves.  While I acknowledge I am limited by the fact that 
there are no overt ‘non-Indigenist’ theoretical frameworks to draw on, the non-
                                                 
19 Lester Irabinna Rigney is an Associate Professor in Education and works for the Yunggorendi 
First Nation Centre for Higher Education at Flinders University in South Australia.  Associate 
Professor Rigney is from the Ngarrindjeri Nations and his research interests include Indigenous 
knowledges and research methodologies, Indigenous education and languages and their 
relationship with reconciliation and Treaty processes.  
  27 
Indigenous ‘sensibility’ evident in the work of writers such as Kathryn Trees 
informs the construction of my theoretical paradigm.  Like Trees,  
…I find myself being critical of the term postcolonial particularly for its 
capacity to be divisive and conservative, to theorise the political but 
maintain a distance from political praxis, rather than being conciliatory and 
transformative.  As might be expected the term is productive for some, 
particularly academics working within literary and cultural studies, and less 
productive and even inhibiting for others, in particular many indigenous 
people (Trees, 1998: 11). 
 
Thus, I argue that in moving beyond the “divisive and conservative” limitations 
of post-colonial theory, we need to move into both a theoretical and political 
discursive realm that supports the epistemological and political aspirations of 
Indigenous people, and simultaneously defines the intersecting ontological, 
epistemological and political responsibilities of non-Indigenous people towards 
Indigenous people. 
 
 
To begin however, I acknowledge that the existing corpus of postcolonial work is 
significant to this thesis in that it represents a ‘starting point’ to the dialogue in 
which I now participate.  ‘Post-colonialism’ facilitates a move between colonial 
and anti-colonial theory and praxis. For example, the theoretical framework for 
this thesis is, in large part, informed by Edward Said’s
20 seminal text Orientalism 
(1985).  Also, Bain Attwood’s
21 discussion on ‘Aboriginalism’, which is a tribute 
to Said’s Orientalism, and post-Aboriginalism, which gives Aboriginalism its 
post-colonial spin, provides an important segue into my discussion on anti-
colonialism.   
 
                                                 
20 Edward Said is regarded as a founder of post-colonial theory. 
21 Bain Attwood teaches at the School of Historical Studies at Monash University.  His research 
interests include Australian and New Zealand Indigenous history, cross-cultural history and 
history and memory.  
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Further, I also acknowledge that without the critical and imaginative work of 
post-colonial thinkers, moving from the colonial towards the anti-colonial would 
lack the creative and analytical input of both the coloniser and the colonised, and 
respective ways of representing their/our being in the world and theorising the 
power relationships between us.  Literature positioned within a post-colonial 
paradigm provides the tools to examine the construction of Indigenous, 
disasporic and non-Indigenous identities as they are produced within the nexus of 
colonial/postcolonial theoretical, social, cultural and political movements.  
Indeed, the broad purview of post-colonialism identifies and affirms the tensions 
these complex identity formation processes produce, and speaks to the affiliated 
struggles for social, cultural and political power and legitimacy.  
 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin argue, post-colonialism is a productive theoretical 
and discursive space, where Indigenous people articulate their specific interests, 
viewpoints and experiences vis-à-vis colonialist knowledges produced on and 
about them.  They write:  
… ‘post-colonial theory’ has existed for a long time before that particular 
name was used to describe it.  Once colonised peoples had cause to reflect 
on and express the tension which ensued from this problematic and 
contested, but eventually vibrant and powerful mixture of imperial 
language and local experience, postcolonial ‘theory’ came into being 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffen, 1997: 1).  
 
 
According to Ashcroft et al, post-colonialism is innately connected to the idea of 
Indigenous people ‘writing back to the empire’ and is empowering for 
Indigenous people because post-colonialism does not exist without the inclusion 
of Indigenous viewpoints and experiences.  In this sense then, post-colonialism  
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provides a discursive space to speak back to and seek redress for the imbalances 
of power inherent in colonialist discourse. 
 
Alternatively, other post-colonial texts problematise the impact of Indigenous 
incursions into colonialist knowledge paradigms on the formation of settler 
identities in colonised societies.  For example, in Chapter Three of this thesis, I 
draw on Terry Goldie’s
22 The Representation of the Indigene (1997); Hodge
23 
and Mishra’s
24 notion of the ‘Bastard Complex’, developed in their 1991 text 
Dark Side of the Dream: Australian Literature and the Postcolonial Mind; and, 
Gelder and Jacobs’ Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a 
Postcolonial Nation (1998).  These texts provide the critical framework for my 
engagement with the appropriation of Aboriginality by invader/settler societies in 
order to appease the anxieties of invader/settler belongings. 
 
In Chapter Four, I also work with Homi Bhabha’s
25 post-colonial notion of the 
‘third space’ to identify useful conceptual differences between his position, and 
that of Marcia Langton who, writing within an anti-colonial framework, 
identifies a third domain as a dialogic space shared by both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people, where anti-colonial representations of Aboriginality are 
produced.  As I problematise my way out of Bhabha’s third space towards 
Langton’s third domain, I argue anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality 
are also produced in a dialogic space shared by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
                                                 
22 Terry Goldie teaches comparative Indigenous literature at York University in Canada and 
researches in post-colonial literature, gay studies, literary theory and drama. 
23 Bob Hodge is a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and his scholarship in 
cultural studies is internationally recognised.  He teaches at the University of Western Sydney. 
24 Professor Vijay Mishra teaches at Murdoch university in English and Comparative Literature. 
25 Homi Bhabha is considered one of the world’s most influential scholars in post-colonial and 
cultural studies.  He has written and lectured on race, gender, culture and the arts.  
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people.  As I conclude this chapter, I draw on the work of Paul Spoonley
26 and 
Farida Tilbury
27, both of whom situate their work in a post-colonial framework, 
to ‘flesh out’ my conceptualisation of anti-colonial constructions of non-
Aboriginality as a political identity. 
 
For me, however, the broad criticisms of post-colonialism are salient ones. Some 
argue that post-colonial discourse is produced out of the logic of colonialist 
knowledge paradigms, and it therefore repeats, rather than disrupts, colonial 
power relations.  Indeed, the presumption that post-colonialism enables 
Indigenous people to speak to the colonialist centre from the periphery, 
privileges the centredness of colonialist discourse and continues the 
disenfranchised position of Indigenous people and perspectives. Therefore, the 
observation that post-colonialism perpetuates the very epistemic violence it seeks 
to disavow is a pertinent one.  
 
Also, others point out that the very notion of ‘post’-colonialism is misleading, a 
discursive obfuscation to the ongoing reality of colonial power relations.  
Imbedded in this critique is a notion that “orientating theory around the temporal 
axis of colonial-postcolonial makes it easier not to see and therefore harder to 
theorize continuities in… imbalances of power” (McLintock, cited from 
Delaney, 1997: 13-14).   
 
                                                 
26 Paul Spoonley teaches as Massey University in New Zealand.  His research areas include neo-
fascism, anti-Semitism, Pakeha identity, Maori development, racism and ethnicity. 
27 Farida Tilbury lectures in sociology at Murdoch University.  Her research interests include race 
and ethnicity, health and medicine and discourse analysis.  
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Indeed, Alice Nannup’s
28 response to an invitation to speak at the “Postcolonial 
Fictions Conference” in Fremantle, Western Australia, in 1992, illustrates this 
point.  The conference, ostensibly named to “problematise the term 
‘postcolonial’”, elicited short shrift from Mrs Nannup:  “My work is not fiction 
but perhaps postcolonialsim is” (Trees, 1998: 109-110).  While clever academic 
double entendres may appeal to those within a specific community of interest, 
this literal interpretation by Mrs Nannup reveals how confronting, if not 
insulting, misnomers like post-colonialism can be to Indigenous people.  Indeed, 
in the unequivocal view of the Indigenous delegates who participated at the 
conference (both Indigenous Australian and Maori), post-colonialism is a white, 
academic fiction that oppresses, rather than liberates Aboriginal viewpoints and 
voices (Trees, 1998: 110).  
 
In my view, post-colonial theorists’ attempts to deal with such critiques have 
been less than convincing.  They fail to take account of the central critique 
offered by Indigenous people, preferring to direct their focus on reconfiguring 
the meaning of post in post-colonial.  For example, Gelder and Jacobs (1998) 
deal with post-colonialism as an expression of linear historical and political time 
by re-conceiving it as an exploration of specific tensions, which arise out of 
unequal power relations that are distinctively post-colonial. That is, they argue 
that Australia has passed through colonialism, and that current inequalities 
experienced by Indigenous people are consequently ‘postcolonial’.  As such, 
post-colonialism does not represent a time where the inequalities of colonialism 
have ended, or where Indigenous responses to colonial power have ceased to be 
                                                 
28 Alice Nannup was born in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.  One of the stolen 
generations, her life story, When the Pelican Laughed, is written in conjunction with Stephen 
Kinnane and Lauren Marsh (2000) (first published in 1992).  
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necessary.  Rather, post-colonialism identifies that while inequality remains, its 
particular causes, manifestations and expressions are unique to the particular 
anxieties of the times, and change to protect the interests of the dominant group.  
Accordingly, the challenges and strategies devised by Indigenous people to 
defend themselves will also change (see, for example, Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 
17 and 24; Curthoys, 2000: 32).   
 
My point is then, while post-colonial theory ‘accommodates’ Indigenous 
viewpoints, it is not easily swayed by them. By absorbing Indigenous critiques of 
the post-colonial back into post-coloniality, post-colonialism is revealed as 
another colonising ideological practice, colonising the views and self-
representations of Indigenous people to serve the purpose of its own redemption 
narrative.  Is it any wonder then that some Indigenous people argue (however 
facetiously) that the ‘post-colonial tension’ can only be resolved once the 
‘colonisers have gone home’ (see Sykes, cited in Trees 1998: 110 and Smith, 
2001: 98; also see Millard, citied in Curthoys, 2000: 32). 
 
As I understand it, Indigenous calls for the ‘colonisers to go home’ serves two 
purposes.  On the one hand, it points to the dangers of universalising the 
applicability of post-colonial literature produced in and about countries where the 
colonisers did ‘go home’, to the Australian situation.  On the other, it is a 
rhetorical devise that speaks to the non-Indigenous anxiety of having ‘nowhere 
else to go’, which of course is linked to the broader post-colonial discourse of 
‘belonging’ I discussed earlier.  As such, the threat of ‘exile’ (see Curthoys, 
1999) is a strategic one, working to succinctly reinforce the legitimacy of  
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Indigenous Sovereignty and to destabilise white sovereignty claims.  However, 
there is also a level at which this ‘speaking back’ belies the many layers of 
interconnectedness between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, some of 
which exist in the intimate and private domain of the family.  As Wendy Brady
29 
writes:  
…we are assumed to seek the removal from this country of all people who 
are not indigenous.  Yet if this were true I would have to see my very close 
sister-in-law taken away from me; I would have to see some of my aunties 
and uncles taken away from me; I would have to see one of my 
grandparents removed.  What an absolute joke this idea is (1999: 30).  
 
In a country where the destruction of families is understood as a treacherous 
mechanism of colonial control, I must confess that even the most spurious 
suggestion that families be further torn apart makes little sense to me.  It is my 
view that this position (unintentionally) buys into the colonialist logic of 
segregation and miscegenation, and denies the reality of the many ways 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ lives are entwined.   
 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith
30 also makes the point that the rapid departure of the settler 
society does not automatically result in decolonisation:  
And, even when they have left formally, the institutions and legacy of 
colonialism have remained.  Decolonization, once viewed as the formal 
process of handing over the instruments of government, is now recognized 
as a long term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic, and 
psychological divesting of colonial power (2001: 98). 
 
My point here is that it is not necessarily either the absence or the presence of the 
invader/settler society that determines successful anti-colonial outcomes, but 
                                                 
29 Professor Wendy Brady is from the Wiradjiri Nation and is the Head of School for Australian 
Indigenous Knowledge systems at Charles Darwin University. 
30 Linda Tuhiwai Smith is Associate Professor of Maori Education and director of the 
International Research institute for Maori and Indigenous Studies at the University of Auckland, 
New Zealand.  She has international standing as a leader in decolonising Indigenous knowledges.  
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rather the ways both Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities and peoples 
collaborate to produce a genuinely anti-colonial outcome.  Of course, this 
includes, but is not limited to, the ways we set about undermining the legitimacy 
of colonialist ideologies in informing the ways we relate to and ‘know’ each 
other, discarding claims to white sovereignty, affirming Indigenous Sovereignty 
and establishing a meaningful basis to co-existence. Indeed, as Marcia Langton
31 
notes with reference to the High Court’s Mabo decision (arguably a milestone 
achievement in terms of realising anti-colonial outcomes in Australia):  
Mabo has put to rest two gross fantasies.  Firstly it has put to rest the 
fantasy that the blacks were not and are still not here.  The fantasy of terra 
and homo nullius.  Secondly, Mabo also puts to rest the fantasy that the 
whites are somehow going to pack up and leave. Co-existence remains our 
lot (2002: 86, emphasis added).   
 
 
In this light, Langton’ s proposal that we must begin to think and act in anti-
colonial ways offers an important alternative for working through strategies for 
dealing with the vestiges of colonialism.  As Anne Hamilton writes: 
While the concept of the post-colonial has become fashionable of late, 
Marcia Langton’s insistence on an anti-colonial perspective changes the 
usual terrain.  An anti-colonial stance requires above all a practical 
commitment to the political consequences of representation.  Anti-
colonialism requires a rupture and positive awareness of the way colonial 
representation has shaped, and misshaped, reality for coloniser and 
colonised alike (c.f.  Langton, 1993: 5). 
 
According to Langton, the purpose of anti-colonial theory is to uncover ways to 
“decolonise our minds” (and institutions) and to undermine “the colonial 
hegemony” (Langton, 1993: 8, also see Smith, 2001: 98 and Rigney, 1999: 110-
111). 
                                                 
31 Marcia Langton is the foundation Professor for Australian Indigenous Studies at Melbourne 
University and is one of Australian’s leading public intellectuals.   Professor Langton has had a 
long career in Aboriginal Affairs and has published extensively on a range of topics including 
(but not limited to) agreement making with Indigenous people; Indigenous culture; media; Treaty 
processes; Indigenous art; and, native title and land rights.    
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In this spirit, Lester Irabinna Rigney, utilises anti-colonial theory to provide a 
critical underpinning for Indigenist knowledge production and political praxis. 
His primary concern is with the construction of Indigenist knowledge within the 
academy, and as such, focuses on the need for Indigenist research methodologies, 
however, he firmly locates the development and promotion of Indigenist work 
within broader, community based political aspirations. He explains this as 
follows: 
The cultural assumptions throughout the dominant epistemologies in 
Australia are oblivious of Indigenous traditions and concerns.  The research 
academy and its epistemologies have been constructed essentially for and 
by non-Indigenous Australians.  Indigenous Australians have been 
excluded from all facets of research.  The process of racialization declared 
that my people’s minds, intellect, knowledges, histories, and experiences 
were irrelevant…[therefore]…Indigenous peoples must look to new anti-
colonial epistemologies and methodologies to construct, rediscover and/or 
reaffirm their knowledges and cultures.  Such epistemologies must 
represent the aspirations of Indigenous Australians and carry within them 
the potential to strengthen the struggle for emancipation and liberation from 
oppression (Rigney, 1999: 113-114).
32  
 
Rigney identifies three central, interconnected elements to Indigenist research.  
Firstly, Indigenist epistemologies must resist colonialist knowledges on and 
about Indigenous people by dealing with the history of genocide, telling the story 
of survival, uncovering continuing forms of oppression and supporting the 
ongoing struggles of Indigenous individuals and communities (1999: 116-117).  
Secondly, Indigenist research must have political integrity and give primacy to 
                                                 
32 In broad terms, I take Rigney’s point, however, I am also mindful that Indigenous people have 
not been excluded from ‘all facets of research’, because Indigenous people have most certainly 
been the ‘objects’ of research  to such an extent that it is not uncommon to hear Indigenous 
people say ‘we are the most researched people on Earth’.  I agree though, that being an object of 
research does not necessarily equate to a validation of Indigenous peoples’ ‘minds, intellect, 
knowledge, histories, and experiences’ (Rigney, see above).  I am also mindful that despite the 
marginalised position of Indigenous scholars within the academy there are an increasing number 
of Indigenous people with post-graduate qualifications, who teach in universities and have their 
work published within academic journals and other texts. Thus, Indigenous scholarship does pose 
important challenges to Western epistemologies of the Indigenous ‘Other’.  
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the work produced by Indigenous researchers.  Moreover, research imperatives 
must be grounded in, informed by and responsive to the ongoing political 
struggle of Indigenous people (1999: 117).  Thirdly, Indigenist research must 
privilege Indigenous voices in a holistic sense.  Not only is the research 
performed by Indigenous researchers, it is informed by Indigenous participants 
“whose goals are to serve and inform the Indigenous struggle for self-
determination” (Rigney, 1999: 118). 
 
While Rigney clearly defines a broad anti-colonial Indigenist research agenda for 
Indigenous people, there is a danger that anti-colonial Indigenist research 
practices and concomitant epistemologies can be absorbed into, or conflated 
within a post-colonial framework.  As such, Rigney’s offering would be reduced 
to an articulation of post-colonial tensions, rather than the emancipatory vision it 
purports to be.  What I am suggesting here, is that post-colonial paradigms 
potentially contain anti-colonial visions rather than support their liberationist 
goals.  In this light then, I argue we respond to Rigney’s charge that “[t]here is 
little evidence that research epistemologies and methodologies in Australia” are 
informed by Indigenous people and knowledges “or that it was produced from 
presumed equals” (1999: 113) by positioning the construction of non-Indigenous 
identities within our own anti-colonial paradigms.  This necessitates producing 
our own anti-colonial epistemological frameworks; using these to inform the 
construction of anti-colonial identities; and, shaping our own anti-colonial 
political outcomes that are consistent with Aboriginal peoples’ political and 
cultural aspirations.  
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In making this proposition, I am following up on Hamilton’s observation (above) 
that “colonial representation [of Indigenous people] has shaped, and misshaped, 
reality for coloniser and colonised alike” and recognise that undermining the 
“colonial hegemony” requires parallel interventions from those who benefit from 
the power relationships produced within colonialist epistemologies. As Tilbury 
notes, the subversion of the colonial project necessitates “an examination of the 
position, privileges and identity of the dominant group and the role which they 
have played in the process of oppression” (2000: 77).  This insight is important.  
It reminds us that anti-colonial dissertations require a conscious recognition of 
the subjectivities of the dominant group. That is, if we cannot locate our 
subjectivities within the theory we have little scope for developing a framework 
for anti-colonial praxis.  Therefore, we must identify a process of identity 
formation that is antithetical to the processes of identity formation linked with 
colonisation and moreover, enables the performance of identity in ways that do 
not rely on racialised systems of domination/subordination.  To this end, I 
conceive non-Aboriginality as existing in relationship with ‘Aboriginality,’ not 
in opposition, thus indicating the first step towards creating a disjunction 
between the usual paradigms that inform self/other binaries.  I develop this point 
below. 
 
An Anti-Colonial Theory for Whitefellas: Making non-Aboriginality 
Anti-Colonial 
In this section, I extrapolate on the anti-colonial theoretical framework for this 
thesis to explain the formation of anti-colonial identities for non-Aboriginal 
people.  I begin with a discussion on the self-serving function of colonialist  
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constructions of ‘Aboriginality’ in formulating the ‘not Aboriginal’
33 self and 
concomitant power relations.  To begin this discussion, I draw broadly on the 
work of Edward Said, and his seminal text Orientalism (1985). In exploring the 
application of his work to the Australian context, I refer to the Australian 
historian, Bain Attwood, and his work on Aboriginalism and post-Aboriginalism 
(1992)
34.  Indeed, Attwood’s work on post-Aboriginalism provides a critical 
point of entry into discussing the productivity of meaningful intercultural 
dialogues in generating non-Aboriginal subjectivities.  However, I also identify 
limitations in Attwood’s conceptualisation of post-Aboriginalism and argue that 
it reproduces the broader limitations of post-colonial theory I discussed earlier.  
While post-Aboriginalism acknowledges the ‘right’ of Aboriginal incursions into 
colonialist (here, Aboriginalist) modes of knowledge production, it ultimately 
produces a conservative outcome, facilitating invader/settler claims to 
Indigeneity.   
 
To expand this discussion, I also draw on Moreton-Robinson’s analysis of post-
Aboriginalism, particularly her criticism that Attwood fails to identify the 
‘whiteness’ of the European group (2004).  Moreton-Robinson argues that unless 
we recognise the white race privilege of the European group, post-Aboriginalism 
merely reinscribes the power relations inherent in Aboriginalist modes of 
knowledge production and therefore offers no meaningful way forward for either 
                                                 
33 In this section, where I use the term ‘not Aboriginal’, or ‘not Indigenous’, I am not referring to 
people, but rather pointing to the ways Aboriginality serves to create a symbolic boundary 
between those who may be included as either Aboriginal or not Aboriginal.  Thus ‘not 
Aboriginal’ speaks to this boundary.  I make this distinction because in this thesis I use the term 
‘non-Aboriginal’ as a political mode of self-identification to be used by ‘non-Aboriginal people’ 
who perceive their identity in relationship with Aboriginal people as Sovereign beings.  
34 Vijay Mishra first used the term ‘Aboriginalism’ in 1987. Hodge and Mishra (1990) also make 
use of Said’s Orientalism to describe ‘Aboriginalism’ in their working of the ‘bastard complex’.  
I refer to this in Chapter Three.  
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Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal people.  On the face of it, I concur with Moreton-
Robinson’s position, however, I also suggest in focusing only on whiteness, we 
re-centre whiteness as the pivotal site of knowledge production and enquiry.  
Thus, I argue that overcoming these limitations necessitates searching out an 
alternative premise to both undermining the power of whiteness and, in corollary, 
constructing anti-colonial models of non-Aboriginality.  With this in mind, I turn 
to Indigenist knowledge producing paradigms and modes of investigation.  I 
argue that Indigenist epistemologies not only dislodge the primacy of whiteness 
as a site and mode of investigation, it brings into the centre an alternative 
paradigm based on Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies and axiologies.  Non-
Aboriginality then, is a process of identity formation that is negotiated within this 
alternative site.  Moreover, it is within this site that anti-colonial constructions of 
non-Aboriginality can be envisioned. 
 
Kathryn Trees writes “…all Australians, regardless of cultural heritage and of 
contact with Indigenous people, have a relationship with ‘Aboriginality’, one that 
has for the most part has been ignored or denied” (1998: 128).  Although Trees 
wrote this in the 1990’s, I still argue that by-and-large, most Australian’s 
relationship to Aboriginality is an abstract one, filtered through the 
misconceptions and misrepresentations generated by other non-Aboriginal 
people.  As Langton notes: 
The most dense relationship is not between actual people, but between 
white Australians and the symbols created by their predecessors.  
Australians do not know and relate to Aboriginal people.  They relate to 
stories told by former colonists (1993: 33). 
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I draw attention to this, not simply to make the banal point that racist 
representations and stereotypes of Aboriginal people are perpetuated on a daily 
basis, but rather to reiterate that these constructions of Aboriginality serve a 
profound ideological function, simultaneously informing notions of Aboriginality 
and those ‘not Aboriginal’.  In the absence of ‘actual’ relationships between 
Aboriginal and not Aboriginal people, ‘Aboriginality’ works to bind the 
individuals and groups not identifying as Aboriginal.  What-is-more, in the 
absence of ‘actual’ relationships, it is possible to ‘ignore or deny’ that this 
abstract relationship exists, and that it is critical to the maintenance of power 
between Aboriginal and invader/settler people.   As Attwood further explains: 
It is now generally acknowledged that…the category of the ‘self’…is 
fashioned through the construction of an Other, which is outside and 
opposite, and that the making of an identity rests upon negating, repressing 
or excluding things antithetical to it.  By creating such binary opposition(s), 
the heterogeneity and difference within the former category is displaced 
and so the unitary self or group is manufactured.  In this process there is 
clearly an interdependence of the two categories, that is, they only make 
sense in the context of each other…this interdependence is usually 
hierarchical, with one category prior, visible and superordinate, the other 
secondary, often invisible and subordinate.  Hence, Europeans have forged 
a collective identity through a discourse which sets them apart from non-
Europeans, especially ‘the Aborigines’ (1992: iii). 
 
 
Two serious implications arise from Attwood’s analysis.  Firstly, when members 
of the invader/settler society maintain an abstract relationship between 
Aboriginality and themselves, they are able to displace the reasons for Aboriginal 
disadvantage and obfuscate the reasons for their own privileges.  Secondly, when 
members of the invader/settler society maintain an abstract relationship between 
Aboriginality and themselves, they perpetuate the logic of terra nullius: the 
fantasy of Aboriginality without the actual presence, voices, viewpoints,  
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knowledges and experiences of Aboriginal people.  As Michael Cathcart 
eloquently explains: 
It is often said that terra nullius was the principle that Aboriginal people 
did not exist – that this was ‘empty land’.  But terra nullius was a more 
complex idea than that.  In law, it stood for the principle that Aborigines 
did not occupy the land in a manner which constituted ownership.  That is 
to say, it did not deny their existence, but it did deny that they were a 
people with a culture.  It did not deny their presence, but it did deny their 
humanity…. It licensed a contradiction which said the Aborigines were 
here – but mute (2002: 213). 
 
 
Thus, “terra nullius [is]… a moral conjuring trick” (Cathcart, 2002: 213) that 
allows Aboriginality to exist in the white imagination, but to deny the 
Sovereignty of Aboriginal people.  Thus, the power relationship between 
Aboriginal and the invader/settler society is not only one of unequal relations.  It 
is a power relationship predicated on the affirmation of white sovereignty over 
the Sovereign rights of Aboriginal people and their land.  However, like 
Attwood, I share the view that Aboriginal incursions into colonialist 
constructions of Aboriginality contain enormous potential to challenge not only 
these constructions, but also provide the premise to developing a new “mutual 
becoming” (Attwood, 1992: ivx). Thus, I work with Attwood’s idea to suggest 
that Aboriginal incursions into Aboriginalist constructions of Aboriginality 
produce an awareness of being in Aboriginal Sovereignty, and command a 
concomitant awareness of our non-Aboriginality.  I return to this point below.  
 
Before I embark on this discussion though, it is necessary to briefly consider the 
theoretical work revealing the dualistic process of identity formation through 
self/Other binaries.  Broadly speaking, this situates Australian processes of 
identity development within an historical and global theoretical context, and  
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firmly within the larger narrative of colonial identity formation and power 
relations.  As such, Edward Said’s Orientalism provides critical insight here.  
According to Said, the ‘Orient’ is a “European invention” (1985: 1), a profound 
and enduring construction of the Other that provides definition to the 
European/western “image, idea, personality, [and] experience” (1985: 1-2) of 
being superior to non-Europeans and facilitating the exercise of cultural 
hegemony (1985: 7). 
 
As Said explains, Orientalism is a complex interplay of interdependent modes of 
knowledge frameworks, production and dissemination (or discourses), on and 
about the ‘Orient’, but within the Occident.  Most obviously, this includes 
knowledge produced in the academy “through its doctrines and theses” (1985: 2) 
but, connected to this are the epistemological distinctions made between “the 
Orient” and … “the Occident” that are consistently re-imagined, re-represented 
and re-produced in a multitude of academic, creative, political, social (and so on) 
communications (1985: 2). These are filtered out “into the general culture”, 
producing a consensus of knowledge about the relationship between East and 
West and an ideological framework by which Western identity can be known and 
understood (1985: 6-7).  As Said writes:  
Orientalism is never far from…the idea of Europe, a collective notion 
identifying “us” Europeans against all “those” non-Europeans, and indeed 
it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely 
what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of 
European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-
European peoples and cultures (1985: 7). 
 
Thus, Orientalism is not an innocently imaginative process.  It culminates in 
producing intricate systemic power relations between East and West.  Again, as  
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Said writes, Orientalism is “the corporate institution dealing with the Orient – 
dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing 
it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient” (1985: 3). 
 
Critical interconnections can be made between the ideological function of 
Orientalism/the Orient for the Occident/West and ‘Aboriginality’ for white 
Australians.  Indeed, Australian historian, Bain Attwood, works with the 
paradigm offered by Said to critique what he calls ‘Aboriginalism’.  Like 
Orientalism, Aboriginalism is an integrated system of knowledge production 
(especially Aboriginal Studies), epistemological and ontological development, 
identity formation (designating Aboriginal people as Other in order to distinguish 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’) and the exercise of power over Aboriginal people 
(Attwood, 1992: i).   
 
Attwood also identifies that other forms of knowledge production on and about 
Aboriginal people exist, ones he defines as ‘post- Aboriginalist’ (see Attwood, 
1992: i and xiv).  Post-Aboriginalism affirms Aboriginal peoples’ incursions into 
Aboriginalist modes of knowledge production and their agency as autonomous 
knowledge producers. Thus, post-Aboriginalism is a dialogic space, a “common 
ground” where “exchange of knowledge” can take place in the spirit of “speaking 
as well as listening” (Attwood, 1992: xiv).   
 
Critically, post-Aboriginalism opposes the orthodox systems of knowledge 
production and strives to “overturn [the] Aboriginalist structures of power and 
knowledge that continue to operate” (Attwood, 1992: xiv).  As Attwood  
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identifies, this necessitates a dualistic approach: shifting the status of Aboriginal 
people from knowable ‘object’ to knowing subject, and in corollary to this, 
identifying and placing the subjectivity of invader/settler peoples in relationship 
with Aboriginal people, with a specific view to examining and deconstructing 
colonialist knowledge systems and their attendant power relations. Within this 
new paradigm, Attwood writes:  
…Aborigines are viewed as socially constructed subjects with identities 
which are relational and dynamic rather than oppositional (in the binary 
sense) and given.  This challenge to essentialism and the teleological 
assumptions embedded in Aboriginalist scholarship involves historicising 
the processes that have constructed Aborigines, thus revealing how 
Aboriginal identity has been fluid and shifting, and above all contingent 
upon colonial power relations.  This approach necessarily involves a new 
object of knowledge – Ourselves, European Australians, rather than Them, 
the Aborigines – and this entails a consideration of our colonising culture 
and the nature of our knowledge and power in relations to Aborigines…. 
These new praxes and knowledges radically destabilise conventional ways 
of establishing identity or the existential conditions of being for both 
Aborigines and ourselves, but they also have the potential to offer a new 
means for a mutual becoming (1992: xv).  
 
 
Like Attwood, I am invigorated by the possibilities that arise when we challenge 
Aboriginalist discourse as the authoritative means for ‘knowing about’ 
Aboriginal people and ourselves.  Identifying the interconnectedness between 
Aboriginal and not Aboriginal identity formation processes and bringing that 
relationship out of an abstract discursive realm and into one whereby not 
Aboriginal people must deal with actual self-representations by Aboriginal 
people demands a profound level of introspection and self-assessment on 
their/our part.   However, I also argue that Attwood does not sufficiently identify 
what he imagines ‘ourselves’ to become.  Without his interpretation of this 
‘becoming’ process, it is difficult to assess whether this version of post-
Aboriginalism is capable of truly challenging self-other binaries and their  
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inherent power relations. Indeed, I rather suspect it is not.  I argue that within the 
version of post-Aboriginalism offered by Attwood, we risk the possibility of 
merely seeking redemption through the incorporation of Aboriginality into 
‘ourselves’: that the new becoming is merely a conservative reformation of the 
European self, one whereby the European stakes their claim in being Australian 
through the cooption of Aboriginality. For example, Attwood writes: 
As Bernard Smith suggested over a decade ago, we have a choice: we can 
either ‘settle for a divided culture’, or we can strive for ‘an effective 
cultural interchange, neither patronising or exploitative’, between 
Aboriginal Australians and ourselves – an interchange which would create 
‘a convergent culture, with its sources in two traditions, one mainly derived 
from European sources, the other derived from …[Aboriginal ones].  By 
choosing this latter path, we could begin the journey towards an authentic 
Australian culture (1992: xv-xvi, parenthesis in the original). 
 
 
While I appreciate the inspirational intent of Attwood’s claim, I am concerned 
that his position comes too close to appropriating Aboriginality in such a way 
that ensures the centred-ness of the European subject (articulated here as 
‘Australian’).  That is, ‘Aboriginality’ retains its subordinated position within 
colonialist knowledge production; its usefulness made clear when it contributes 
to the creation of an authentic Australian. Thus, authority of colonialist 
epistemologies and ontologies is not destabilised, rather it is re-stabilised and 
authenticated through the integration of Aboriginality into the invader/settler self.  
 
Geonpul academic Aileen Morton-Robinson is also sceptical of Attwood’s 
analysis.  Her uneasiness is that Attwood does not name and define the European 
subjectivities as ‘white’. Moreton-Robinson argues that although the European 
group’s ethnicity is identified (as European) their racialised status as white 
remains un-marked and un-named.  For her, the category of ‘Aborigine’  
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however, retains its racialised marking.  Thus, for Moreton-Robinson, the 
hierarchical relationship between European/Aboriginal remains in tact because 
the whiteness of the European is not located and named within the overall 
discourse of race.  As she writes: 
Race is implicit in the construct Aborigine but not identified as being 
implicit in the category European Australian.  In contrast to whiteness, 
Aboriginality as a racial construct is identified with blackness and is named 
and attached to Aboriginalism and post-Aboriginalism because it is deemed 
valid discursive practice…. Aboriginalism and Post-Aboriginalism are 
socially constructed by whiteness as representations of what it is not.  The 
new theoretical challenges to Aboriginalism recognise that what is required 
is a new object of knowledge but whiteness as an epistemological a priori 
works to assign this object on the basis of European Australian ethnicity 
rather than race.  This ensures that race continues to belong to the 
Indigenous other and whiteness remains hidden, which leads me to ask the 
question: how is post-Aboriginalism the new means of our mutual 
becoming when conventional ways of deploying race have not been 
radically destabilised? (Moreton-Robinson, 2004: 82). 
 
In short, Moreton-Robinson argues that because Attwood fails to identify the 
whiteness of the European, the logic of whiteness prevails and the positions from 
which one distinguishes the relationship between subject and object/knower and 
known, are in tact because the ‘knower’ is not self-knowing as white.   
 
There is a level at which I take Moreton-Robinson’s point.  I agree that it is only 
through a process of self-knowing that we can engage with our own 
epistemological systems and the ways they inform ontologies between 
Aboriginal people and members of the invader/settler society.  However, I also 
query how the naming of whiteness eventuates in ameliorating the reproduction 
of (binary) oppositional relationships between Aboriginal people and those who 
are not Aboriginal.  Beyond the obvious and immediate gain of identifying white 
race privilege, I ask, what does naming whiteness offer us in terms of a ‘mutual 
becoming’?    
  47 
 
I appreciate that critical whiteness studies provides tools for deconstructing 
‘race’ based power relations.  For example, naming whiteness and positioning it 
with the lexicon of race relations has profoundly altered the ways race oppression 
and race power are theorised.  It is argued that by naming whiteness we expose 
its supposed normativity and neutrality as products of white power.  Moreover, 
white identifying people are challenged not to see race/racism as an external 
phenomenon, extraneous to everyday experience, but rather as something 
“inseparable from other facets of daily life” (Frankenberg, 1993: 6).  As 
Frankenberg argues, “to speak of whiteness is…to assign everyone a place in the 
relations of racism” (1993: 6, emphasis in the original).  While white people 
might say, “[r]ace has nothing to do with me, I’m not racist” but it is “more 
difficult for white people to say “[w]hiteness has nothing to do with me – I’m not 
white”” (Frankenberg, 1993: 6).  It is feasible then, that because whiteness 
studies brings white and black into relationship within the overall discourse of 
race it provides the means by which white Australians’ relationship with 
‘Aboriginality’ as an abstract discursive framework is fundamentally challenged. 
 
I argue though, that the paradox of whiteness studies is while it claims whiteness 
as a location within the discourse of race, its ultimate aim is to discredit ‘race’ as 
a category of social organization, disadvantage and privilege (see for example, 
Garvey and Ignatiev, 1996: 9-10). That is, it is dependent upon a repudiated 
concept to explain itself and the paradigm within which it operates. Thus, the 
paradox is that while race is not a legitimate form of social organization, it  
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remains an a priori for investigating critical elements of social organization, 
disadvantage, discrimination, oppression and privilege. 
 
On the face of it, the reasons for this are self-evident.  For example, Aboriginal 
people utilise the language of race to strategically subvert colonialist modes of 
categorisation and hierarchicalisation, and form a basis for collective cultural, 
physical and spiritual survival in the face of ongoing racist oppression. As Ian 
Anderson
35 writes:  
…Aboriginal identities are formed within the context of colonial 
relations…it would be unreasonable to expect Aboriginal people to ‘re-
invent’ their self-representation without any reference to the hegemonic 
language of race…. Otherwise we would be expecting people to form 
identities in the context of an ongoing experience of cultural racism, and at 
the same time render the impact of such an experience totally without 
meaning (1997: 11). 
 
 
Equally, as long as the material effects of racism and race privilege persist, ‘race’ 
must continue to be a matter of scrutiny.  Indeed, in Australia where there are 
“dramatic disparities in the conditions for life” between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people, and statistical indicators for social wellbeing clearly 
demonstrate that Aboriginal people fall well below ‘other’ Australians (see 
Cowlishaw and Morris, 1997: 3), the case for ‘race’ is clearly a compelling one.   
 
However, the potential consequence of keeping ‘race’ in play is that it 
reproduces the epistemological frameworks it seeks to disavow and in so doing, 
re/activates the centred-ness of whiteness (albeit, named whiteness) within the 
                                                 
35 Ian Anderson is a descendent of the Palawa Trouwerner, Plaimeairrerenner and Trawlwoolway 
clans.  He is the foundation Chair in Indigenous Health at the University of Melbourne, Deputy 
Head of the University’s School of Population Health and Director of its Centre for Health and 
Society and the Onemda VicHealth Koori Health Unit.  
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already understood binary relationship. That is, the naming of whiteness is 
dependent upon the ongoing subordinated position of blackness, by simple virtue 
of the fact that within this dualistic framework, whiteness is the dominant binary. 
Therefore, rather than decentring the significance of binaries in forming and 
shaping ways of knowing and relating to others, these binaries are re-centred. 
Moreover, because whiteness, as the dominant binary, invokes the concept of 
blackness, whiteness retains its epistemological and ontological pre-eminence.  
The hierarchies of difference that we seek to deconstruct are held in place. For 
example, it is frequently noted how one of the consequences of whiteness studies 
is that rather than decentring whiteness, it re-centres it, potentially squandering 
the time, energy and resources that have gone into other burgeoning areas of 
cultural minority studies (Flores and Moon, 2000: 98).  American scholars Clark 
and O’Donnell also speak to this concern, alerting us to the problem of “white 
fetishism” (1999: 4). They write: 
Simply put, critics wonder if the surge of interest in even critical White 
studies by leftists genuinely committed to anti-racist struggle is but another 
way dialogue becomes centered and/or recentered around whiteness.  Even 
dialogue that seriously problematizes whiteness and its social construction 
taken to an extreme, dominating the discourse at multicultural education 
conferences, in multicultural education textbooks and in the multicultural 
education classroom, puts Whites at the center again and again…which 
may be how the White left manifests its racist pathology to be at the center 
(Clark and O’Donnell, 1999: 4-5). 
 
If we follow Moreton-Robinson’s advice and take the view that post-
Aboriginalism becomes a meaningful dialogic space between Aboriginal and 
invader/settler people once the whiteness of the white group is named and 
positioned within the overall discourse of race, we run the risk of creating a 
dialogic forum monopolised by the interests of whiteness.  I argue then, that with 
whiteness occupying the re-centred, re-privileged ground, the dialogic space of  
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post-Aboriginalism runs the gauntlet of becoming the dialogic space for 
determining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ articulations of whiteness.  Broadly speaking, the 
American scholar Becky Thompson alerted us to this in 1997 when, in 
conjunction with the White Women Challenging Racism Collective, she 
identified the linguistic difficulties inherent in whiteness studies: 
Every time you say it is okay to be white, it sounds like the white 
supremacists.  Because there is no other language, we need to use the same 
words they do – with opposite meanings – and figure out how to organize 
amid this contrast (Thompson et al, 1997: 363). 
 
 
In Chapter Two, I explore the tensions Thompson identifies with reference to the 
New Race Abolitionists and their position that anti-whiteness activists should 
seek out strategic alliances with white race supremacist organisations.  However, 
it suffices to say for the moment that whiteness studies produces its own internal 
and organic struggle for meaning that is still identified by notions of what it is 
not (white/not black, racist/not racist), and moreover, further displaces the 
potential of dialogic relationships with Aboriginal people.  Alison Ravenscroft’s 
analysis of the recent ‘history wars’ between Henry Reynolds and Keith 
Windshuttle illustrates my point here (2004: 3).  Ravenscroft writes: 
…I have turned firstly to the problematic of white historical practice, in 
particular of a positivist historical practice which seeks its truth, or truths, 
in the archive and the written record.  These problematics have assumed a 
particular urgency now in Australia in the context of the new contestations 
over history and its claims to truth following the so-called Windshuttle-
Reynolds debate concerning very different ‘truths’ of the ‘frontier wars’.  
But we might say that in some important ways Keith Windshuttle, Henry 
Reynolds and their respective supporters do not, after all, represent 
opposing and exclusive positions on the history of Australian black-white 
relations, but are on the same side: the side of white Australians whose 
faith in the archives disavows the very ‘truths’ which they are seeking?  For 
the archive is of our own making, of course; it is structured by the very 
same logic of black white relations which we seek to prove, or dispute.  
Perhaps, instead, the ‘truth’ of our history must be found in the logic of our 
own whiteness, and the blackness it produces for its own purposes, and the  
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ways in which whiteness structures histories and counter histories alike 
(2004: 3). 
  
Ravenscroft is clearly suggesting that we resolve this dilemma by naming and 
claiming the ‘white’ vested interests in the production of white histories.  
However, I argue that it is precisely because whiteness is produced within the 
logic of whiteness that we may well identify that which was previously un-
named, but that is all we have identified.  Relationships with Aboriginality are 
still secondary or marginal to the relationships we are producing for ourselves, 
amongst ourselves.  Indeed, Ravenscroft makes the point that whiteness produces 
blackness for its own purposes.  The purpose here, I suggest, is to redeem 
whiteness, at the exclusion of Aboriginal experiences, knowledge and needs.  A 
story shared by Wendy Brady in her paper at the Winds of Change Conference at 
the University of Technology, Sydney in 1998 illustrates the point I am making 
here.  The story Wendy shared told of a massacre committed against her great-
grandmother’s clan group during the killing times, and the importance of 
learning that written evidence of this massacre existed, documented and diarised 
by white people.  “No longer” said Wendy, “could there be any denials of this 
having taken place”.   Upon revealing her story at the Reconciliation Convention 
in Melbourne in 1997, a white historian approached Wendy.  Previously, he had 
refuted the possibility of the massacre taking place.  He enquired of Wendy the 
possibility of researching the matter further.  Of this, Wendy writes: 
How could she tell this man of their pain.  It did not need to be researched.  
It was only necessary to hear the story and acknowledge the wrongdoings 
of the past (Brady, 1998: online). 
 
Let us engage in speculation for a moment.  It may be possible to suggest the 
white historian may well have made his enquiry in the spirit of admitting his  
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previous error and a genuine desire to ‘get history right’.  He may also have 
made his enquiry in the spirit of naming and documenting white culpability in 
the atrocities committed against this (Wendy’s) family.  He may even have a 
notion that he would claim his own white subjectivity, admitting how his 
dependence on the (white) written document had led him to make the initial 
mistake.  However, I suggest that the redemptive function of these (good) 
intentions clearly serve the epistemological needs of whiteness more 
purposefully than the specific epistemological and emotional needs of the 
storyteller, Wendy Brady.  In this light, Rutherford’s analysis of Freud and 
Lacan’s working of the structural links between morality and aggression, and 
‘good’ versions of Australian whiteness is instructive here.  Although Rutherford 
confines her analysis to Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and its grass roots 
members’ notion of Australian whiteness, I argue that the salient point, the point 
that at the precise moment we set out to do or be ‘good’ it manifests as an act of 
aggression towards Others, also applies to this scenario (see Rutherford, 2000: 9-
11). 
 
As I understand Brady’s story, the purpose in telling it is to be heard: to occupy a 
space in a dialogic forum where the innate emotional value of the story is self-
evident, and the knowledge the story speaks is true unto itself.  In this moment in 
time, the invader/settler position within the dialogic space is that of listener and 
learner.  To presume that the story/knowledge is offered so that the non-
Aboriginal voice becomes the ‘speaker’, again reproduces the binary of 
subject/knower, object/known, typical of Aboriginalist modes of knowledge 
production.  Even though white academics may produce a ‘knowledge’ that  
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claims the whiteness of its purview, what inevitably remains marginalised, are 
the insider knowledges, perspectives and motivations communicated in the initial 
transmission of knowledge, in this instance the story.  There is a level then, at 
which whiteness produces its own safe ground. Obfuscating the emotional reality 
of the story means we do not have to reckon with it.  We do not have to deal with 
the grief and distress the story conveys. What-is-more, we do not have to ask, 
what does this knowledge mean for me?  How do I respond in a way that affirms 
and respects the subjectivity of the person who offered me the story in the first 
instance? 
 
When members of invader/settler societies enter into a dialogic, knowledge 
producing space in relationship with Aboriginal people, our role as listeners is 
not a passive one.  It requires a holistic response that begins with the 
fundamental recognition of the inalienable Sovereignty of the knowledge giver.  
In this instance, the knowledge giver is the storyteller, Wendy Brady.  As an 
individual with Sovereign connections and obligations to the land where this 
event took place, she is also a Sovereign owner of the story.  As invader/settler 
people, we are connected to those perpetrators of this event because of the 
transgenerational benefits accrued to us because of Aboriginal dispossession and 
exploitation of their land.  Thus, we are also connected to this story because it 
represents the denial of Aboriginal Sovereignty in protection of white 
sovereignty.   An active response to this is the recognition of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty, and placing ourselves in a dialogic, knowledge producing 
relationship where we own and name our non-Aboriginality.  I argue then, that it 
is at this point we begin to see a way forward for bringing ourselves out of  
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abstract relationships with ‘Aboriginality’ and into actual relationships with 
Aboriginal people.  That is, we engage as non-Aboriginal subjects in relationship 
with Aboriginal subjects, understanding that our identities are mutually 
constitutive, but predicated on the knowledge and respect of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty. It is in this context I advocate non-Aboriginality as an anti-colonial 
marker for identity. 
 
I argue that naming and claiming non-Aboriginality is a project that expands on 
the initiative of whiteness studies, teaching us that naming whiteness is pivotal to 
undermining white privilege.  I also argue naming and claiming non-
Aboriginality makes critical interconnections with Indigenist theoretical 
paradigms.   The value of using Indigenist frameworks as a point of departure for 
constructing non-Aboriginality is that they are fundamentally grounded in 
alternative world views and value systems that counter the negative connotations 
associated with Indigeneity in colonialist discourses (see Smith, 2001: 146).   By 
taking on the “colonial disenfranchisement of Indigenous people”, Indigenist 
paradigms reposition Indigenous knowledge “at the centre” (Phillips, 2003: 3, 
emphasis in the original) of knowledge production.  This then necessitates a 
relational and concurrent repositioning of western epistemologies, especially as 
they relate to epistemologies of the self.  I argue that reconstituting the non-
Aboriginal self within this ‘new’ centre represents such a repositioning.  This 
strategic epistemological and ontological move valorises the primacy of 
‘Aboriginality’, as it is conceived within Indigenist frameworks, as the giver of 
meaning to non-Aboriginality, and demands non-Aboriginality exists in the 
profound and irrevocable recognition and affirmation of Indigenous Sovereignty.    
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Conclusion 
 
In this introductory discussion, I have introduced my argument for anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality.  I have argued non-Aboriginality is an anti-
colonial process of identity formation because it is constituted within the locus of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty. The political intent of my argument is to propose a 
process whereby non-Aboriginal Australians engage in a process of substantive 
reconciliation with Aboriginal people.  I have affirmed the original objectives of 
reconciliation, as they were determined in 1991.  I have also argued that 
substantive reconciliation demands mainstream Australians critically engage 
with their commitment to white sovereignty and embark on a process of identity 
construction that acknowledges the history of invasion, colonisation and the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people.  As such, substantive reconciliation stands in 
sharp juxtaposition to the conservative program of ‘practical reconciliation’. 
 
Further, I have contextualised the theoretical aims of this project as a critical 
response to whiteness studies and contemporary scholarship on belonging. I have 
argued both of these discourses are mutually self-supporting, and work to 
validate continued commitment to white sovereignty. I have also argued for a 
theoretical framework through which anti-colonial constructions of non-
Aboriginality can be constructed.  I have argued this framework must stand in 
contradistinction to both colonialist and post-colonialist problematisations of 
settler identity construction.  To this end, I have drawn on Marcia Langton’s 
notion of anti-colonialism, and Lester Irabinna-Rigney’s application of anti-
colonialism in Indigenist research methodologies.  I have argued that the  
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recentring of Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies and axiologies necessitates a 
relational repositioning of non-Indigenous ways of self-knowing.   
 
In the following chapter, I detail the methodology for this project. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Introduction: 
In this chapter, I discuss the methodological approach taken to write this thesis.  
This thesis is a qualitative research project comprising both a written exegesis 
and a thirty-minute radio documentary.  The written text is an account of my 
argument for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality.  In developing this 
argument, I draw on a broad range of literature in the area of race and cultural 
theory.  The documentary includes a series of interviews with non-Aboriginal 
people. Overall, the interviews represent a collection of personal narratives that I 
work with to produce a documentary that supports a meta-narrative of anti-
colonial identity production, as it is expounded within the exegesis.  In the 
following discussion, I explain the relationship between the exegesis and the 
documentary as part of an overall methodological approach to the project.  I then 
move on to discuss the methodologies applied to both the documentary and the 
written text. Finally, I offer a brief discussion on my reasons for 
‘autobiographicalising’ (Nicholl, 2000: 370) both the written text and the 
documentary.   
 
My salient concern for the methodological approach taken with this project is 
that it supports the theoretical direction of the work.  Just as I have argued that 
Indigenist theoretical paradigms and epistemologies inform anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality, the methodology is informed by Indigenist 
research approaches.  From the outset, I insist that it is not my intention to  
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appropriate elements of ‘Indigeneity’ into my work, but rather to engage in a 
dialogic relationship with Indigenist scholarship, and ask, what can we learn 
from this as non-Aboriginal people pursuing our own anti-colonial subjectivities, 
epistemologies and methodologies.  Indeed, just as Linda Tuhiwai Smith makes 
the point that Indigenist research practices are informed by both western research 
approaches and a combination of Indigenous cultural practices (2001: 142-143), I 
argue that it is reasonable to demonstrate a cognisance of Indigenist research 
methodologies and consider how they can inform our own ethical obligations in 
undertaking research and achieving best practice outcomes.  In taking this 
approach, I seek to reiterate my commitment to respond to Rigney’s criticism 
that non-Aboriginal scholars too infrequently take seriously our obligation to 
learn from Indigenous epistemologies and treat Indigenous scholarship as having 
equal value to our own (see above).                                          
 
The Relationship between the Exegesis and Documentary: 
In this section, I explain the methodological relationship between the written text 
and the radio documentary.  There are several interconnected reasons for 
presenting this thesis in two components, and I elaborate on these below.   
 
Firstly, as I have already discussed at length in the Introduction, my task with 
this project is to conceptualise non-Aboriginality in ways that problematise 
colonialist modes of constructing both the Aboriginal Other and the 
invader/settler self.  My interest here is to disrupt this mode of knowledge 
production and its inherent power relations by working through anti-colonial 
constructions of the non-Aboriginal self.  I have also discussed that I conceive  
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anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality as an overtly political identity 
formation process, feeding into the process of achieving substantive 
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.  Throughout the 
written component of this project, I elaborate my thinking by constructing a 
theoretical basis for naming, defining and politicising the non-Aboriginal subject.   
I develop this in Chapter Four. 
 
The function of the documentary in the first instance is to provide a space where 
a diversity of non-Aboriginal people have an ‘embodied’ presence within the 
production of this project because their voices are heard telling their unique 
stories. Trees, who recognises the capacity of storytelling to bridge the nexus 
between theory and praxis, informs this methodological approach.  She argues 
that this bridge occurs because the corporeality of the storyteller is present within 
the theorising process (Trees, 1998: 5 and 17-18). In taking this approach, I seek 
to ensure that the theorising process evident in the exegesis is not detached from 
the substantive reality of people’s daily lives, cumulative life experiences and 
individual viewpoints.  Thus, the documentary serves two interconnected 
purposes: to convey local, specific and personal knowledge and experiences 
(articulated through storytelling) that can be theorised into an epistemology of 
non-Aboriginality, and, to articulate the ‘doing’, or praxis, of non-Aboriginality.  
 
Within the documentary, it is my intention to valorise the storytellers as 
knowledge producers in their own right.  In this sense, the function of the 
documentary is to draw on the oral tradition of storytelling to impart knowledge 
to the listener. As Benjamin writes:  
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[T]he storyteller worked primarily in an oral tradition.  He gave ‘counsel’ 
to his listeners; he was bound to place; he was corporeal; he had presence.  
He transmitted something ‘useful’ from which his listeners could benefit; 
he was wise and authorising; and spoke from a lifetime’s experience.  He 
involved listeners – who, it is assumed, do not have what he has; who lack 
– in direct relationship with himself (c.f. Trees, 1998: 17-18). 
 
In choosing a medium that provides immediate access to the stories of non-
Aboriginal Australians who have close relationships with Aboriginal people, I 
seek to create a publicly available representation of the ways intercultural 
relationships enrich non-Aboriginal people’s lives, and influence the process of 
identity development. 
 
Overwhelmingly, invader/settler Australians are deprived of these stories 
because the omnipresence of Aboriginalist/colonialist modes of knowledge 
production continues to inform the framework through which Aboriginal and 
invader/settler relationships are constructed.  In my view the colonial logic that 
insisted befriending an Aboriginal person constituted a gross violation of 
acceptable behaviour amongst whites and a potential risk to white safety and well 
being (Markus, 1994: 51-52) still prevails.   
 
Take, for example, the well-established connection between violence directed 
towards Aboriginal people and a means of maintaining law and order on the 
frontier (see for example, Jebb and Haebich, 1992: 34; Markus, 1994: 51-52, and 
for a related discussion, see Ware, 1992: 37- 42).  Far from being a redundant 
ideological tool, this recent transcript from ABC TV’s Mediawatch program 
(August, 2005) reveals the prevalence of this type of thinking in contemporary 
Perth, Western Australia.  The transcript includes the program’s compare, Liz  
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Jackson’s narration and dialogue that went to air on the Howard Sattler show 
(drive-time) on 6PR, a commercial talk station.  The transcript begins: 
[JACKSON] Howard was co-hosting a regular talk back segment with Hughie 
the cabbie when David phoned in. 
 
DAVID: Um, Yeah, I was just inquiring about your justice system right, I reckon 
it’s just too soft mate, you know, like I’m in a wheel chair, and back in August 
last year I got speared by an Aboriginal glue sniffer. 
 
SATTLER:  Goodness gracious 
 
DAVID: …went to court on the 1st July, he got a hundred hours… 
 
SATTLER: He didn’t go to jail at all? 
 
DAVID: …didn’t go to jail at all, you wonder why people want to take the law 
into their own hands… 
 
HUGHIE: But…David, its Hughie here mate, I bet the Defence Counsel stood up 
giving all the mitigating circumstances in the world as to why he did his crime. 
 
DAVID: Oh yeah. 
 
HUGHIE: Yep. 
 
SATTLER: Yeah it’s not on. 
 
DAVID: Just too soft mate, nigger nigger pull the trigger, far as I’m concerned. 
 
(Laughter all round, and a few “oohs”) 
 
SATTLER: He said that. 
 
HUGHIE: I didn’t say that. 
 
SATTLER: I know you didn’t say that. 
 
HUGHIE: I didn’t say that. 
 
SATTLER: He said that. 
… 
 
[JACKSON] No Howard, you didn’t say it, but you seemed to think it was pretty 
funny and you allowed it to go to air. 
 
All talk back at 6PR is on a 10 second delay so that calls like that can be cut off. 
The next day Howard made his excuses. 
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SATTLER: On yesterday’s program I inadvertently allowed on-air part of a 
listener’s call which on reflection could have offended members of the 
Aboriginal community, and that wasn’t my intention.  And the views expressed 
by the caller were not supported by me, my studio guest or this radio station. 
 
[JACKSON] “Inadvertent”? “Could cause offence”? 
 
… 
 
[JACKSON] Would you call that support, or just indulgence?  It’s certainly not a 
rebuke  (Mediawatch transcript, August, 2005, accessed, 1.11. 2005). 
 
The significance of this transcript is that Sattler is one of the highest rating talk 
back presenters on one of Perth’s leading commercial talk back stations.  If there 
were concerns that such a dialogue would cause offence to 6PR’s advertisers or 
target audience, this call would have been dumped.  Clearly, no such concern 
exists, and so far from being an isolated comment from one rogue caller, this 
broadcast represents a broad consensus view between the radio station, the 
businesses that support the station and the listening audience
36.  Thus, it is in this 
context that I argue that there is a continuum in the colonialist logic that informs 
the ways non-Aboriginal people should interact with Aboriginal people and 
speak about Aboriginal issues.  Indeed, in a previous analysis of Sattler’s 
program in the early 1990’s and its overt anti-Aboriginal position and hysterical 
focus on Aboriginal youth crime, Steve Mickler concluded that: 
In such a climate, championing prejudice can be seen not as reflecting 
legitimately held ‘public opinion’, but condoning, if not promoting, the 
genocidal pressure indigenous people have been put under since European 
colonisation (1998: 61). 
 
                                                 
36 For further analysis of 6PR and the Howard Sattler program, refer to Steve Mickler’s, 
Gambling on the First Race (1996); The ‘Robespierre’ of the Air: Talkback Radio, Globalisation 
and Indigenous Issues (1997); and, The Myth of Privilege: Aboriginal Status, Media Visions and 
Public Ideas (1998).  For a related discussion on the historical representation of Aboriginal 
people in the Australian media, see Michael Meadows, Voices in the Wilderness: Images of 
Aboriginal People in the Australian Media (2001).  
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This is not to say, however, that the pervasiveness of this logic goes 
unchallenged. 
 
Take, for example, some of the stories found within Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal biographies and autobiographies.  In her book Wandering Girl 
(1993), Glenyse Ward reveals the friendship between herself and Bill, the 
general hand, in the house where she worked as a domestic, and how important 
this friendship was to her emotional survival during this time.  As she writes: 
With a look of mystification about his old face, he spoke in a very gentle 
voice and told me to go and get a cup and saucer and have a cup of tea with 
him.  He explained to me that he would be my friend if I needed one…. We 
chatted on a bit more and when I told him I had to go to the old shed and 
get the six boxes of bottles, he offered to come and help me (Ward, 1993: 
65). 
 
More recently, Patrick Dodson’s biography tells the story of his Irish born great-
grandfather, who bequeathed his property to Patrick’s Granny Liz.  The 
Aborigines Protection Board in Western Australia intervened and prevented 
Patrick’s Grandmother from accessing her inheritance, consequently committing 
her to a life of poverty (Keeffe, 2003).  In addition, Stephen Kinnane, in his 
book, Shadow Lines (2003) reveals the love between his English born 
grandfather, Edward Smith, and his Mirrawoong grandmother, Jessie Argyle.  
Despite a staggering level of intrusion and intimidation from the office of A.O 
Neville, their love endured a lifetime. 
 
The significance of these biographies and autobiographies are that they provide 
glimpses into other relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
based on familial obligation, friendship, reciprocity and love.  Thus, they provide  
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for more complex understandings of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relationships 
in the face of racism and white oppression. 
 
In a similar vein, there are a small but growing number of accounts written by 
non-Aboriginal people that speak to their knowledge of Aboriginal/Australian 
history and close inter-personal relationships. Martin Flanagan’s, In Sunshine or 
Shadow, (2002); Duncan Graham’s (ed.), Being Whitefella, (1994); Sally 
Dingo’s, Dingo: The Story of Our Mob (1997); Darryl Tonkin’s, Jackson’s 
Track: Memoir of a Dreamtime Place (2000); Phil Thompson’s, Whitefella 
Wandering (2001); Mary Ellen Jordan’s, Balanda: My Year in Arnhem Land 
(2005); and, Neil Murray’s, Sing for Me Countryman (2003).  The documentary 
offered as part of this project can be included as part of this genre of non-
Aboriginal autobiographical accounts of intercultural and intersubjective 
relationships and, moreover, stands in sharp juxtaposition to the type of radio 
content detailed earlier. Through the immediacy of these stories included in the 
documentary, I seek to encourage points of connection and understandings for 
other Australians who do not have access to these stories or life experiences.   
Thus, it is my intention that these stories provide a point of entry and a means to 
considering the theoretical position of my thesis and the conclusions I reach. 
 
In corollary, I make the point that while the participants in the documentary may 
not necessarily view or express their experiences within a discourse of anti-
colonialism, the purpose of the exegesis is to theorise these types of experiences 
into an overtly political framework to galvanise the cultural and political 
possibilities which arise out of anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality.   
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Combined, both the exegesis and the documentary speak back to colonialist 
modes of knowledge production and the ways it informs relationships between 
Aboriginal and invader/settler people.  They work in symbiosis, to create 
ruptures within these modes of knowledge production.  They speak to the 
possibilities arising out of identity formation processes that are antithetical to the 
ones produced within traditional, conventional discourses. 
 
The Documentary: 
The documentary element of this project is a thirty-minute radio production, 
comprising a series of interviews with non-Aboriginal people who have 
meaningful connections and relationships with Aboriginal people.  I argue that 
politically meaningful notions of non-Aboriginality must be nurtured within a 
dynamic discursive space where individual stories and experiences are as 
significant as the salient argument for the construction of anti-colonial definitions 
of non-Aboriginality. Thus, the purpose of the documentary is to present a 
diversity of stories by non-Aboriginal people that speaks to the multiplicity of 
ways non-Aboriginal Australians contemplate their identity in relationship to 
Aboriginal people and the knowledge of living in Aboriginal Sovereignty.   
 
The production of a radio documentary supports the theoretical basis of this 
project because it draws on the Indigenist research methodologies of storytelling 
and testimony. Linda Tuhiwai Smith draws key distinctions between storytelling 
and testimony. On one hand, she argues storytelling plays a role that is internal to 
the cultural life and maintenance of Indigenous communities (Smith, 2001: 144).  
On the other hand however, testimony serves a more external function, providing  
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culturally appropriate methods for Indigenous people to bear “witness” to the 
“extremely painful…events” that have happened to them and their communities 
and communicate this to appropriate audiences (Smith, 2001: 144).  These 
distinctions are useful in fleshing out the purpose and the function of the 
documentary as I conceive it. 
 
As Linda Tuhiwai Smith explains, storytelling works to bind communities and 
provides shared identity through shared history. On a cultural level, storytelling 
works to maintain oral traditions and serves to share stories of land and people, 
significant historical events and interpersonal connections.  On a political level, 
storytelling also works to collectivise Indigenous experiences of racism and 
injustice  (Smith, 2001: 144-145). As a research methodology, storytelling allows 
for the culturally appropriate transmission of “diversities of truth” (Smith, 2001: 
144) and distributes control of the research between the researchers and the 
storytellers.  Story telling also builds and sustains community life: “the 
indigenous community becomes a story that is a collection of individual stories, 
ever unfolding through the lives of the people who share the life of that 
community” (Bishop, c.f. Smith, 2001: 145).   
 
Similarly, I argue that the value of bringing together the stories of non-
Aboriginal people into a radio documentary is that it brings disparate voices and 
individual experiences into a ‘community’ of people who share common 
(although not the same) experiences, values and life experiences.  Through 
storytelling, individuals speak to their own understandings of Australian racism 
and injustice towards Aboriginal people; the ways they locate themselves into  
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this history and contemporary reality; and, their relationships with Aboriginal 
people and how this affects the ways they self-identify.  Although my function as 
both the author of the text and the producer of the documentary means I 
contextualise the stories within a broader theoretical framework, ultimately the 
views and experiences expressed within the stories belong to those of the 
storytellers. Indeed, by way of protecting the authority and the integrity of the 
interviewees’ storytelling, I provided participants with a recorded copy of their 
interviews, along with a copy of the documentary.  This process gave them the 
opportunity to ensure their stories were faithfully represented.  The SBS 
Documentary Indigenous Protocols (Johnson/SBS) and SBS Protocol and 
Guidelines for Film and Television on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people (Bostock, 1997) inform this practice.  These protocols encourage 
participation from those consenting to be part of the production process.  While 
both of these documents deal specifically with the production of film and 
television on and about Aboriginal people, I believe these guidelines can also 
inform non-Aboriginal ethical work practices. 
 
In terms of representing an internal community of non-Aboriginal people, the 
storytelling evident in this documentary is a way of collectivising individual 
efforts and experiences, and promoting and sharing a commitment to meaningful 
co-existence with Aboriginal people.  It is in the act of storytelling that 
participants in this documentary share political, intellectual and emotional 
motivations for anti-racist work and theorise strategies for continuing and 
improving it (for related discussions on the role of storytelling in anti-racism see, 
for example, Adleman and Enguidanos (ed.), c1995; Thompson and Tyagi,  
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1996).  In addition, through telling stories, we grow anti-racist alliances and 
networks between members of oppressed groups and ourselves (Thompson and 
Tyagi, 1996: x).  In an Australian context, Reconciliation Learning Circles are an 
example of this. In these, and similar forums, we recognise ourselves as members 
of a community committed to anti-racism and co-existence between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people, and state our belonging to this community through 
sharing stories.   
 
In this sense then, storytelling as a methodological approach to research also 
overlaps with ‘networking’ as an Indigenist methodological approach to research.  
Indeed, Linda Tuhiwai Smith identifies that networking is about building 
knowledge, relationships, contacts, trust and confidence between individuals and 
communities (Smith, 2001: 156-157).  Moreover, it is as members of a 
community we draw strength and inspiration from each other, and this is critical 
to maintaining the energy to sustain our commitment.  As bell hooks writes: 
The social order hungers for a center (i.e. spirit, soul) that gives it identity, 
power and purpose…. Working within community, whether it be sharing a 
project with another person, or a larger group, we are able to experience joy 
in struggle.  That joy needs to be documented.  For if we only focus on the 
pain, the difficulties which are surely real in any process of transformation, 
we only show a partial picture (1994: 249). 
 
On a macro level however, the stories evident in the documentary speak to a 
broader Australian community.  In this sense, the stories are like ‘testimonies’, 
vouching for the sincerity and profundity of the relationships the participants 
speak to, and the ways this informs their sense of self.  For Smith, testimony 
incorporates the process of storytelling, but it is more public and connotes the 
formality of saying something “under oath”.  One of the important elements of  
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testimony is that it translates well into the written document and because of this, 
can be recorded for posterity (Smith, 2001: 144).  Within Australia’s 
contemporary history, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s 
Bringing Them Home Report (Dodson and Wilson, 1997) compiled numerous 
testimonies from Aboriginal people who are members of the Stolen Generation.  
So confronting was the evidence in this testimony that the historian Robert 
Manne insists it has “the power to change forever the way… [we see our] 
country’s history (Manne, 2001: 104).  Similarly, I argue just as testimony has 
the capacity to ‘take on’ the official narratives of national histories, and 
challenge the ways we constitute identities within and around these official 
narratives, the process of telling stories about the importance of intercultural and 
intersubjective relationships also provides productive examples of the ways we 
constitute identities outside mainstream discursive practices.   
 
In the spirit of gathering testimony, the radio documentary serves to valorise the 
voice of the storyteller, to ‘re-tell’ the story in a way that its emotional integrity 
remains intact, and where the listeners can respond in an empathetic way.  The 
beauty of radio documentary is that it allows room for deep human connection, 
between the storytellers and listeners.  It is because radio is an intrinsically 
intimate medium it allows space for imagination and empathy.  As the noted 
documentary producer Bill Bunbury says, “[i]f you make this distinction between 
cognitive and affective you certainly need to know the facts, but you need to hear 
them in a way that moves you” (c.f. Phillips and Lindgren, 2002: 63). 
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Participants: 
Linda Delaney’s (1997) approach to her study on the ‘constructions, implications 
and negotiations of whiteness in Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations’ 
informs my selection process for participants for this documentary.  She writes: 
The main criteria for selecting participants in the study was that a direct 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians had to 
have occurred…. The criteria for relationships is central to the study not 
only as a vehicle for investigating the emergence of ‘white-selves’ within 
Indigenous Australian domains but also as a means for exchange of identity 
within and between interactive cultures.  To this end this work can be 
perceived as both acknowledging and disrupting the self-other dynamics 
which construct our identities in colonial discourses (Delaney, 1997: ix). 
 
The people I have interviewed for the documentary element of this project are 
the author, journalist and avowed football fan Martin Flanagan.  Flanagan is 
originally from Tasmania and now lives and works in Melbourne. The themes 
and issues raised in Flanagan’s book, In Sunshine or In Shadow (2002) informed 
the basis of my interview with him. In this autobiographical text, Flanagan 
explores his Irish ancestry, the significance of his (and Tasmania’s) relationships 
with Truganini (and Aboriginality more generally), and the ways his interaction 
with Aboriginal people have taught him to interpret these relationships and 
interconnections.  Christine Donaldson is a Pediatric doctor who lives with her 
husband and children in Kagoorlie, Western Australia.  Christine’s husband is 
Geoffrey Stokes who is a Wongatha elder and Pastor. Christine and Geoffrey 
work with local communities to achieve cultural, political and social justice 
outcomes.  One area of particular concern to them is achieving improvements in 
Aboriginal health in remote areas. Camilla Cowley is a former pastoralist from 
Queensland.  Camilla gained a level of national prominence in the late 1990’s 
when, after the Gungerri people made a Native Title claim on areas of ‘her 
property’, she negotiated a co-existence agreement with them.  Subsequently,  
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Camilla became an outspoken advocate for reconciliation and opponent of the 
Howard Government’s 10-point amendment plan of the High Court’s Wik 
decision. Christine Kerr is from Sydney.  She lived for some time on Bathurst 
Island and has a long association, in varying capacities, with Tranby Aboriginal 
Co-operative College in Sydney.  Harriet Ketley is from South Australia.  She is 
a Native Title lawyer and was the instructing solicitor in the Mirrawoong 
Kadjerong Native Title case. 
 
The participants who have consented to my interviewing them for the 
documentary all have longstanding and ongoing relationships with Aboriginal 
people, in their workplaces; within close personal friendships; as part of their 
immediate and extended families; and as members of communities.  Most often, 
it was a combination of two or more of these factors.  The participants include 
people from a range of occupational positions and geographic locations.  This 
representation is important because too often white Australian responses to 
Aboriginal rights debates are couched in terms of the urban intellectual elite 
versus rural ‘rednecks’.  This unhelpful and unsophisticated dichotomising does 
nothing to elucidate the range of complex and dynamic relationships between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in urban, rural and remote areas.  
 
Questions: 
While Delaney’s study focused on the realisation of whiteness in the face of 
interactive encounters with Aboriginal people, I seek to develop this further by 
exploring the ways invader/settler Australians’ interaction with Aboriginal 
people produces a cognisance of their ‘non-Aboriginality’.    
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Because my primary interest is in gathering stories for a radio documentary (as 
distinct to gathering empirical data), the questions asked during the interviews 
followed the methods applicable to producing a radio documentary.  Conventions 
for producing radio documentaries determine that you get the best stories when 
you allow the storyteller room to talk.  The job of the interviewer is simply to 
guide, facilitate and affirm stories.  As Bill Bunbury says, it is imperative to be a 
“good listener” (c.f. Phillips and Lindgren, 2002: 62):   
[You need] to listen to stories, to try and capture what it is that people want 
to tell you…. Listening intently is the most important thing because you 
can miss so many cues if you’ve got this list of questions somewhere that 
you’ve got to refer to all the time.  (c.f. Phillips and Lindgren, 2002: 62). 
 
It is precisely because each story is unique that I do not ask exactly the same 
questions of each participant.  Rather, I framed questions to facilitate the 
storytelling of each participant based on what I already knew and was able to 
research about their stories.  In the instance of Martin Flanagan for example, I 
based the interview on his autobiography In Sunshine or in Shadow (2002), 
because it reflects many of the concerns, themes and issues with which this 
project deals.  In other instances, I had a pre-existing relationship with some of 
the participants and I was able to shape my questions in accordance with my 
prior knowledge of their stories.  Alternatively, some participants are recognised 
public figures in the area of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal affairs, and general 
information was available in the public domain (see Cowley, 1998).  On other 
occasions, word of mouth sufficed. 
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Sound: 
The overall sound of radio documentaries is constructed out of the tone and the 
settings of the interviews; the language and tone of the script, and the choices 
made vis-à-vis the music and sound effects (SFX).  These choices affect the 
accessibility of the documentary and the ways listeners connect with the 
program.  As Bunbury says of his own experience, “[w]hat I am trying to do as I 
make a documentary is to get that sense of taking a person into an experience as 
closely as possible.  Without the distractions of a visual image, that person can 
actually, I think, enjoy that story more intimately because they can bring their 
imagination to it” (c.f. Phillips and Lindgren, 2000: 62).  Thus, I seek to create a 
listening experience where listeners relate empathetically to the stories of 
‘ordinary’ non-Aboriginal Australians who have close and ongoing relationships 
with Aboriginal people, and provide an opportunity to (re)think the ways our 
identities are constructed in relationship to each other.  Ultimately, it is my goal 
to entice invader/settler Australians into thinking through anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality by removing the barrier of what can be 
perceived by some as obfuscatory, theoretical language and opening up pathways 
of inter-personal understanding.  
 
The Written Text: 
This project extrapolates on the work previously explored in my Masters thesis 
Deconstructing Whiteness — Constructing non-Indigenousness: Reconceiving 
White Racial Identities in Invader Societies (1998).  The written text is produced 
by using qualitative research methods.  In this dissertation, I develop my original 
position that white Australians must reinvent their white race identities as ‘non- 
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Indigenous’, and on this basis forge a meaningful co-existence with Aboriginal 
people on their land.  Broadly, I have accessed a range of critical race, cultural, 
post-colonial and anti-colonial literature.  Specific attention is given to critical 
whiteness studies, especially the American based anti-whiteness movement, the 
New Race Abolitionists and critiques thereof.  I have also researched ‘post-
colonial’ texts focusing on invader/settler ‘belonging’, which were published 
after the completion of my first thesis.  Additionally, I have developed my 
argument for the creation of the non-Aboriginal subject with reference to 
subsequent works published in this area.  Finally, I have autobiographicalised the 
thesis in an appreciation of Indigenist knowledge production and storytelling as a 
way of establishing links between the ‘self’ (myself), theory and the community 
with which I seek to connect.  
 
Autobiographicalising the Text: 
The third methodological approach taken with this project is the 
autobiographicalisation (Nicholl, 2000: 370) of the text.  I have already 
explained in the ‘protocol’, that stating who I am and where I am from is a way 
of signalling my desire to engage in diplomatic relations with Aboriginal people 
in the context of their Sovereignty.  It signals my awareness of living in 
Aboriginal Sovereignty and foregrounds my desire to negotiate my identity in 
relationship to this fact.  
 
Autobiographicalising the text is consistent with the practice of declaring one’s 
own subject position, which emerged during the 1980-90’s ‘politics of 
difference’ debate within academic feminism.  This practice was instigated at the  
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insistence of ‘women of colour’ and Aboriginal women, who wanted white 
women to acknowledge the epistemic violence of white women’s feminism by 
declaring their subject positions (see Huggins, 1994). While the declaration of 
one’s own subject position represented a significant shift forward in challenging 
the presumption of authority and neutrality by the academic authoriser and/or 
investigator, it is my view that in these contexts, identity was declared as a static 
and locatable endpoint rather than a constant ‘work in progress’ (as it were), as 
this extract from Catriona Elder reveals: 
White historians dominate the writing of academic Aboriginal history.  
However, Aboriginal women and men have long been telling and writing 
their own history.  There are implications about power and empowerment 
that are important in thinking about the process, that continues, of white 
academic historians writing Aboriginal history.  In writing this paper I 
therefore acknowledge that I am writing one story, in a myriad of possible 
stories.  It is a story shaped by my position in Australian society (as a 
white, middle-class, urban dwelling, woman) and my position in historical 
scholarship (as a feminist and a student).  From this standpoint, I write a 
story about how white society and its discourses shaped the lives of 
Aboriginal and white women in the 1930’s (1993: 115). 
 
While Elder’s declaration certainly underscores the importance of recognising 
the co-existence of a diversity of hi/stories and standpoints in the re/telling of 
these hi/stories she marks her identity by naming categories that are already 
‘known’ to her (“white, middle-class, urban dwelling, woman” and a “feminist 
and a student”). Thus, there is little scope for understanding how identity 
formation processes might be challenged and changed in response to these 
disclosures, what we might subsequently ‘discover’ about our identities, and 
name that which was previously ‘unknown’ to us. 
 
Thus, my purpose in autobiographicalising this text is in part, to underscore the 
fluidity of one’s own subject position and the ways we realise and adopt non- 
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Aboriginality as an anti-colonial marker for self-identity.  In this light then, the 
function of autobiographicalising the text resonates with Frankenberg’s 
observation that we are remade over and over again, and that this process of 
remaking reveals itself in the sharing of autobiographies.  As she writes: 
Memory, and one’s sense of self, are continually (re)formed.  Chains of 
events in a life are such that each moment seems both to lead to or even 
make the next, and to be remade by the moments that follow it.  My 
childhood was then, if not literally relived, certainly reconceived in the 
context of my adult life.  In this way, we can say my memories, my self are 
(re)formed.  Thus in order to say how it was that my first steps towards 
self-consciousness about the racialization of my own childhood happened, 
not in Britain but in Santa Cruz, California, I need to say how I came to 
realize myself as answerable to a set of questions about racism, 
imperialism and my own history and identity.  And in order to explain how 
that happened, I need to explain how I got to Santa Cruz at all 
(Frankenberg, 1996: 8, emphasis in the original). 
 
In addition, autobiographicalising the text is a means of recognising and 
addressing the conundrum faced by many non-Aboriginal academics who do not 
want to speak on behalf of Aboriginal people and their culture, but do want to 
speak to and own white Australian history and the treatment of Aboriginal 
people.  This extract from Brabazon’s Tracking the Jack illustrates the point I am 
making here:  
As a white Australian, I have benefited from colonisation and 
dispossession.  There is a sense that ‘the I’ must not write the words about 
indigenous culture.  At times, it seems like a stylistic act of colonisation – 
the we writing about the they.  But, by not discussing indigenous questions, 
the injustices, silence and oppressions of everyday life are perpetuated…. 
We whitefellas are part of this history, a history that we must confront and 
discuss…. Through this recognition, we need to grasp our role in 
alleviating these inequalities in the future (Brabazon, 2000: 56, emphasis in 
the original). 
 
As a matter of principle, I support the general thrust of Brabazon’s position.  
However, I suggest that the dilemma she identifies between writing about 
Indigenous culture and writing about her understanding of her place in Australian  
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history and contemporary society is made all the more problematic because she 
conflates Indigenous culture with white/Aboriginal history.  While I do not mean 
to suggest that Indigenous cultures are not informed by the history of 
colonisation and relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, I do 
suggest there is a clear distinction between speaking for Indigenous culture and 
speaking to the ways identities are produced out of this history.   
Autobiographicalising the text is one means by which we can articulate 
recognition of our accountability in the face of this. 
 
Further, the autobiographicalisation of the text is a response to my obligation to 
observe Aboriginal protocols in storytelling.  As Wendy Brady has written in 
reply to the non-Aboriginal propensity to authorise and editorialise Aboriginal 
peoples’ stories, “[w]hen I speak of sharing our stories or finding common 
ground through them this does not mean that it becomes the opportunity for non-
Indigenous academics to colonise our storytelling.  The ideal response would be 
to acknowledge the gift of the story through reciprocity which means giving a 
story in return” (Brady, 1998: online).  Thus, this observance of protocol 
recognises and affirms my place within Indigenous Sovereignty and a 
preparedness to operate within the rules and obligations this recognition 
necessitates.   
 
I have already noted the importance of storytelling and testimony as critical 
Indigenist methodological and epistemological priorities.  Indeed, numerous 
published autobiographies by Aboriginal people and biographies co-authored 
with non-Aboriginal people continue to play a crucial role in representing the  
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diversity of Aboriginal experiences in negotiating the impact of colonisation and 
ongoing racism; evidencing cultural survival; challenging the white Australian 
mythologies of terra nullius and peaceful settlement; witnessing the devastation 
of the stolen generations and other human rights abuses; celebrating the 
achievements of political and community leaders and other important role 
models; and documenting the contribution of Aboriginal people to mainstream 
Australian life.  Examples of this include Sally Morgan’s My Place (1988); 
Margaret Tucker’s If Everyone Cared (1977); Boori Pryor’s Maybe Tomorrow 
(1998); Langford-Ginibi’s Don’t Take Your Love to Town (1988); Rita and 
Jackie Huggins’ Auntie Rita (1996); Glenyse Ward’s Wandering Girl (1993); 
Kinnane, Marsh and Nannup’s When the Pelican Laughed (2000), Stephen 
Kinnane’s Shadow Lines (2003), Keeffe’s Paddy’s Road (2003); Eric Hayward’s 
No Free Kicks (2006), and Sean Gorman’s Brother Boys (2005)
37.  Each one of 
these texts (and many more) challenges the dominant, hegemonic narrative of 
white Australian history, culture and national identity, and exposes the silences 
the dominant narrative strives to protect. 
 
My point here is, however, that the responsibility to tell these stories, and 
perform the political and cultural work of these stories, lies disproportionately 
with Aboriginal people.  As a result, non-Aboriginal people are largely 
unburdened by the emotional responsibilities and consequences for telling these 
stories, as this interview extract with Ruby Langford-Ginibi attests: 
Well, it took me four and a half years plus one near nervous breakdown 
from writing up all the hurt and the death.  I was writing about the death of 
my kids, and I was recovering from major surgery on my stomach.  They 
                                                 
37 It is worth noting here that the non-Aboriginal co-authors referenced here all have ongoing 
personal and professional relationships with Aboriginal people.    
  79 
pulled the guts out of me literally, you might say, but I was real stressed 
out, that’s how I came to be here at Allawah Hostel.  At the time I used to 
live in Henderson Road, Alexandria, and it got so bad I had to go and see 
someone to talk to, a psychologist, but I was telling him what was wrong 
with me.  I knew what was wrong with me.  He said, “Look, it’s only just 
stress that you’re suffering.  It will get better, in time it will, you really 
know what’s wrong with you.”  I was sitting down and crying and telling 
him while I was crying that I was suffering, mourning for my kids all over 
because of writing this book, and he said, “Well, it will get better, it’s only 
just stress.  When I got to this hostel here, I had nothing, not like you see 
today.  This is my seventh year here and ah, jeez you can accumulate some 
stuff, aye?” (Little, 1994: 101-102). 
 
I argue that non-Aboriginal people also have a responsibility to tell our stories; 
both when they are hard to tell and because they are hard to tell.  I argue that this 
observance of protocol signals a genuine desire to engage with Aboriginal people 
in an inter-personal, empathetic and emotionally appropriate way.  In a sense 
then, storytelling is not just about the cultivation of knowledge in the ‘objective’ 
academic sense; it is also about nurturing and sustaining substantive, meaningful, 
intercultural relationships. 
 
Finally, the autobiographicalisation of this text works to meet my ethical 
responsibility to step out from behind the veil of academic, ‘racial’ and cultural 
neutrality and declare my subjectivity as a non-Aboriginal person.  Here, I am 
borrowing from Nicholl’s concept of the ‘autobiographicalisation” of texts and 
voices (2000: 370), and her “coming out” as a white woman (2000: 380).  
Nicholl contends that the “autobiographicalisation of difference” occurs when 
the work of Indigenous and NESB (non-English speaking background) writers is  
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juxtaposed against the dominant group’s “‘universal’ narrative forms that are 
unmarked by corporeal or cultural specificity” (2000: 270)
38.   
 
In contrast to Nicholl, I argue it is precisely the unmarked voice of the dominant 
group that gives it corporeal and cultural specificity.  As Rebecca Aanerud notes 
with reference to whiteness in literature, “…all readers…until very recently and 
regardless of the race of the author, have been positioned as 
white…[and]…unless told otherwise, the reader, positioned as white, assumes 
the characters are white.  (Un)marked whiteness is, of course, a type of 
marking”.  We know when characters are white “because no body says so”.  
Moreover, this marking is made clear by the visibility of the boundary that 
contains the white group; “the overt racial marking of the non-white characters” 
(Aanerud, 1997: 37). 
 
Despite this small difference of opinion, I take the salient point of Nicholl’s 
thesis when she writes that the formal, passive voice of academic writing 
maintains authority because it is positioned as the official arbiter of competing or 
contested ‘perspectives’.  Contrasted with this then, the active voices of 
Indigenous writers who speak in terms of the first person can only constitute a 
perspective.  That is, a perspective to be mediated and moderated by the 
‘neutral’, detached voice of the white, academic authoriser (2000: 371). 
 
Nicholl seeks to undermine her white authority by telling of her struggle to 
“come out” (2000: 282) from the protection of the passive voice and declare her 
                                                 
38 It is, of course, important to note that some Australian non-Aboriginal academics writing in the 
area of Indigenous studies recognised the importance of autobiographicalising their work.  Two 
examples include Saunders, Huggins and Tarago (2000, pp 39-58), and Sean Gorman (2005).  
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subjectivity as a white woman.  Although she does not say as much, by making 
overt statements about her whiteness, rather than just leaving it up to imagination 
of her readers and audiences, she is in fact, autobiographicalising her difference 
as a white woman.  And, what’s more, she’s empowered by it. 
The relief I experienced in coming out…was linked to the realisation that 
my whiteness was something that Indigenous people had always known 
about me. Finally the mental gymnastics of unconscious whiteness could 
cease…. The upside of coming out is that I no longer have to be good and 
have found a community of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people where I 
can speak in the first person…and be listened to (Nicholl, 2000: 282). 
 
Beyond the grammatical devise of writing in the active voice, the insertion of my 
stories into this work is the autobiographicalisation of this thesis.  They are my 
coming out as a non-Aboriginal person. It is my hope that these stories will 
personalise my academic voice: that they will explain, entertain, amuse and 
dismay.  I also join my stories with those of other whitefellas.  In sharing these 
stories, I claim my belonging to a community of non-Aboriginal/Indigenous 
people.   
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My name is Sol Belear and I’ve been a good friend of Ted’s and the 
St Vincent’s Church for quite some time. But I must say here early 
this morning I seen all these white men in white robes and 
crucifixes. The last time we had that down here is when the Klu [sic] 
Klux Clan was here. (laughter).
39 (Compass transcript, April, 2006, 
accessed 27.09.2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 From the Eulogy given at Father Ted Kennedy’s funeral, 2006.  Father Ted Kennedy was a 
Catholic Priest who ministered to the Aboriginal community in Redfern, an inner city suburb of 
Sydney. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Reassertion of Colonialism through the Abolition of 
Whiteness 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise my argument for the creation of 
the non-Aboriginal subject as a response to critical whiteness studies.  I argue 
that there are significant limitations within critical whiteness studies allowing the 
resuscitation and continuation of colonialist ideologies informing relations 
between Aboriginal people and the invader/settler society.  Further, I argue, the 
limitations within critical whiteness studies curtail the potential for anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality.  In order to advance my argument, I provide 
a case study of the New Race Abolitionists.  
 
The New Race Abolitionists make an important case study for this chapter for a 
number of inter-dependent reasons.  Firstly, providing New Race Abolitionism as 
a case study allows for a closer examination of the general concerns I raised with 
regard to critical whiteness studies in the Introduction.  Secondly, by focusing on 
the New Race Abolitionists, I provide myself with a forum for contextualising 
the political intent of the autobiographies featured within this thesis.   
 
In this chapter, I begin by outlining the intersecting relationship between my 
‘whiteness’, my political beliefs and some of the ways I conceive my 
‘belongings’.  I acknowledge there may appear to be a synergy between the ‘left’ 
agenda of the New Race Abolitionists and my own left-wing political 
viewpoints.  However, as will become clear, any possible collusion in political  
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direction is superficial.  The storytelling included in this chapter enables me to 
provide a personal framework for my critique of the New Race Abolitionists.  
Further to this, the storytelling included in this chapter foregrounds subsequent 
stories included in this thesis and the broader political and theoretical direction of 
my argument. 
 
Thirdly, despite the influence of American scholarship in whiteness studies on 
Australian work, to date there is very little engagement with the New Race 
Abolitionist movement from an Australian perspective.  Some notable exceptions 
include a feature article published in the ‘Spectrum’ section of the Sydney 
Morning Herald in February 2000 by Debra Jopson; Jane Haggis’ critique of 
Vron Ware’s advocacy of abolishing whiteness through hybridity (2004a and 
2004b); Bob Pease’s reference to Abolitionism in his 2004 article Decentring 
White Men: Critical Reflections on Masculinity and White Studies; and, a passing 
reference in the Introduction to Ghassan Hage’s text Against Paranoid 
Nationalism (2003: 5)
 40.  Thus, I argue that we are currently without a 
substantive analysis of the efficacy of the New Race Abolitionists in 
undermining the colonialist hegemony in invader societies such as ours.  I offer 
                                                 
40 Here Hage promotes the idea of ‘Race Traitor’ as an opportunity for non-Indigenous 
Australians to ‘cross over’ into Indigeneity (2003: 5).  While I explain the significance of ‘race 
traitor’ and ‘crossing over’ later in this chapter, for Hage, “becoming Indigenous” (2003: 5) 
provides a means to explore the nexus between dominant versions of remembering Australian 
national history and Aboriginal remembrances and acknowledging they may not be 
commensurable to white remembering.  Becoming Indigenous is, according to Hage, “ a 
symbolic tipping of the balance between the coloniser and the colonised” (2003: 4-5).  As I argue 
in the following chapter, the idea of non-Indigenous people appropriating an Indigenous identity 
is not a new one.  For over a century, the construction of white Indigeneity has been profoundly 
linked to the Indigenisation of white national identity, establishing national legitimacy. 
Ultimately, this manoeuvre works to uphold the power of white sovereignty.  However, Hage’s 
reference to Race Traitor marks a new discursive framework by which constructions of white 
Indigeneity are mooted.    
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my engagement with New Race Abolitionism as a means to articulate a specific 
Australian response and in the spirit of dialogue with this corpus of work. 
 
Fourth, the New Race Abolitionists make a useful case study because of the 
focus they give to problematising the nexus between theorising whiteness, and 
promoting anti-white activism.  As such, they occupy a unique position amongst 
those investigating whiteness.  Indeed, as Flores and Moon argue, one of the 
prevailing concerns with whiteness studies is that it has failed to deliver a 
“compelling vision of a liberatory whiteness” (2000: 99) that motivates white 
identifying people to mobilise against white power.  However, I argue the activist 
methods promoted by New Race Abolitionists are counter-productive when 
applied in the Australian context.  There are a number of reasons for this. 
 
New Race Abolitionists propose that disassociating with the inherent evil of 
whiteness necessitates ‘crossing over’ to the intrinsic goodness of blackness.  In 
broad terms, I argue ‘crossing over’ validates the appropriation of another’s 
identity as an expression of political solidarity, without sufficient understanding 
that this appropriation is in and of itself an act of power.  I have already pointed 
to this with reference to Ghassan Hage and his suggestion that white Australians 
should appropriate Indigeneity (see above).  Given that I develop issues relating 
to the appropriation of Indigenous identity in the following chapter, I do not 
pursue this argument here.   
 
In this chapter, I argue ‘crossing over’ constitutes a simplistic reversal in the 
attribution of human qualities according to one’s skin colour.  This reversal does  
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little to challenge the validity of colour as a system of social organisation, 
reinscribes the binary relationship between white and black, and ultimately 
ensures the epistemological centredness of whiteness.  I argue the 
epistemological centredness of whiteness is protected because it maintains the 
power to universalise the definitions of whiteness as both a physical descriptor 
for skin colour and as a metaphor for a system of social organisation and power.  
Take, for example, this definition offered by Thompson et al.  They write:  
…whiteness identifies those who are light skinned, with Western European 
physical features…. The experience of whiteness…is one of unearned 
privileges which all white people receive in various ways due to racism.  A 
light skinned “white” person who experiences race privileges may or may 
not buy into the ideology of whiteness as a system of exploitation based on 
white supremacy.  However, that person cannot separate her/himself from 
the experience of being white, since we live and breathe the privileges 
every day (Thompson et al, 1997: 357, emphasis in the original). 
 
Consequently, all light skinned people are assumed to share in the power and 
prestige of whiteness equally.  This negates the experience of cultural racism 
experienced by cosmetically ‘white’ Aboriginal people and undermines the 
significance of Aboriginal cultural knowledge, affiliations, kinship connections 
and insider knowledge produced by colonised peoples as primary modes of self-
identification.  Moreover, universalising the experience of whiteness as one of 
‘unearned privileges’ compromises recognising Aboriginal incursions into 
whiteness as ‘strategic whiteness’ (a mode of engagement with the ideology of 
whiteness that protects cultural difference), and assumes an affirmation of 
cultural assimilation. 
 
I also argue ‘crossing over’ into blackness encourages a mode of political 
identification that disassociates whiteness from historical memory and context  
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(Alcoff, 1998: 8).  In Australia, this is antithetical to the original goals of 
reconciliation which sought to bring greater awareness of Aboriginal 
dispossession and disenfranchisement to the white Australian community, 
proposed a formal document or Treaty and pledged to address the chronic social 
disadvantage experienced by most Aboriginal people because of colonisation.  
Thus, this ahistoricity works to support the punitive, neo-colonial objectives of 
‘practical reconciliation’, which refuses an affirmation of Aboriginal Sovereignty 
by rejecting the importance of a Treaty, undermines the importance of a broad 
acceptance of Australia’s history within the broader community and makes 
improvements in Aboriginal peoples’ quality of life contingent upon 
assimilation.     
  
Finally, I argue that the New Race Abolitionists’ advocacy for strategic alliances 
between anti-whiteness and pro-white activists is intensely problematic.  In the 
first instance, I argue such alliances are at odds with Australia’s international 
treaty obligations, specifically the International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racism (ICERD).  More specifically though, I argue such alliances 
ask anti-whiteness/anti-racist/pro-reconciliation Australians to forge strategic 
alliances with pro-white organisations at the expense of developing relationships 
with Aboriginal people.  I argue that in an Australian context, to focus on such 
alliances negates the imperative for members of the invader/settler society to 
engage in meaningful, intercultural, intersubjective dialogues with Aboriginal 
people.  Indeed, I suggest it fundamentally shifts our focus away from being in 
Aboriginal Sovereignty and towards being in the sovereignty of those who would 
see violence committed against Aboriginal people in pursuit of their own  
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political agenda.  With regard to the New Race Abolitionists, the political agenda 
is driven by a desire to destroy the white, American, capitalist state. 
 
The following discussion on New Race Abolitionism contextualises my 
argument for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality because it is a 
revealing counterpoint to the model I propose.  As I argue in Chapter Four, anti-
colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality are formed out of meaningful 
dialogic relationships with Aboriginal people, in full cognisance of Aboriginal 
peoples’ status as Sovereign subjects.  I also argue, non-Aboriginality is a 
political process of identity formation that opposes the appropriation of 
Indigeneity by members of the invader/settler society; rejects ‘race’ and its 
commonly accepted signifiers as means of categorising and stratifying human 
beings; is not dependent upon ‘colour’ in order to determine cultural or political 
affiliation; is historically located within the dispossession and 
disenfranchisement of Aboriginal people; and, is committed to developing a 
politically useful praxis that supports human rights, social justice and the self-
determination objectives of Aboriginal people.  Moreover, anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality recognise the legitimacy of invader/settler 
peoples’ belongings is contingent upon all of the above occurring.    
 
 
Chapter Overview: 
 
The following discussion is broken into three parts.  In the first section, I 
introduce two of the New Race Abolitionists’ principal proponents, John Garvey 
and Noel Ignatiev.  I also outline the broad political philosophy and ideological  
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influences informing the Abolitionist manifesto and provide an overview of their 
theoretical framework and their methodology for social change.   
 
Following this introductory overview, I foreground my analysis of the New Race 
Abolitionists with an autobiographical account that situates both my political 
beliefs and my whiteness within this thesis.  In so doing, I seek to reveal the 
personal and political framework through which I problematise my whiteness 
and my belongings.  In this instance, my whiteness is articulated through paternal 
kinship line, and is made manifest in my relationship to my Grandfather’s second 
wife, Val, who was from India.  However, it also turns out that my paternal 
kinship lines provides a site through which I forge my political belongings 
insofar as my Grandfather’s political activism (he was a committed communist 
and trade union activist) provides a ‘lineage’ to my own left-wing political 
beliefs.  Moreover, this story reveals that both my whiteness and politics 
constitute intersecting modes of belonging that further provide the means through 
which I negotiate my sense of place within broader political, social and 
institutional milieus. The examples I provide include a progressive left-wing 
radio station in Melbourne, 3CR, where I worked for a number of years as a 
volunteer and paid employee, and Sydney University (an Australian sandstone 
university), where I undertook my Masters degree.  In providing this account, I 
contextualise my response to the New Race Abolitionists on a personal and 
political level.  On face value, it would appear that because of my political 
beliefs I would find substance in what the New Race Abolitionists have to offer: 
another political belonging if you will.  However, as will become clear 
throughout the course of this thesis, this personal explanation is part of a bigger  
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narrative trajectory, one that reveals the theoretical and methodological 
limitations of the New Race Abolitionists (and, more generally, other white race 
deconstruction theories) when it comes to negotiating whiteness and belonging in 
the locus of Indigenous Sovereignty. 
 
In the final section, I provide my critique of New Race Abolitionism.  I focus my 
analysis on key elements of the New Race Abolitionist program.  This includes a 
critical engagement with the notion of race traitors ‘crossing over’ from 
whiteness into blackness and a condemnation of the New Race Abolitionists’ 
insistence that anti-whiteness activism necessitates forming strategic alliances 
with white-race supremacist and militia organisations. 
 
The New Race Abolitionists: An Overview 
New Race Abolitionism is an academic and activist movement, generated in the 
United States, which purports a radical methodology for social change.  The New 
Race Abolitionists’ journal, Race Traitor, is promoted (by Abolitionists) as the 
movement’s “intellectual center”, encouraging debate and supporting practical 
anti-whiteness measures (Garvey and Ignatiev, 1996: 10).  Race Traitor attracts 
interest amongst “academics, grassroots activists, rightwing militia types, 
prisoners, students and others” (Flores and Moon, 2000: 101).  As such, it is 
credited with promoting a ‘class inclusiveness…rarely found in leftist journals” 
(Alcoff, 1998: 14).  Race Traitor is available on the internet, and you do not need 
a subscription to access it (see http://www.racetraitor.org ). Additionally, Race 
Traitor articles are regularly reprinted or referred to in anarchist journals and 
‘zines (Alcoff, 1998: 14).  By way of gauging Race Traitor’s acceptance within  
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academic and literary circles, it is worth noting that numerous prominent scholars 
have contributed articles to the journal.  In addition, an anthology of articles 
published in Race Traitor in 1996 won the 1997 American Book Award (Garvey 
and Ignatiev, 1996). 
 
Both of Race Traitor’s founding editors, John Garvey
41 and Noel Ignatiev
42, 
have backgrounds in grass-roots activism and currently hold academic positions.  
Noel Ignatiev, who assumes a more public role in promoting the Abolitionist 
credo, worked in the labour movement in Chicago for decades.  His PhD 
dissertation, How the Irish Became White, describes “the process of 
Americanization as an accommodation to “whiteness” – how immigrants became 
American by distancing themselves from Blacks, thereby achieving the 
privileges that accrue to the white skin” (West, circa 1998: 178). Despite being a 
member of the academy, Ignatiev’s commitment is to ‘abolish’ whiteness rather 
than ‘study’ it (West, circa 1998: 178). 
 
There are several important points to make about the New Race Abolitionists’ 
political philosophy.  Variously described as “libertarian anarchist” (Alcoff, 
1998: 14) and “Marxist/neo-Marxist” (Flores and Moon, 2000: 100), Garvey and 
Ignatiev are avowed anti-capitalists who argue ‘whiteness’ is an oppressive 
ideological tool “used by the wealthy and powerful” to prevent the white 
proletariat from recognising their shared class interests with working blacks 
(Alcoff, 1998: 14).  As Ignatiev argues: 
                                                 
41 No biography is available for John Garvey. 
42 Noel Ignatiev is Professor of History at Massachusetts College of Art.  Prior to this he was 
Professor of History at Harvard University.  He completed his PhD at Harvard in 1995.  
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Although I talk about “white privilege,” I do not deny that poor whites have 
been exploited.  After all, the United States, like every modern society, is 
composed largely of masters and slaves.  The problem is that many of the 
slaves think they are part of the master class, simply because they partake 
of the privileges of the white skin.  The fact is, whiteness has not brought 
freedom and dignity to the majority of European Americans in this country; 
whiteness has been a substitute of freedom and dignity.  It does not exempt 
people from exploitation; it reconciles them to it.  It is for those who have 
nothing else (circa 1998: 199-200). 
 
However, despite its apparent leftist agenda, the New Race Abolitionists also 
embrace philosophies that are more typical of the far right, such as the right to 
bear arms and the valorisation of American ‘lawlessness’ (Garvey and Ignatiev, 
1996: 95). 
 
 
The New Race Abolitionist movement is an anti-white movement as distinct to 
an anti-racist one. Abolitionists reject anti-racism and the views of those who 
promote inter-racial harmony.  This, they argue, represents an adherence to the 
fallacious category of race, which in turn enables the myth of the ‘white race’ 
and thus, white power.  For the New Race Abolitionists, the abolition of the 
white State is critical to the abolition of whiteness.  As Flores and Moon observe: 
Their critique of the State and its institutions also extends to liberal efforts 
to reform the system which they see as un reformable.  In their view, efforts 
to eradicate white supremacy that do not include opposition to the State 
only reinforce the authority of the state, which they position as the most 
important agency in maintaining racial oppression (2000: 102). 
 
New Race Abolitionists dismiss those who attempt to mediate the worst excesses 
and demonstrations of white power (such as the KKK
43) as liberal reactionaries.  
“Race”, they insist, “is not the work of racists”, but is made and remade by social 
institutions on a daily basis (Garvey and Ignatiev, 1996: 179, emphasis added).  
                                                 
43 Ku Klux Klan, an American based white race supremacy organisation.  
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They argue that social workers, the education system, welfare workers, the 
labour market, the media and the criminal justice system all have vested interests 
in preserving the status-quo, and are therefore part of the problem, not the 
solution (see Flores and Moon, 2002: 192-193; Garvey and Ignatiev, 1996: 180).   
 
New Race Abolitionists hold the abolition of whiteness as pivotal to the 
elimination of white (race) privilege and racism.  For them, the successful 
abolition of whiteness is contingent upon the recognition that ‘white’ is not a 
legitimate racial or ethnic identity; it is simply constructed as such in order to 
disguise that it is a marker for power. As the self-proclaimed Abolitionist David 
Roediger writes, “[i]t is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is 
that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false….it is the empty and terrifying 
attempt to build an identity on what one isn’t and on whom one can hold back” 
(Roediger, 1994, c.f. Winant, 1997: 47).  
 
Abolitionists believe that because whiteness is socially constructed it can be 
deconstructed through repeated acts of non-compliance with the power of 
whiteness.  Because New Race Abolitionism is a subversive political movement, 
it does not require unanimous support from white identifying people.  Rather, the 
abolition of whiteness requires that enough people work to obfuscate the 
meaning of whiteness (through acts of non-compliance) to the point where it can 
no longer work as a system of social organisation (Garvey and Ignatiev, 1996: 
11).   
 
One example of non-compliance is the call for white Abolitionists to ‘cross over’ 
from whiteness into blackness.  Crossing over is represented as an act of political  
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solidarity with blacks insofar as it signifies a rejection of white race privilege and 
recognition of the oppression of black people because of whiteness.  One 
Abolitionist writer, Phil Rubio, provides a discussion on representations of 
‘crossing over’ in American popular culture.  Rubio distinguishes those who 
poorly mimic black culture (as in minstrelsy) (Rubio, 1996:151), and those 
whose crossing over represents white cultural subversion and “a political 
defection from the white race” (Rubio, 1996: 161).  Rubio provides a range of 
examples from music (the white Jazz Clarinetist Milton Mezzrow self-identified 
as a “voluntary Negro”) (Rubio, 1996: 152); sport (he attributes the white 
basketball player Bobby Hurley as a purveyor of the “black basket ball 
aesthetic”) (Rubio, 1996: 160); and film.  With reference to the films the Blues 
Brothers and The Commitments Rubio writes: 
There is a serious message in all this comedy.  Spiritual expressions of 
musical inspiration are not new or uniquely African.  What’s unique here is 
the use of African-American culture by whites to find the spirit, and hence 
the humanity, they feel they’ve lost.  Besides just having a good time, these 
characters, like earlier generations of abolitionists and civil rights workers, 
see themselves on a “mission from God,” to free so-called white people 
from a culture of guilt and shame.  White supremacist culture has created 
the conditions for its opposite to arise and destroy it (1996: 156). 
 
Another example of non-compliance is the Cop Watch Program.  The Cop Watch 
Program ‘watches’ cops for evidence of corruption, racism and discrepancies in 
the treatment of black and white citizens.  Ostensibly, when white people ‘watch 
cops’ it signifies a forfeiture of the favourable treatment white people receive 
from the police simply because they are white. As Garvey and Ignatiev point out, 
“…if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the [white] club to 
make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking 
at him or her, how would this effect the cops behaviour? (1996: 13).  
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As a tactical devise, the Cop Watch Program serves two strategic purposes.  
Firstly, it offers a mechanism for personal agency in non-compliance with 
whiteness; a process by which one might ‘cross over’ into blackness.  Secondly, 
it provides the means by which Abolitionists can mount insurgency against the 
white state.  The police, as agents in the maintenance and administration of white 
power on behalf of the State are an obvious target.  Undermining the authority of 
the police, and their capacity to enforce whiteness, undermines the capacity of 
the State to govern in the name of whiteness.  Further to this, the New Race 
Abolitionists also advocate “treason”, calling Abolitionists to rise in armed 
insurrection against the white State.  The imperative for “direct action” (Flores 
and Moon, 2002: 194) means the New Race Abolitionists seek out strategic 
military alliances with others who promote the demise of the State, including 
anarchists and neo-fascist organisations (Flores and Moon, 2002: 194-196).  
Garvey and Ignatiev argue that the “conventional left” has lost its revolutionary 
impetus, and are in cahoots with the State, conspiring to provide intelligence 
reports on the activities of militia groups to law and order agencies.  One such 
example of this is the Southern Poverty Law Centre, which claims to have “the 
most extensive computerised files on militias and hate groups in existence” 
(1996: 94).  Complicity with such surveillance activities, argue Garvey and 
Ignatiev, render leftist organisations mere agents of the State, colluding in the 
oppression of its citizens.  In juxtaposition, the militia groups provide the only 
genuinely radical voice in a conservative and reactionary society.  They write: 
[T]he militia movement is a rebellion against the massive, faceless, soul-
destroying system that is sucking the life out of ordinary people in this 
country and around the world.  Of course it carries with it danger as well as 
a promise.  Insofar as it has a vision for the future, it is not ours.  We do not 
underestimate the importance of this difference.  But it has done more to 
shatter the image of government invulnerability than any other  
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development of recent times.  That the “left” fails to see the potentials it 
reveals and does less than nothing to develop its own challenge to power is 
an index of its irrelevance…. From its first issue, Race Traitor has insisted 
that only the vision of a new world can compete with the fascists for the 
loyalty of those angry whites who think that nothing less…is worth fighting 
for.  Abolitionists must draw a line between themselves and the “loyal 
opposition”.  If they fail to do so, they will not be heard (Garvey and 
Ignatiev, 1996: 95). 
 
 
Like all Revolutionary movements, New Race Abolitionists require martyrs.  
Throughout the literature, New Race Abolitionists evoke the story of Mark 
Twain’s fictional character, Huckleberry Finn, and the slavery abolitionist and 
leader of the Harper’s Ferry Rebellion (1859), John Brown, as inspirations for 
their cause.  Indeed, both have entire editions of Race Traitor dedicated to them. 
Twain’s Huckleberry teaches that whites can  break from “sivilization”, befriend 
black people, and “realize [their] inherent humanity” (Flores and Moon, 2000: 
104).  The story of John Brown teaches whites the value of violence in ending 
oppression and how to “organize and carry out the anti-whiteness revolution” 
(Flores and Moon, 2000: 105). 
 
More recently, others such as Timothy McVeigh (otherwise know as the 
Unibomber after his bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City) are 
hailed as heroes to the Race Traitor cause.  As John Garvey elaborates, McVeigh 
was an “American man at war with America” (2001: online). He targeted the 
federal building in Oklahoma City because it “housed agencies of the American 
Government that had been responsible for crimes against Americans 
(specifically, the incineration of Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas and the 
assault on the Weaver family in Ruby Ridge, Idaho)” such as the FBI and the 
ATF (2001: online).    
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In one Race Traitor article, Garvey paints a sympathetic picture of McVeigh, 
portraying him as man who has ultimately been denied the privileges his 
whiteness promised him.  As Garvey explains, McVeigh was born in 1968  “and 
grew up in the suburbs of Buffalo”.  By the time he was a young man he was 
unable to get a job at the factory where both his grandfather and father had 
worked, due to economic downturn. Facing the prospect of unemployment he 
joined the army and gained a reputation as am “excellent solider” (Garvey, 2001: 
online).  He saw service in Iraq and it is here he had his first experiences of 
killing people and was apparently traumatised by it. Garvey reports McVeigh as 
saying: 
 [w]hat made me feel bad was, number one, I didn’t kill them in self-
defense…. When I took a human life, it taught me these were human 
beings, even though they speak a different language and have different 
customs.  The truth is, we all have the same dreams, the same desires, the 
same care for our children and family.  These people were humans, like me, 
at the core” (2001: online).  
 
More than this though, it seems McVeigh was “bothered” by being “part of a war 
that involved no direct threat to the United States” and he suspected that he was 
co-opted by a United Nations force that had a broader plan to “take over the 
world” (Garvey, 2001: online).  
 
By the time McVeigh returned from the war he was “a different person…close to 
breaking down” (Garvey, 2001). After leaving the army, McVeigh drifted 
between States and jobs, working for a time at Burger King, “a salesman at a gun 
shop and gun shows” and a security guard (Garvey, 2001: online).  Garvey sums 
up the significance of McVeigh’s story to the Race Traitor cause, writing:  
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Timothy McVeigh never claimed to be a race traitor but he does not appear 
to have been a white supremacist.  He did not start a race war.  He did not 
start a race riot.  He did not participate in a lynching.  He did not bomb a 
black church.  He did not plant a white bomb.  He killed people considered 
by the conventions of our time to be black and white.  He probably never 
thought about it but he might not even have considered himself white.  He 
lived and died at a time when whiteness had been splintered but had not yet 
been replaced by an anti-whiteness that could serve as the groundwork for a 
renewed American civilization…. From the moment Timothy McVeigh set 
out from Buffalo to the moment he arrived in that same Oklahoma, he 
never had the benefit of sustained contact with the Jims of our day.  Had he 
had it, he might have done something different from what he did. He might 
even have become the John Brown of our day.  It’s a shame he didn’t.  We 
all bear some of the responsibility (2001: online). 
 
As for those innocent people who lost their lives at the hand of McVeigh in 
Oklahoma City, Garvey dismisses them as mere collateral damage; even the 
children who had been dropped off at the crèche on the ground floor of the 
Federal Building by parents on their way to work that day. In praise of 
McVeigh’s one-man-stand against the State Garvey writes: 
That’s what happens in war.  They all pay – even those whom no one 
believes should pay.  Soldiers die and so do a lot of other people, including 
children, who play no active role in war making…. Timothy McVeigh 
wanted a body count – the higher the better.  The federal government he 
reasoned, had unlimited amounts of cash to replace buildings, but the lives 
of federal employees could not be replaced.  He needed to deliver a 
quantity of causalities the federal government would never forget.  It was 
the same tactic the federal government used in armed international 
conflicts, when it wanted to send a message to tyrants and despots.  It was 
the United States government that had ushered in this new anything-goes 
mentality.  McVeigh believed, and he intended to show the world what it 
would be like to fight a war under these new rules, right in the federal 
government’s own backyard (2001: online). 
 
It is perhaps interesting to note that the convicted murderer Martin Bryant is 
championed as a cause celebre within some race hate organisations and gun 
rights lobbyists in Australia and comparisons have been made between him and 
Timothy McVeigh (Lateline transcript, May, 1999, accessed 23.1.2008).  
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Bryant’s ‘claim to fame’ is that he massacred innocent people in a brutal attack at 
Port Arthur in Tasmania.  
 
A Story about Political Identity and Activism: 
I begin this account with a story about one of my earliest memories of my 
Grandfather, my Dad’s dad.  My story starts with Dad and I catching the bus to 
Grandpa’s house, on Cyril Street in Box Hill.  I must have been little because I 
was in the pusher. The house Grandpa lived in was a housing commission house, 
built in the post-WW2 housing boom. This night Grandpa and a few of his union 
mates were sitting around sharing ‘longneck bottles’ of Melbourne bitter by 
tipping them into vegemite jars that had been recycled into drinking glasses.   
 
Grandpa was a strange character, he was as ‘deaf as a post’ and lived in his own 
world of revolution and change, circulating in and amongst Carlton’s left 
community and plotting ways to overthrow the exploitative, capitalist state.  For 
his troubles, he held a unique position within the family, somewhere between 
ridicule and admiration.  Grandpa loved mankind but hated Catholics (he can be 
credited with teaching me the bigoted rhyme, “Mickey dog, Mickey dog, sitting 
on the Mickey log”. Years later I discovered that ‘Micks’ had the same rhyme for 
us, only they substituted the word ‘Proddie’ for ‘Mickey’).  He marched 
alongside women’s liberationists in the 1970’s for equal pay and legalised 
abortion, but was an appalling misogynist.  He said he believed in the equality of 
all people, but the first time I ever heard a racist verbal attack being committed 
was when he called Val, his second wife, who was from India, “A fuckin’ black 
cunt’.    
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No one denied Grandpa’s bigotry. Instead, we accommodated it by valorising his 
commitment to working class struggle. The family joke was that Grandpa 
wouldn’t die until the revolution had arrived.  We all ‘knew’ that if he didn’t get 
to build at least one barricade in the street then he would die an unhappy man.  
Robbie, Grandpa’s youngest daughter and the auntie closest to me in age and 
temperament captured this valorisation in a poem she wrote for Grandpa after he 
died.  
 
Our Father 
My brother told me 
That when he and Nanette were kids 
Our father would swim from the Mentone to Mordialloc pier
44 
While the kids sat on the beach with icecreams in their hands 
And the dog stole licks from each unguarded cone 
That was years before the time when I was born 
On the crest of my mother’s fortieth year 
And far from the sea where we walked 
My brother holding a case of ashes in his hands 
All that remained of our father 
 
I thought of him standing in the chill air 
Under the clocks
45 
Selling papers to the early workers 
Agitating he called it 
And wandering home with him to the tiny flat 
To the rotting carpet, the coffee stained chipped cups 
He never seemed to notice 
And having another fight with him 
Over the state of things 
And going on the usual hunt for his damn hearing aid 
I could hear whistling feebly beneath a pile of party room letters 
While my batteries ran down with the weight of futility and 
                                                 
44 This story reminds me of Mao swimming across the Yangtze River to prove his revolutionary 
fitness!  I hasten to add though, Grandpa was no Maoist! 
45 ‘The clocks’ are the clocks at the entrance of Flinders Street Station in Melbourne.  Part of the 
original structure of the building, they are a Melbourne landmark and popular meeting place for 
people. As such, ‘the clocks’ is a Melbourne colloquialism.  If I were to say, “meet you under the 
clocks at ten” I’d be meeting you at Flinders Street at ten o’clock.  Grandpa used to sell the 
socialist newspaper The Tribune under the clocks.  
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Helplessness 
 
And there on the beach with Terry, Julie, Nanette 
The grandkids played in the shallows 
My brother walked out 
With the ashes 
The ashes to send floating to sea 
Ashes to float to Mordialloc pier 
Under a satin shroud of twilight sky 
And gold lined clouds 
And one faint diamond star 
And gazing up 
At the whole grand pink gaudy insolent blaze 
Of God’s great opulence 
God’s own bloody flag 
Said aloud 
Too late you bastard 
Too late. 
 
I read this poem as a tribute to Grandpa’s political convictions and a lament for 
the loss of a man who could never really be the father my auntie wanted him to 
be.  There are many reasons for this, and not-the-least was Grandpa’s 
preoccupation with politics.  I know that when she passed this poem on to me 
that she had just recently obtained papers through freedom of information that 
ASIO had kept on him. I wonder if those papers weren’t some way of trying to 
access the heart and soul of a man she needed to understand as her dad. 
 
My relationship with Grandpa wasn’t close, and my contact within him was 
intermittent.  On the whole, the memories I have of him are refracted through the 
stories of others.  It is telling, I think, that one of the last times I saw Grandpa 
was at Easter in 1985. I disembarked from the train at Flinders Street on my way 
to work.  An old man came rushing up to me with a batch of fliers advertising the 
Palm Sunday Peace Rally.  He was yelling, “give ya kids a future”. Tired and 
grumpy, (travelling down from the country to the city, I used to sleep on the  
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train) I was just about to yell back “what bloody kids?” when I realised it was 
Grandpa.  In an uncanny way, this story serves as confirmation of those I have 
had passed on to me, and as an epitaph to the man I know primarily through 
stories. 
 
I have always been a trade unionist, and my politics can be described as ‘left’.  
For want of a better alternative, I attribute Grandpa as the provenience of my 
political beliefs.  In so doing, I give an important part of who I am and what I 
believe a genealogy (an essentialism if you will).  I also give my self a 
connection to a man I barely knew.  
 
I don’t know how Grandpa met Val, or why they decided to marry.  There is 
some talk in the family that Val needed a husband to stay in the county. As for 
Grandpa, I suspect he was in need of company and a cook.  Whatever the case, 
when Val married into the family in the mid 1970’s she entered a white 
Australian world where Grandmothers’ expertise was measured in terms of their 
ability to roast legs of lamb and bake bread and butter puddings.  When new 
babies came along, they applied themselves to the mass consumption of Patons 3 
ply ‘Feathersoft Wool’ and number 10 knitting needles and began producing 
knitted booties, bonnets and matinee jackets.  Prior to the birth of the new infant, 
everything would be white or pastel lemon.  Subsequently, and upon knowing the 
baby’s sex, a final knitting frenzy resulted in complementary pastel pink or blue 
coordinating outfits.  Where buttons were required, they were always tiny faux-
pearl shanks and ribbons were soft and silky-satin (and inevitably became  
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knotted and frayed when teething babies began to suck on them at about 6 
months!). 
 
Val apparently didn’t know any of this, and it seems that Grandpa omitted 
bringing her up to speed.  So, on those rare occasions when we were at Cyril 
Street, (the exterior of which had, by now, been painted bright green and red; 
Val’s exotic Indian influence we thought) Dad, the only son, was fed an 
enormous bowl of curried chicken and rice, which had been bulked up with these 
revolting fibrous pulses called lentils.  This of course was a radical departure 
from the obligatory mashed potatoes that accompanied every meal at home.  My 
sister and I were spared this foray into international cuisine – curry being too hot 
for kids – so we got mince on toast instead.  But, for dessert, we would all be 
treated to coconut tapioca jelly that had the colour and texture of ‘dissected 
brains’ (as my sister and I used to call it).  On the way home, we’d laugh and 
ridicule Val’s cooking.  Poor woman, what was she thinking?  We’d reason that 
in India she’d been married to a bloke who was “high up” in the army, had 
probably had servants and hadn’t learnt how to cook.  “Poor thing”, we’d muse.  
Then, the laughter would start again with the umpteenth retelling of the time she 
got confused in a supermarket and fed Grandpa curried cat food for a week!   
 
The first baby in the family who Val knitted for was my youngest sister, Hannah.  
Hannah was born in 1978 at a time when baby wear was changing from 
traditional pastels to brighter, more ‘stimulating’ colours.  Apart from making 
some minor fashion statement for the up-and-coming toddler, the modern 
penchant for bright colours was apparently part of some claim that they would  
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teach babies to focus their eyes sooner.  Well, the vivid green dress Val knitted 
Hannah was positively dazzling!  Constructed out of scratchy polyester yarn 
from Fossey’s, if it didn’t teach her to focus it would most certainly blind her!  
Val was thanked and the dress was promptly deposited into Hannah’s wardrobe.  
To the best of my knowledge, Hannah never wore the dress, although I saw the 
odd teddy bear in it years later.   
 
Like Val’s curries, the story of the knitted dress was one that circulated in our 
family from time to time.  On the surface, they were funny stories; the type 
families tell as part of characterising the distinctive idiosyncrasies of its 
members.  Equally, funny stories are a way of teasing family members, of 
causing mild embarrassment to induce conformity:  a way of signaling to a 
recalcitrant individual that you have deviated too far and it’s time to ‘pull ya 
head in’.  But, it is my belief that the stories about Val had a bit more depth to 
them than that.  Like a pool where you can’t quite see the bottom, I think, that the 
stories and laughter were a surreptitious form of humiliation where we’d separate 
Val’s differentness from our sameness. Far from conspiring to induce her 
conformity they reinforced our belief that she could never conform and therefore 
she could never really belong.  Val could never really be the same as one of the 
Grandmothers because she wasn’t white enough and she never would be because 
she couldn’t cook white or knit white. 
 
It took many years for me to understand that our family’s attitudes towards Val 
were racist.  Previously, I had failed to even recognise that there was an ‘attitude’ 
at all. Sometime during the mid 1990’s when I first began accessing critical  
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whiteness studies as part of my Masters degree in Gender Studies, I was 
introduced to Vron Ware’s work, The White Woman’s Burden (1992).  In a 
subsequent piece of writing, Island Racism: Gender, Place and White Power 
(1997), Ware explores contemporary manifestations of racism in post-colonial 
England, and focuses on the ways white women’s racism manifests.  Ware 
argues that expressions of racism are gendered and as such, it is:  
…important to go beyond the idea of women being drawn into actively or 
passively supporting racism as an aspect of their subordination to 
men…[and that] it might be more productive to analyze gender and racism 
in relation to a particular place and time in order to demonstrate the 
intricacies of social relations that give rise to white supremacist activity 
(1997: 307).  
 
Not surprisingly, Ware identifies the domestic sphere as an important site for 
white women to express their racism.  Frequently, white women complained 
about the smells of food coming from their Asian
46 neighbours’ homes and made 
spurious accusations about low levels of hygiene.  Ware writes, “most of the 
intolerable habits involve domestic space; smells, spitting, cockroaches, and the 
bringing in of disease all represent threats to the home” (Ware, 1997: 300).  In 
this instance, threats to the home are analogous to threats to the nation and the 
nation’s whiteness.  Perhaps it is useful to remember when Val became a 
member of our family, Australia was in the dying days of the White Australia 
Policy and multiculturalism was becoming acceptable.  
 
In addition to Ware’s analysis, I argue that not only are expressions of racism 
gendered, the targets for racist expression are also gendered so that the racism 
can be essentialised with greater ‘precision’. Gendering racism creates the 
                                                 
46 Remembering here that ‘Asian’ in a British context often means Indian or Pakistani.  
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illusion of accuracy, and lends an apparent credibility to racist thoughts, words 
and actions. Also, gendering racism creates parallel sites for the objectification of 
those who are being positioned in opposition to the white self. For example, 
attacks on food and knitting are a way of gendering racism and this serves as a 
way of de-feminising women through their ‘race’.  As such, women are not only 
deprived of their racial or cultural identity, they are deprived of their gendered 
identity as well. By identifying Val through her Indian cooking and sense of 
colour and aesthetics, we isolated her from her role as Grandmother, thus her role 
as a senior woman within the family.  Far from being able to separate the racism 
and sexism Val experienced, the oppressions we subjected her to were 
interlocking and interconnected.  Remember, my Grandfather had called her a 
fuckin’ black cunt. 
 
What makes this especially sad in my mind is that Val never had children of her 
own.  We could have been her chance to be a Grandmother if we had opened our 
hearts to her and understood the gigantic meals as her hunger to nurture, and the 
bright green baby’s dress as a luminous expression of love.   
 
I was introduced to Vron Ware in the first year of my Masters in Women’s 
Studies degree at Sydney University.  If memory serves me correctly, this was 
week three of our ‘Introduction to Feminist Studies’ core unit.  It was the same 
week I was introduced to the work of bell hooks and Jackie Huggins.  My 
introduction to feminism and feminist activism had come earlier than this though, 
and is a bit harder to put a date on. However, I can isolate my time working at the 
progressive, left wing community radio station in Melbourne as being formative  
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in my feminist instruction.  At 3CR, I worked with strong women who had ‘been 
there in the ‘70’s’ and had a wealth of experience in collectivising and consensus 
building. Here I learnt to articulate feminist demands.  We have a right to equal 
pay and industrial equity, the right to say no (to sex), the right to say yes (to sex), 
the right to free and safe contraception and abortion, and the right to freedom 
from male violence.  I found my feminist voice and in so doing I found a natural 
home at 3CR.  Here I could be a politicised, feminist, working class woman and 
be empowered in those identities.  Little did I know, I could also be white
47.  It 
was Jackie Huggins’ essays critiquing the colonising impulse of white women’s 
feminism that compelled greater self-reflection on my part.  Huggins argued that 
the liberationist vision of white women’s feminism privileged the universal 
category of ‘woman’ and their oppression under patriarchy and in so doing 
negated the racist oppression experienced by Aboriginal women.  Further, 
Huggins said the emphasis on patriarchal oppression was a convenient 
displacement of white women’s role in the colonisation and oppression of 
Aboriginal women.  She argued as long as white women set the agenda for 
liberationist politics they would be blind to the fact that although the types of 
oppression endured by Aboriginal women were gender specific, Aboriginal 
women’s political priorities could not be separated from Aboriginal men’s and 
were a direct response to the legacy of colonisation and racism.  Huggins claimed 
that as long as white women remained oblivious to these facts then our feminism 
was not only racist, it was another colonising ideology, negating the lived 
experiences and world views of Aboriginal women.   In part, it is the ‘logic’ of 
Huggins’ argument that informs my critique of the New Race Abolitionists 
                                                 
47 It is also important to note that 3CR provided airtime to other minority broadcast groups 
including ‘ethnic’ (as they were referred to) and Aboriginal broadcasters.  However, the 
community I identified and associated with at 3CR was the women’s/feminist community.  
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insofar as I argue that many ‘white’ people are blind to the neo-colonial 
tendencies of their own anti-whiteness, ostensibly liberationist theories (Huggins, 
1994). 
 
I had moved to Sydney in 1993 to work at 2SER-FM, a major metropolitan 
community radio station, allegedly with leftist politics and an activist agenda.  
Thinking that I’d moved to the Sydney equivalent of 3CR, I was disillusioned 
when I found I had in fact come upon a ‘groovy’ inner-city life-style station that 
catered more to urban/e subcultures than it did to pressing and profound social 
justice objectives. 
 
However, 2SER-FM did open a door for me that possibly would not have been 
opened had I stayed in Melbourne.  In 1996, we started working with a group of 
media students from Tranby Aboriginal College.  This was my first experience in 
working closely with Kooris, and in not-so-straight-forward ways led to the 
development of friendships with some Kooris and Murris living in Sydney.  
Later in 1996, I spent a month living in Alice Springs, working at CAAMA 
(Central Australian Aboriginal Media Association) as a radio trainer/mentor.  It 
was because of these experiences that I began to make a range of other life 
choices, including choices about my academic direction and growth.  Alongside 
this came new ways of perceiving and conceiving my identity, both within and 
outside of the academy.  But wait, I am getting ahead of myself here.  I pick up 
this part of the story in Chapter Four, when I talk not so much about the 
importance of seeing my whiteness, but about my non-Aboriginality.  For now, I 
want to turn my attention back to the New Race Abolitionists.  
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An ‘Abolition’ of Identity: 
In this section, I critically engage with the limitations of the New Race 
Abolitionists’ methodology for anti-white activism.  I argue the theoretical and 
methodological framework offered by Abolitionists serves to reinscribe the 
epistemological centredness of whiteness and in an Australian context this 
translates into the perpetuation of colonialist ideologies that continue to inform 
power relations between Aboriginal people and members of the invader/settler 
society.  My discussion focuses on three inter-connected elements, including the 
political value of ‘crossing over’ from whiteness into blackness; a critique of the 
ahistoricity of identifying as a race traitor vis-à-vis practical reconciliation; and, 
the proposition that anti-white activists should activate strategic alliances 
between themselves and race hate organisations.   
 
In the initial stages of my discussion, I draw on critiques offered by the 
American scholars Linda Martin Alcoff
48 (1998), and Lisa Flores
49 and Dreama 
Moon
50 (2000 and 2002).  In so doing, I acknowledge the role their work plays in 
informing the general direction of my analysis.  However, given the purpose of 
my discussion is to offer an Australian critique of the New Race Abolitionists, I 
also draw on a range of literature from both Indigenous and other Australian 
writers.  These include Wendy Holland
51 (1996), Lynette Rodriguez
52 (2004), 
                                                 
48 Professor Linda Martin Alcoff teaches in the Political Science faculty at the Maxwell School, 
Syracuse University.  Her primary research interests are continental philosophy, epistemology, 
feminist theory and philosophy of race. 
49 Associate Professor Lisa Flores teaches in communication at the University of Utah.  Her 
research interests include gender studies and feminist theory, masculinity, critical race theory and 
whiteness studies. 
50 Dreama Moon teaches as California State University, San Marco in the College of Arts and 
Sciences/Communication. 
51 Wendy Holland teaches in the School of Social Sciences, at the University of Western Sydney.  
Her areas of expertise include cultural heritage and tourism and Indigenous Australian cultural 
studies.  
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Wendy Brady (1999), Dennis McDermott
53 (2004) and Hannah McGlade
54 
(2000).  I also draw on speeches made by Australian political leaders pertaining 
to reconciliation. In my discussion on practical reconciliation I draw on work by 
Robert Manne
55 (2001), Jon Altman
56 and Boyd Hunter
57 (2003) Ian Anderson 
(2006) and Ruth McCausland
58 (2005). While these writers and sources are not 
concerned with New Race Abolitionism, evidence provided in their work raises a 
number of salient points that go towards an explication of my critique.  
 
The first point I make in my critique of New Race Abolitionism relates to the 
political efficacy of ‘crossing over’ from whiteness into blackness.  As I have 
already discussed, crossing over is one means by which Abolitionists highlight 
the social constructedness of whiteness; register their non-compliance with the 
ideology, practice and privileges of whiteness; and, signify their political 
unanimity with oppressed peoples. Abolitionists articulate this process as 
‘treason to the white race’ and politicise their anti-white selves by co-opting a 
‘race traitor’ identity.  While I recognise the value in appropriating a political 
identity that stands in contradistinction to whiteness, in the following discussion I 
argue there are a number of limitations integral to the Abolitionists’ approach 
                                                 
52 Lynette Rodriguez is Associate Professor for Aboriginal Studies at Notre Dame University 
(Australia), Broome Campus. 
53 Dennis McDermott is a Koori psychologist, academic and poet.  He is conjoint Professor in 
Indigenous Health at the University of New South Wales. 
54 Hannah McGlade is a Nyungar Woman and human rights lawyer. 
55 Robert Manne is a Professor of Politics at La Trobe University and one of Australia’s leading 
public intellectuals. 
56 Professor Jon Altman is the Director of the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
(CAEPR) at the Australian National University and his research interests include sustainable 
economic development and associated policy issues for Indigenous Australians, the Indigenous 
customary economy, Native Title and Indigenous land management. 
57 Dr Boyd Hunter is a fellow at CAEPR.  His research interests include labour market analysis, 
social economics and poverty research. 
58 Ruth McCausland is a Senior Research Fellow at the Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning, 
University of Technology, Sydney.  Her research interests include Indigenous policy, human 
rights and Indigenous peoples, international social justice and criminal justice issues.  
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that serve to reinscribe the epistemological centredness of whiteness.  In the first 
instance, I draw on Flores and Moon (2000 and 2002) to argue the New Race 
Abolitionists apply a simplistic reversal of the essentialised qualities ascribed to 
skin colour so that whiteness becomes inherently ‘evil’ and blackness becomes 
essentially ‘good’.  Consequently, colour is legitimised as a means to ascribe 
characteristics and personal (racialised) qualities to groups of human beings; 
essentialise (political) identities; and, maintain binary relationships between 
whiteness and blackness.  Extrapolating on Flores and Moon, I further argue that 
crossing over essentialises ‘blackness’ as a marker for Aboriginality.  This 
obscures the multifarious ways Aboriginal people experience racism, non-the-
least of which includes the negation of Aboriginality when ‘blackness’ is not 
physically evident.  Finally, crossing over assumes that white-looking people can 
actually surrender their whiteness in favour of blackness.  As Kincloe and 
Steinberg argue, this is an absurdity, which only serves to highlight the very 
privilege of whiteness.  They write: 
Whites alone can opt out of their racial identity, can proclaimed [sic] 
themselves nonraced.  Yet no matter how vociferously they may renounce 
their whiteness, white people do not lose the power associated with being 
white.  Such a reality renders many white renunciations disingenuous (c.f. 
Flores and Moon, 2000: 107). 
 
By way of extending Kincloe and Steinberg’s observation, I draw on Linda 
Martin Alcoff’s (1998) argument that ‘crossing over’ implies the right to control 
the black Other by co-opting their political autonomy.  Further, I argue that 
because ‘crossing over’ insists on unidirectional movement between whiteness 
and blackness, it definitionally excludes Aboriginal peoples’ experiences and 
deployment of strategic whiteness as a means to intercede in the power of 
whiteness in their lives.  Therefore, crossing over controls the right of access to  
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whiteness by non-white people, thereby preserving the power and privileges of 
whiteness for ‘white only’ use.  
 
Crossing Over 
It is not hard to understand the subversive appeal of the New Race Abolitionists.  
New Race Abolitionists provide a new political language for white people 
seeking ways to self-identify that are not dependent on whiteness to describe 
social, cultural and political locations and affiliation. As one Race Traitor has 
observed, “[y]ou’ve given me a new term for myself – RACE TRAITOR –  and 
have forced me to think about issues which I haven’t touched in a long time” 
(Flores and Moon, 2002: 197).   
 
Race Traitors purport to disengage from their whiteness in pursuit of a ‘cross 
over’ into blackness.  Crossing over requires a convoluted process of 
disidentification with whiteness; identification as a race traitor, followed by a 
reidentification as black.  Imbedded within these processes are a number of 
contradictions.  Firstly, a commitment to the social construction of race is critical 
to the disidentification of whiteness.  By way of signalling their disidentification 
from whiteness, race traitors begin to refer to themselves as “”so called” whites” 
(Flores and Moon, 2000: 104). While this disassociation from whiteness signifies 
a ‘race traitor’ identity, it is clear that naming whiteness is necessary in locating 
their white selves within the lexicon of race.  Moreover, Race Traitors keep the 
language of race in play because they seek to transcend whiteness in favour of 
blackness.  This requires a re-inscription of human qualities through skin colour, 
which is enabled through a simplistic reversal of traditional binaries where all  
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‘good’ (‘humane’, ‘authentic’, ‘natural’, ‘defiant’) human attributes are assigned 
to ‘blackness’ (Flores and Moon, 2000: 108-109; Flores and Moon, 2002: 191) 
and ‘bad’ (‘tricked by the devil’, deranged’, ‘privilege of greed and domination’, 
anti-Christ’) human attributes are assigned to whiteness (Flores and Moon 2000: 
102).  Thus, at the precise moment Race Traitors seek to abolish whiteness 
through the appropriation of blackness, the discursive arrangements through 
which they pursue this abolition ensures the very fact of whiteness exists.  As 
Flores and Moon write: 
Too often race traitors reinscribe racial essentialisms and retain hierarchies 
based on superiority/inferiority and domination/subordination.  Such 
entanglements are most vivid in Race Traitor’s reliance on the black/white 
binary….when race traitors reduce whiteness to a monolithic evil and 
simultaneously glorify a pure and humane blackness, they reinforce binary 
and relational notions of race.  All that we know of whiteness and white 
experiences, as well of race and of Blackness comes through the 
juxtaposition of whiteness with blackness.  So long as white is defined in 
relation to Black, the move to abolish whiteness through the “taking in of a 
little blackness” is made impossible.  Blackness and whiteness still only 
exist in and through each other.  Each, as the opposite of the other, is only 
understood in contrast.  And while race traitors seek to escape skin color 
definition, that option is not available to Blacks.  Instead, Blacks retain 
their essence, albeit a different one.   More natural, more humane, Blacks 
remain colored; they are their skin.  The main difference between the Race 
Traitor argument and traditional discussions of race is the inversion of 
power positions.  Race Traitor, at least at the explicit level, promotes 
Blacks.  However, latent power positions are not actually disrupted (2002: 
198).  
 
 
Within the discursive framework used by Race Traitors, monolithic notions of 
whiteness and blackness work to essentialise ‘blackness’ as the signifier for 
oppression.  While this may serve the ideological purposes of white people 
seeking an alternative, anti-white site for political identification, it sheds little 
light on the multifarious ways Aboriginal people negotiate whiteness, blackness, 
Aboriginality and racism in their lives.  I argue, essentialised understandings of  
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blackness as oppression universalises Aboriginality as blackness.  This both 
negates the experiences of ‘cosmetically white’ Aboriginal people, and absorbs 
Aboriginal peoples’ engagement with ‘strategic whiteness’ into a victorious 
claim for assimilation. 
 
Connected to this argument are problems of universalising our understanding of 
whiteness.  The assumption that all ‘white looking’ people share in the power of 
their whiteness equally (see Thompson et al, 1997: above) normalises the 
definition of whiteness to the exclusion of those whose experiences of their 
‘cosmetic’ whiteness represents anything but empowerment and privilege.  I 
argue totalising definitions of whiteness conceal the various ways racism is 
performed in societies where whiteness is understood to constitute the human 
norm.  Therefore, as Wendy Holland argues: 
The collapsing of the binary opposition – through which many of us have 
come to view the relationship between murri and non-murri people as 
simply a relationship black and white australians – is necessary in order to 
facilitate a broader understanding of racism (1996: 98). 
 
There is a small but growing body of autobiographical and scholarly literature 
produced by Aboriginal writers exploring the relationship with their ‘physical’ 
whiteness, Aboriginality and blackness and the ways these elements combined 
impact on their interface with whiteness/white Australia.  While these accounts 
are uniquely personal, Aboriginal autobiographies are necessarily positioned 
within and share a history of colonisation and speak back to the tensions between 
whiteness, the validation of Aboriginality through blackness, and Aboriginal 
cultural belongings as they are determined by family, community and country. In 
so doing, these autobiographies highlight the hypocrisy of colonialist ideology  
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where Aboriginality (as blackness) was once deemed undesirable and to be ‘bred 
out’, and is now required (by many) as validation of an Aboriginal identity. 
Wendy Brady captures this tension when she writes: 
When I look at you, I look at you with a face that actually represents a 
history of colonisation.  Loss of ownership of land, loss of human rights, 
and for some of us, the loss of our colour but not the loss of our culture.  I 
can walk down the street and not necessarily be seen to be who I am.  But if 
I walk down the street with my cousins, or my aunties or my uncles, or my 
father, then I am understood to be part of that other dangerous group (1999: 
28). 
 
In her essay/autobiography, But Who Are You ‘Really’? (2004), Lynette 
Rodriguez tells of the way her whiteness mystifies and defies the white 
imperative for easy classification.  She tells how, as a child and young adult she 
recognised her physical difference from her siblings and cousins (who are darker 
than her), but at the same time she writes, “[m]any times I have looked at my 
skin and while I knew I was looking at the colour white, I saw black” (2004: 98).  
Equally, those who she observed as ‘white’ were “alien beings from another 
world” (2004: 98).  The white people who came into contact with Lynette and 
her family saw it as their prerogative to evaluate, quantify and elevate her 
‘whiteness’.  This is an abridged version of part of her story: 
I was in Grade 6, and each Aboriginal student had to meet a man, who I 
now assume was from either the Education Department or the Native 
Welfare Department (it was about 1968-9).  I walked in and sat in front of a 
youngish man with black hair and a white shirt…. He looked at me  for a 
long time and I remember him saying ‘what shall I put you down as??  One 
sixteenth??  I now realise that he was trying to work out what percentage of 
Aboriginal blood I had…. A few months ago I was talking to Mum and she 
said that in the sixties she went to the Native Welfare Office and was told 
by one of the officers interviewing her that, ‘Well, we have good news.  
Finally, your children can be classified as white, but unfortunately you 
can’t because you fall just below the mark’.… No one asked Mum or 
thought of the fact they were technically dividing a mother and her 
children.  It made no difference to us children who always thought of 
ourselves as totally Aboriginal.  At the time, this ‘mark’ meant nothing to  
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Mum and our life continued as it always had been.  So much for that 
(Rodriguez, 2004: 104-105). 
 
Wendy Holland also shares her account of negotiating whiteness in the essay 
Mis/taken Identity (1996).  Holland writes, “[l]iving in a white body and 
identifying as a murri means that my experience of racism has always been 
different to that of a murri living in a black body” (1996: 97).  For Holland, her 
Murri identity is negotiated between multiple and intersecting sites of resistance 
and racism.  She recounts the story of being rejected by her father’s white 
extended family because she is Aboriginal (as distinct to ‘black’).  She also tells 
of the pressure on her family to be “respectable – quiet and hard working”, to be 
“cleaner than clean, better than best” (1996: 101) to avoid drawing attention to 
their Aboriginality.  By the same token, Wendy finds her Aboriginality (as 
cultural difference) ignored by her white peers and those she comes into contact 
with in the education system because she is ‘white’.  As for negotiating 
whiteness/Aboriginality in the Murri community, Wendy is also critical of the 
essentialising impulse that sometimes informs Murris’ understanding of 
‘Aboriginality’.  This she says, “only works to reinforce the racism of the 
dominant culture” (1996: 105).  For Holland, the overlapping sites of 
Aboriginality and whiteness are simultaneously, and paradoxically, sites of 
empowerment and disempowerment.  In an account that also serves as an 
interesting ‘answering’ story to the Race Traitor ‘cop watch’ program, she tells 
of her experience bearing whiteness to police harassment of a ‘black youth’.  She 
writes (and I quote at length):  
I was making my way home through the back streets of an inner-city 
suburb one night when I happened to notice two police offers standing over 
a black youth.  They had the youth pinned against a wall, with a torch 
shining in his face.  As I drove by I felt really uncomfortable about the  
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situation and wasn’t sure what to do.  By the time I had driven around the 
block, I had made up my mind that I would idle my car so the headlights 
were shining right on the police. 
 
Less than a minute after I turned up, the police officers turned off the torch, 
a couple of minutes later, they let the youth go.  It was obvious that they 
started to get a bit nervous about being watched.  I continued to sit in my 
car while the youth walked away.  I made a point of watching the police as 
well, and they knew it too.  While I am not sure what the youth had been up 
to for the police to take the action that they did, I was convinced that he 
didn’t deserve the treatment that he received. 
 
Now what was interesting was what went through my mind at the time of 
the incident.  I re/member feeling really angry and ready to jump out of my 
car in order to take on the police in relation to the way they were treating 
the youth.  However, I knew that if I did, I probably would have ended up 
being abusive toward the police…creating even more trouble.  I also 
recognised that it was safer to be in my car, rather than on the street, given 
my gender.  At the same time I distinctly re/member recognising the power 
I had in the situation as I sat within my car. 
 
Looking white was to my advantage in this particular situation, and I knew 
it!  I also knew that if I were questioned by the police I could use my 
position within my workplace as well as support from other members of 
staff to challenge such racism.  This is not the first time that I have been 
placed in such a situation and it probably won’t be the last.  Racism is alive 
and well in australia today, and I know only too well what it is like to be on 
the receiving end of it (Holland, 1996: 109-110). 
 
The point that I am making here is that definitions of Aboriginality that rely on 
the physical presence of blackness reduces us to conceiving whiteness, blackness 
and Aboriginality according to physical determinants, and marks a return to the 
days when Aboriginality was quantified according to a bogus biological 
formulae. This then, negates the importance of kinship connections and cultural 
belongings in identifying as Aboriginal, and is out of step with contemporary 
‘social’ definitions of Aboriginality that include a person’s self-identification as 
Indigenous and acceptance by the community to whom he or she belongs
59 
(Brady and Carey, 2000: 274, also see Langton, 1993: 29).  Further, 
                                                 
59 I also take Brady’s point that for bureaucratic, employment and other purposes, self-
dentification as Aboriginal requires a process of authentication and documentation from 
Aboriginal community organisations.  This is not an imposition that is placed on white people.  
  118 
essentialising Aboriginality as blackness erases the impact of colonisation on 
both the ‘colour’ and cultural expression of Aboriginal people.  This ahistoricity 
enables ‘whiteness’ to discursively resist the ways Aboriginal people employ 
whiteness as a site of resistance against the power of whiteness and its intrusion 
into their lives.  Crossing-over then, places significant constraints on the ways 
Aboriginal people express an independent consciousness vis-à-vis their 
experience of whiteness. As Linda Martin Alcoff argues, crossing over is a way 
of incorporating the political and cultural autonomy of oppressed peoples, with a 
view to containing their independence.   
 
Alcoff’s argument is, informed by Sartre’s work on “the Look and its role in 
social relations” (Alcoff, 1998: 20).  Alcoff argues it is:  
in the Look of the Other we perceive the Other’s subjective consciousness 
– that is, the Other’s interior life as similar to our own.  We also perceive 
our being-for-others, or the value and meanings we have in the eyes of the 
Other” (1998: 20).   
 
On one level, Alcoff argues, “white racism is generally predicated on the need 
and desire of whites to deflect the Look of the Black Other, a Look that will 
reveal guilt, accusation and moral deficiency” (Alcoff, 1998: 20).  In this 
instance, deflecting the Black gaze is a discountenancing of the subjectivity of 
the Black Other and disallows recognition of the human experience of racism 
that results from the Othering process.  Moreover, a refusal on the part of whites 
to meet the returned gaze enables the continued objectification of those who are 
positioned as Other from the purview of the dominant, Othering gaze (Alcoff, 
1998: 20-21). 
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However, Alcoff extends her analysis to argue that unlike processes of deflection 
that perpetuate the objectification of the Other, cross-overs also represent a 
recognition of the Other’s subjectivity and the means by which that subjectivity 
is integrated into the subjectivities of those in control of the Othering processes 
in order to render the Other safe, manageable and ‘in sight’.  This process of 
incorporation then, negates the difference of the Other, producing a sameness 
that neutralises the potency and meaning of their returned gaze.  It maintains 
dominance by controlling the right to ‘Look’.  Alcoff explains, “the desire to 
incorporate the Other’s freedom within me, such that my needs and desires are 
still at the center and the Other exists only as a portion of my arranged world 
without real autonomy” (Alcoff, 1998: 20, emphasis in the original). 
 
Following from Alcoff, I argue when ‘whites’ pre-arranged world is informed by 
easy categories of white and black (albeit ‘evil white’ and ‘good black’) there 
exists the means to obscure the ways oppressed people utilise and engage with 
the oppressors’ whiteness to their own advantage.  Therefore, containing the 
freedom of the ‘black Other’ (in this instance, Aboriginal people) necessitates 
restricting access to the privileges of whiteness, even when access to the 
oppressors’ whiteness provisions oppressed people with the means to mitigate 
the effects of whiteness and retain cultural integrity.  To develop this point, I 
refer to Dennis McDermott, and his analysis on Aboriginal peoples’ use of 
‘strategic whiteness’. 
 
The purpose of McDermott’s discussion is to problematise the impact of strategic 
whiteness on the emotional, psychological and physical health outcomes of  
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Aboriginal people.  He positions his discussion within a broader, post-colonial 
framework.  Borrowing from Franz Fanon’s metaphor “linking colonialism and 
disease” (2004: 39), McDermott acknowledges the impact of “settlement and 
dispossession” and the Othering of Aboriginal peoples’ lives that “flows” from 
these practices (2004: 39-40).  He also draws on research and clinical studies on 
the psychological health of Aboriginal people struggling with “identity and 
belonging” (2004: 39).  McDermott acknowledges that evidence shows 
psychological and related physical health outcomes improve for Aboriginal 
people when they are “clear about who…[they] are and…[feel] strong 
in…identity” (2004: 38).  However, he also argues that strategic whiteness may 
have positive health effects, empowering Aboriginal people to negotiate and 
deflect the Othering gaze and the experiences of social isolation and alienation 
that come from this. 
 
For McDermott, strategic whiteness manifests through a range of ‘self 
modifying’ behaviours (2004: 36) and places Aboriginal people in dialogue with 
whiteness (2004: 40).  He argues strategic whiteness provides the “interstice” 
through which Aboriginality as difference can be negotiated without having to 
comply with the imperative for sameness through whiteness.  Here McDermott 
draws on the work of Trinh Minh-ha, and her notion of ‘appropriate’, 
‘inappropriate’ and ‘inappropriate/d’ behaviour to develop his point.  He writes: 
Trinh’s work suggests that strategic Whiteness may also play out in less 
direct, sometimes seemingly paradoxical ways.  People may confound 
expectations: crucially, they may defy expected behaviour and in so doing 
may act, not only in an inappropriate, but in an ‘inappropriate/d’, fashion.  
Trinh notes a linkage between acting inappropriately and refusing 
appropriation.  In her analysis there may exist a conscious or non-conscious 
strategy of becoming an ‘inappropriate/d other (McDermott, 2004: 36-37). 
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For McDermott, strategic, or inappropriate/d whiteness, confounds, or ‘tricks’, 
the usual ‘taxon’ of different-ness and sameness/Aboriginality and whiteness by 
disabling whiteness’s imperative for easy categorisation.  Strategic whiteness 
displaces and obscures the Othering gaze.  It is a way of saying “[y]ou can’t even 
pin me down…let alone negate me!” (2004: 37).  Thus, with strategic whiteness, 
Aboriginal difference is inserted into the broader discursive arrangements of 
whiteness and Aboriginal people create their niche for social inclusion without 
having to ‘appropriate’ whiteness or bow to the pressures of assimilation. 
 
I argue McDermott’s analysis represents a dynamic way of negotiating 
Aboriginality vis-à-vis whiteness that acknowledges the social constructedness of 
racialised identities, resists essentialisms and allows for cultural and political 
integrity.  Juxtaposed against the New Race Abolitionists’ notion of crossing 
over, McDermott’s argument resists the power of whiteness and the imperative 
for compliance (assimilation), whilst simultaneously recognising that whiteness 
is contended with and negotiated by Aboriginal people on a daily basis.  Thus, I 
argue, uncritical acceptance of the new Race Abolitionists’ model would see us 
accept a unidirectional understanding of crossing over at the expense of 
recognising the multiple and complex ways the interstices between whiteness and 
blackness are negotiated by those whose positionality to whiteness differs from 
white (dis)identifying people.   Therefore, in the absence of this understanding, 
crossing over from whiteness into blackness simply serves as a hegemonic 
paradigm, insisting that the only way to resist whiteness is to be ‘black’.  The 
disingenuity of this claim is that the physical absence or presence of ‘blackness’ 
turns out to be the basis of Aboriginal peoples’ experience of racism.  
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The second point I make in my critique of New Race Abolitionism is that 
crossing over promotes a mode of political identification that is characterised by 
its ahistoricity and discontinuity.  As such, I argue crossing over is at odds with 
the foundational principles of reconciliation that are predicated on an affirmation 
and restoration of the special rights that accrue to Aboriginal people because they 
are first nation’s peoples, and a full and frank acknowledgment of the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people because of colonisation.  Because of this, I 
argue crossing over plays into the hands of contemporary, neo-conservative 
expressions of ‘practical reconciliation’, which seeks to redeem the national 
story; the reputation of Australian people through a denial of atrocities 
committed against Aboriginal people; and, seeks to assimilate Aboriginal people 
into whiteness through an explicit negation of their rights as Aboriginal people.    
 
In part, my argument is informed by Linda Martin Alcoff, who, writing from a 
North American perspective, wonders at the value of political mobilisation that is 
not grounded in a sense of community and shared history, and is unified by a 
profound, morally charged, common purpose.  She writes: 
Every individual, I would argue, needs to feel a connection to community, 
to a history, and to a human project larger than his or her own life.  Without 
this connection, we are bereft of a concern for the future or an investment 
in the fate of our community…. If this analysis is correct…what are North 
American whites to do…. Should they become, as Noel Ignatiev and John 
Garvey argue, race traitors who disavow all claims or ties to whiteness?…  
Can a deracialized individualism provide the sense of historical continuity 
that moral action seems to require? (Alcoff, 1998: 8). 
 
Within contemporary political discourse, ‘reconciliation’ is conceived as two 
competing models: ‘symbolic reconciliation’ and ‘practical reconciliation’.  
Symbolic reconciliation is attributed to Paul Keating’s Labor government  
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although it is important to note that Keating did not refer to reconciliation as 
‘symbolic’.  Rather, I argue, the term ‘symbolic’ is a politically motivated 
phrase, used by the Howard Liberal government to diminish the reconciliation 
process and its potential to set Australia on a path towards decolonisation.   In 
contrast, Howard promotes ‘practical reconciliation’, which focuses on the 
‘practical’ matters of improving Aboriginal health, housing, education and 
employment (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 2).   
 
Altman and Hunter (2003) identify key ideological differences between symbolic 
and practical reconciliation. They argue Keating’s symbolic reconciliation is 
associated with “Indigenous rights, stolen generations, deaths in custody and the 
invalid alienation of land and resources” (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 2), whereas 
practical reconciliation denies the validity of according Indigenous people their 
unique status as first nation’s peoples and the specific rights that accrue to them 
because of this (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 13).  
 
I take Altman and Hunter’s point, however, I also argue there are limitations to 
this definition because it confines the ideological differences between the two 
models of reconciliation to achieving specific outcomes for Indigenous people.  I 
argue ‘symbolic’ reconciliation is a much bigger project, and necessarily 
incorporates the important task of rescripting the national narrative in order to 
include the story of colonisation and Aboriginal dispossession, which hitherto 
was largely ignored in mainstream Australian forums and institutions.  Although 
reconciliation was a ‘top-down’ process of political and cultural change, it was 
understood that it would not succeed without broad community support.  This  
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involved a two pronged approach: extensive consultation with Aboriginal 
communities to ascertain their aspirations for reconciliation and provisioning 
mainstream Australians with consciousness raising education on our colonial 
past. To this extent, reconciliation was necessarily inclusive of members of the 
invader/settler society and was bound by an acute awareness of the need to 
provide education on the moral imperative for reconciliation and to unite us/them 
with Aboriginal people in articulating a vision for the future of the nation, and 
our respective places within it.  Therefore, I argue the tension between symbolic 
and practical reconciliation is not merely a tension between achieving symbolic 
and practical outcomes for Indigenous people.  Fundamentally, and 
paradoxically, it is a tension produced out of a struggle for ownership of the 
symbolic space, the way the national story will be told, what place Indigenous 
people have within the narrative structure of this story, and the responsibilities 
and moral obligations of members of the invader/settler society towards 
Aboriginal people.  As Simeon Moran writes: 
…perceiving the nation as a contested symbol opens the space for an 
understanding of nationalisms as having multiple meanings, competed over 
by ‘different groups manoeuvring to capture the symbol’s definition and its 
legitimising effects’.  Recognising this symbolic aspect of the nation also 
allows us to see national and governmental rhetorics as ‘elements in larger 
contests to define meaning of national symbols and to define the [nation] 
symbol itself (2003: 183, parenthesis in the original). 
 
I argue practical reconciliation is its own symbolic domain: one that denies its 
symbolic power through the rhetoric of ‘practicality’.  This rhetoric conceals the 
symbiotic relationship between the containment of Indigenous rights and the 
rescripting of the national story so that it protects white sovereignty.  Therefore, I 
argue within symbolic reconciliation and practical reconciliation, there is a 
tension between Australia’s attempts to decolonise and its obvious, defensive  
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counter point, the need to resist decolonisation through a re-colonisation of 
Aboriginal people and their land.  It is in this light that I argue practical 
reconciliation is essentially underpinned by a neo-colonial impulse.  In the 
following discussion, I elaborate this argument with reference to the role of 
history in marking out the parameters of the reconciliation debate, with specific 
reference to Robert Manne’s analysis of the politicisation of the stolen 
generations and the Bringing Them Home report (1997).  I then turn my attention 
to an examination of practical reconciliation and its ability to deliver social 
justice outcomes to Aboriginal people. In the first instance, I refer to Altman and 
Hunter’s quantitative analysis of reconciliation outcomes for Aboriginal people 
from 1991-2001.  Following this, I discuss the ‘post-reconciliation’ era and the 
abolition of ATSIC, the mainstreaming of Indigenous affairs and the 
implementation of Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs). 
 
In 1991, the Reconciliation Bill was passed through the Australian Federal 
parliament with bipartisan support.  Broadly, the Bill had three objectives: to 
meet the social justice and human rights needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people; to formulate a formal document, possibly a Treaty, between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people; and, to increase mainstream awareness of 
the history of dispossession of Aboriginal people (Tickner, 2001: 29).  Thus, 
claiming history was identified as one of the critical, central tenants of bringing 
about a reconciled Australia.  In 1992, in his historic Redfern Address 
commemorating the United Nations International Year of Indigenous People, the 
then Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating declared: 
It begins, I think, with the act of recognition.  Recognition that it was we 
who did the dispossessing.  We took the traditional lands and smashed the  
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traditional way of life.  We brought the disasters.  The alcohol.  We 
committed the murders.  We took the children from their mothers.  We 
practiced the discrimination and exclusion.  It was our ignorance and our 
prejudice.  And our failure to imagine these things being done to us.  With 
some noble exceptions, we failed to make the most basic human response 
and enter into their hearts and minds.  We failed to ask – how would I feel 
if this were done to me?  As a consequence, we failed to see that what we 
were doing degraded all of us (c.f. Grattan, 2000: 61). 
 
In 1996, with the election of the Federal Liberal Party, national history and 
memory became politically fraught.  In late 1996, Prime Minister John Howard 
invoked Geoffrey Blainey’s phrase ‘black armband view’
60 of history to rail 
against ‘political correctness’ and revisionist versions of Australian history that 
included accounts of Aboriginal dispossession (Macintyre, 2004: 136-137). 
Subsequently, the term ‘black armband’ has worked its way into the Australian 
vernacular as a way of eschewing Australian/Aboriginal history.   Arguably, the 
most notable example of this political contestation is the Federal Government’s 
response to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s (HREOC) 
Bringing Them Home Report (1997).  The report was the result of an Inquiry into 
the Stolen Generations headed up by the then President of HREOC, Sir Ronald 
Wilson and the then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner 
(HREOC), Michael Dodson. Initiated in 1995 under the Keating government, the 
Inquiry gathered evidence from “Indigenous organisations and individuals, State 
and Territory Government Representatives, other non-government agencies, 
former mission and government employees, and individual members of the 
                                                 
60Geoffrey Blainey first invoked the metaphor ‘black armband’ in 1993 when he delivered the 
John Latham Memorial lecture.  The expression was used as a juxtaposition to the “three cheers” 
(Macintyre, 2004: 131)version of Australian history.  Blainey has explained that he intended the 
phrase to refer to the black armband worn by footballers as a sign of respect when someone 
important has passed away.  Historian Stuart Macintyre notes that this explanation is “strained” 
(2004: 131). The phrase was subsequently picked up and used by John Howard in 1996 when 
speaking to the Federal Parliament and it has since become part of the discourse surrounding 
Australian/Aboriginal history (Macintyre, 2004: 3).    
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community” (Dodson and Wilson, 1997: 19).  Testimony was also taken from 
535 Aboriginal witnesses around Australia, all of whom revealed the devastating 
impact of various States’ and Territories’ child removal policies during the 20
th 
century (Dodson and Wilson, 1997: 21).  The report concluded that child 
removal policies were genocidal and made 54 recommendations to the Federal 
Government (Dodson and Wilson, 1997: 651 - 665).  Amongst these 
recommendations, the Federal Government was urged to make an apology, on 
behalf of the nation to Aboriginal people (Dodson and Wilson, 1997: 651).  The 
Federal Government has staunchly refused to offer this apology, and the former 
Prime Minister Howard did little more than state his ‘regret’.  
 
In 1997, the Liberal Federal Government outlined its policy for ‘practical 
reconciliation’, which flagged a radical departure from the model proposed 
earlier by the Labor Party.  At the 1997 Reconciliation Convention in Melbourne, 
Prime Minister John Howard opined: 
Reconciliation will not work if it puts a higher value on symbolic gestures 
and overblown promises rather than the practical needs of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people in areas like health, housing, education and 
employment.  It will not work if it is premised solely on a sense of national 
guilt and shame.  Rather, we should acknowledge past injustices and focus 
our energies on addressing root causes of current and future disadvantage 
among our indigenous people (1997: online). 
 
The plan for practical reconciliation was reiterated at Corroboree 2000, the 
ceremony to commemorate the end of the official reconciliation period.  Again, 
Howard’s vision obfuscated the importance of engaging with the nation’s 
history.  He declared: 
…I do not believe it is accurate or fair to portray Australia’s history since 
1788 as little more than a disgraceful record of imperialism, exploitation 
and racism.  Such a portrayal is a gross distortion and deliberately neglects  
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the overall story of great Australian achievement that is there in our history 
to be told. Australians of this generation should not be required to accept 
guilt and blame for past actions and policies over which they had no control 
(c.f. Gratton, 2000: 90). 
 
Notwithstanding the critical need for improvements in Aboriginal health, housing 
and education, Howard’s new plan reduced reconciliation to four objectives most 
Australians regard as axiomatic rights, accruing to us because we are citizens of 
this country. Gone (for the time being at least) is the possibility of a Treaty and 
the powerful and important work of recovering our shared history is significantly 
undermined.  Indeed, an entire neo-conservative ‘industry’, comprised of 
conservative think-tanks, public intellectuals, some academics, journalists, 
lawyers, former public servants and politicians, has dedicated itself to waging an 
ideological war on reconciliation by denying the violence of colonisation and its 
ongoing repercussions for Aboriginal people.   
 
For example, Robert Manne’s In denial (2001) details the machinations of the 
denialist industry
61 vis-à-vis the Stolen Generations and the Bringing Them 
Home Report  (1997)
62. In his essay, Manne reveals the level of collusion 
amongst some of Australia’s most powerful political conservatives in 
suppressing and vilifying the report’s findings.  He writes:  
Gradually critics of Bringing them home emerged.  Some of the criticism 
came from former administrators of Aboriginal affairs; some former patrol 
officers; some from conservative journalists; some from right-wing think-
tanks and magazines.  It was the magazine Quadrant, however, under the 
editorship of Padraic McGuiness, that marshalled the troops and galvanised 
the disparate voices of opposition to Bringing them home into what 
amounted to a serious and effective political campaign (2001: 6). 
                                                 
61 For further discussion see Stuart Macintyre’s, The History Wars  (2003), especially Chapter 
Eight. 
62 In In Denial, Manne also touches on his critique of Keith Windshuttle and his repudiation of 
frontier violence and massacres against Aboriginal people. For further discussion on this see 
Robert Manne’s (ed) Whitewash: On Keith Windshuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History 
(2003).  
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As Manne explains, the anthropologist Ron Brunton, from the private think-tank, 
‘The Institute of Public Affairs’, fired the first salvo against Bringing Them 
Home with his “backgrounder”, Betraying the Victims published in 1998 (Manne, 
2001: 31 and 107). Here, Brunton speculates that positive accounts of child 
removal had been deliberately stricken from the record; that welfare agencies had 
legitimate reason for removing neglected children; and, the authors did not 
exercise sufficient emotional restraint in their writing of the report.  Brunton also 
argued witnesses evidence (that is, Aboriginal witnesses who gave evidence to 
the Inquiry) was not tested against other, government documentary evidence and 
the Inquiry did not include the experiences of non-Aboriginal children removed 
from their families (a spurious charge as this was beyond the Inquiry’s terms of 
reference as they were determined by the Federal Government).  Brunton also 
condemned the report’s charge that Aboriginal child removal was genocidal in its 
intent (Manne, 20011: 31 - 42). 
 
It was Padraic McGuiness, editor of the conservative Quadrant magazine and 
columnist for the Sydney broadsheet newspaper the Sydney Morning Herald who 
spearheaded the denialist campaign.  As Manne explains, McGuiness became 
editor of Quadrant in 1997, and by 2000 he had “moved from the promise of 
“genuine debate” on Aboriginal policy to the reality of atrocity denial in the 
David Irving mode” (2001: 59).  Regular contributors to Quadrant, such as Frank 
Devine, Christopher Pearson, Andrew Bolt, Piers Akerman and Michael Duffy 
were columnists for The Australian, Australian Financial Review, the Herald 
Sun in Melbourne and the Sydney Daily Telegraph respectively.  Each played  
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their role in propagating myths about the stolen generations, variously claiming 
that ‘half-caste’ children had been ‘rescued’; that children had only been 
removed when their neglect had been proved in court; and, the Stolen 
Generations were the result of “basic social welfare interventions” (2001: 69) 
and had nothing to do with race.  Sir Ronald Wilson, one of the report’s co-
authors was vilified and the report itself was called “a Big Lie” (2001: 70-71).  
‘Sorry Day’
63 was lampooned as a “celebration of guilt” (2001: 72) and 
Australians who supported the event were positioned as elites who used the 
stolen generations “to entrench their own “status and power”” (2001: 72).  This 
ironic view reveals an astonishing lack of self-awareness by those who truly do 
occupy an elite position in Australian political life and their capacity to influence 
public opinion away from Aboriginal concerns.  Additionally, particular attention 
was paid to Jewish intellectuals who made links between “Australian history” 
and “the Nazi Holocaust” (2001: 73).  Urban dwelling Aboriginal people were 
cast as greedy and motivated only by the compensation dollar (2001: 74). 
 
Manne argues that between 1997 and 1999 there is some difficulty in 
determining how close the Federal Government was to the denialist movement.  
However, he also asserts that on the 1
st of March 1999, the day Douglas Meagher 
QC made his opening address in the Gunner and Cabillo trial in the Northern 
Territory on behalf of the Commonwealth, “the Howard government openly 
joined the anti-stolen generations campaign” (2001: 77).  In part, this claim is 
evidenced by the fact that Meagher was speaking on behalf of the 
Commonwealth because he was acting for them in this trial.  However, in April 
                                                 
63 The 26
th of May is designated as a day of remembrance for the Stolen Generations.  
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2000 the Federal Government made its submission to the Bringing Them Home 
Senate Inquiry.  Here, the Federal Government challenged the use of the word 
‘stolen’, and nitpicked over the number of children removed, alleging that the 
number of children removed hardly constituted a ‘generation’.  In short, the 
submission argued that the stolen generations were a “‘myth” (Manne, 2001: 82).  
As Manne writes: 
Beyond the arithmetic and pedantry, the Senate submission proceeded 
down [familiar] paths…. It repeated many of the methodological criticisms 
of the Wilson-Dodson inquiry pioneered by Ron Brunton; treated Colin 
McLeod’s thin and jejune memoir as an authoritative account of removal 
policy; and quoted uncritically the simplistic and erroneous “half-caste as 
outcast” theories of Reginald Marsh. More seriously, the government 
submission followed Douglas Meagher and the Commonwealth’s legal 
team in its assessment of Aboriginal child removal policy – simultaneously 
sentimentalising the attitude of administrators as one of “care, concern, 
compassion and humanity”, while altogether bleaching out of the picture 
the fundamental racism involved, the determination to rescue part-whites 
from the degradation of an Aboriginal life.  Most seriously of all, as with 
all contributions to the anti-stolen generations campaign, it did not even 
bother to discuss that evidence which revealed the racial engineering, 
eugenic basis of Aboriginal child removal policy and practice in both the 
Northern Territory and Western Australia.  This evidence is, or course, at 
the heart of the discussion about genocide and the stolen generations (2001: 
84) 
 
From 1997-2000, the Stolen Generations ‘debate’ became the discursive 
paradigm through which reconciliation was discussed in Australia.  The notion of 
an apology, or more specifically, the word ‘sorry’, came to symbolise 
reconciliation itself.  In large part this is because the then Federal 
Government’s
64 incapacity to say ‘sorry’ signified its refusal to engage with the 
history of colonisation and to heed the calls of those thousands of Australians 
who needed to hear the apology in order to ‘move on’ from our shared history.  
Following 2000, and the formal conclusion of the reconciliation ‘era’, public 
                                                 
64 While the former Howard Federal Government steadfastly refused to apologise, every State 
Government in Australia has offered its own formal apology.  
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pressure for the government to apologise began to decrease; a tacit 
acknowledgement that the government would not yield to this requirement of 
reconciliation.  Indeed, it is arguable that the Federal Government has won this 
round of the ‘history wars’.  Many of the arguments put against recognition of 
the stolen generations have garnered the force of a hegemonic discourse; 
becoming part of mainstream Australian language and ‘common sense’ 
understandings of Aboriginal/Australian relations. I argue this has serious and 
ongoing implications for the way reconciliation has been cast in the 21
st century.   
 
That there is an important moral link between an apology and substantive 
improvement for Indigenous peoples’ lives is illustrated in Govier and 
Verwoerd’s discussion on the Promise and Pitfalls of Apology (2002)
65.  As 
Govier and Verwoerd explain, an apology has “three main dimensions” (2002: 
69): 
First, the wrongdoer is acknowledging wrongdoing by himself or the group 
or institution he represents.  In expressing moral regret for a particular act, 
he is in effect admitting that the act was wrong, and that he (or the group he 
represents) was responsible for it.  This admission will be addressed to the 
victim or victims of the wrongdoing, and to others as well, in the case of a 
public apology.  Second, in apologizing, the offender is acknowledging the 
moral status of the victim(s), the primary person(s) to whom he apologizes.  
The act was wrong, and in doing it, the offender (or those he represents) 
injured the victims or victims, who did not merit or deserve this ill-
treatment.  Third, the offender is acknowledging the legitimacy of feelings 
of resentment and anger that the victims may feel in response to being 
wronged.  The act or acts in question were wrong, and they really did hurt 
the victims, who did not deserve to be wronged.  Thus, resentment and 
related feelings would be justified (2002: 69). 
 
 
                                                 
65 Govier and Verwoerd frame their argument with reference to South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation processes.  It is interesting to note that one of the Keynote speakers at the 
Australian Reconciliation Convention in 1997 was Dr Alexander Boraine, the Vice Chairperson 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  In his address, he also made the 
important connection between practical and moral amends so that reconciliation can be achieved.  
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Further, Govier and Verwoerd argue “moral amends” need to be reinforced with 
“practical” and “material” amends.   Material amends refers to reparations of 
some kind, whereas practical amends may include both material amends and 
efforts to improve attitudes and relationships between people (2002: 73).  Thus, 
Govier and Verwoerd assert that without practical and material amends, the 
moral apology can perpetuate the original injury (2002: 73).  They write: 
For potential reconciliation between the parties, and for good evidence of 
sincerity on the part of perpetrators, a full-fledged moral apology should 
include a commitment to practical amends (Govier and Verwoerd, 2002: 
73). 
 
In the Australian context, attacks on symbolic reconciliation (symbolised through 
the apology) in the name of practical reconciliation are conjoined with attacks on 
Indigenous peoples’ rights.  In the absence of contextualising reconciliation 
within history, the root causes of problems faced by Aboriginal people and 
communities are denied.  Moreover, by denying the legitimacy of Aboriginal 
claims, which are based in a history of colonisation, the specific rights that 
accrue to Aboriginal people because of this historic fact are denied.  
Consequently, the gains made by Aboriginal people in the early years of 
reconciliation are diminished, both in ‘symbolic’ and ‘practical’ terms. 
 
Jon Altman and Boyd Hunter investigate the impact of practical reconciliation on 
Aboriginal people in their paper, Evaluating Indigenous Socioeconomic 
Outcomes in the Reconciliation Decade, 1991-2001 (2003).  In their discussion, 
Altman and Hunter draw on Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data produced 
from the 1991, 1996 and 2001 national census surveys to analyse socioeconomic 
outcomes for Indigenous people under the Keating Labor government (1991- 
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1996) and the Howard Liberal Government (1996-2001) during the official 
reconciliation period.  Altman and Hunter’s analysis reviews the successes and 
failures of both governments, but focus their evaluation on practical 
reconciliation.  The key variables used in their analysis include employment, 
income, housing, education and health (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 3-5).  These 
variables closely match the identified target areas under Howard’s practical 
reconciliation program.  Their analysis includes figures for both absolute change 
in socioeconomic outcomes for Aboriginal people and relative change compared 
to other Australians.  As Altman and Hunter note, an analysis of relative change 
is important because “practical reconciliation is as much about reducing relative 
disparities as about absolutes” (2003: 12). 
 
Altman and Hunter find that between 1991-1996 absolute wellbeing for 
Indigenous people improved in six areas including labour force participation in 
full time jobs; home ownership; household size; university attendance; post-
school qualifications and population over the age of fifty-five (2003: 11).  It also 
found that overall labour force participation declined and the median income for 
families and adults (two different sets of figures) declined.  Male life expectancy 
at birth remained the same.  Between 1996-2001, Altman and Hunter found  
absolute improvements in median and family income (two different sets of 
figures); home ownership; household size; university qualifications and post-
school qualifications; and, population over fifty-five.  They also found that there 
had been an absolute decline in labour force participation; participation in full 
time jobs.  Male life expectancy at birth remained the same.  In other words, the  
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socioeconomic status for Indigenous people in absolute terms reveals an even 
“scorecard” for both governments (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 12).   
 
An analysis of the relative outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians for the years 1991-1996 and 1996-2001 reveals a considerable 
decline in the second part of the decade under practical reconciliation.  Altman 
and Hunter find that between 1991-1996 there were relative improvements in 
fulltime employment; family median income; home ownership; household size; 
and, post-school qualifications.  They also find a relative decline in adult median 
income; male life expectancy at birth and population over fifty-five.  
Alternatively, between 1996-2001, there were relative improvements in median 
family income; home ownership; household size; and, post-school qualifications.  
Relative declines occurred in labour force participation, full-time jobs, adult 
median income; university attendance; male life expectancy and population over 
fifty-five years (Altman and Hunter, 2003: 11).  Altman and Hunter summarise 
their finding thus: 
In the period 1996-2001 relative wellbeing improved in four variables and 
declined in six, a poor scorecard that suggests that Indigenous people have 
not shared in the national economic growth to the same extent as other 
Australians.  Over the entire reconciliation decade 1991-2001, there was 
absolute improvement for six variables, a decline in three and no change in 
one.  However, in relative terms the story has been a little different.  In the 
period 1991-2001, there was a relative improvement in five variables, and a 
relative decline in five variables.  Of particular concern was relative decline 
over the period in educational and health status.  In terms of reconciliation, 
if this is interpreted in relative and practical and socioeconomic terms, there 
is less reconciliation in 2001 that in 1996.  It is equally worrying that areas 
of improvement evident in 1996 have been eroded over the period 1996-
2001 (2003: 12). 
 
In their critique, Altman and Hunter argue practical reconciliation “implies that it 
is relatively straightforward to address Indigenous disadvantage.  However, the  
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multifaceted and historically ingrained nature of this disadvantage means that 
deficits in particular social indicators might not be amenable to easy solutions” 
(2003: 12).  Further, they argue, there is an arbitrary distinction between the 
‘symbolic’ and the ‘practical’.  For example, when the Federal Government deny 
the impact and the extent of the stolen generations they ignore the 
interconnections between positive parenting outcomes, high incarceration rates 
and the impact this has on employment and education.  Also, failure to affirm 
Indigenous peoples’ land rights ignores that Aboriginal “economic problems 
have their genesis long ago with the alienation of land and resource rights” 
(2003: 13).  Thus, Altman and Hunter conclude: 
Despite the policy rhetoric of the first two Howard Governments 1996-
2001, there is no statistical evidence from census information that their 
policies and programs are delivering better outcomes for Indigenous 
Australians, at the national level, than those of their political predecessors.  
This intractability is worrying in part because it is evident during a time 
when the Australian economy is growing rapidly.  This suggests, in turn, 
that problems are deeply entrenched – it is not just a matter of governments 
choosing between practical and symbolic reconciliation.  There are other 
pressing issues – the levels of investment to address historical legacies and 
contemporary shortfalls, the targeting of resources to the most needy, and 
the delivery of program support in whole-of-governments ways that will 
make a difference.  A major problem for both Indigenous Australians and 
the nation is that other research…suggests that the situation described…is 
likely to get worse
66, rather than better, over the next decade (2003: 14).  
                                                 
66 Reference to current Aboriginal health statistics demonstrates that Altman and Hunter’s 
concerns were prescient. In their recent report Close the Gap: Solutions to the Indigenous Health 
Crisis Facing Australia (2007), Oxfam Australia detail a litany of failure in achieving positive 
health outcomes for Aboriginal people.  The report asserts Aboriginal peoples’ life expectancy is 
twenty years less than that of other Australians.  In contrast, in the USA, Canada and New 
Zealand, the differential between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people is put at about seven 
years. In Australia, the infant mortality rate of Aboriginal children is three times greater than that 
of other Australian children. This is fifty percent higher than Indigenous children in Canada and 
New Zealand (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 3).  Indeed, in 2003, the United Nations Human 
Development Report stated that “the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Australians expected to live to age 65 is lower than underdeveloped nations like Bangladesh and 
Nigeria” (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 5). Oxfam Australia estimate that an expenditure increase of 
$350-500 million is required to Aboriginal health outcomes in Australia (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 
3).  While they acknowledge that “spending on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health has 
increased, it hasn’t done so any faster than for the rest of the population so the expenditure gap 
hasn’t narrowed” (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 8).  In fact, “the Federal Government, through 
programs under its direct control (i.e. Medical Benefits Scheme/Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 
OATSIH, aged care but excluding transfer payments to the states) spends approximately 70c per  
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In the years subsequent to Altman and Hunter’s analysis, the former Howard 
government ‘refined’ its practical reconciliation agenda.  In 2004, the Federal 
Government disbanded the official elected representative body for Aboriginal 
people, ATSIC
67. A new committee, the National Indigenous Consultative 
Committee, was handpicked by the government to advise on policy matters, and 
funding responsibilities for Aboriginal service provision was transferred to 
mainstream government departments.  The Federal Government also 
implemented a new ‘mutual responsibility’ program for Aboriginal communities 
and organisations.  In a perverse twisting of fate, Aboriginal people are rendered 
‘responsible’ to the white nation and must observe the protocols of white 
sovereignty. These new “shared responsibility agreements” (SRAs) connect the 
provision of funding and infrastructure with Aboriginal communities’ obligations 
to “commit to specific behavioural changes or other actions” (McCausland, 
2005: online).  For example, in 2004 the Federal Government negotiated the 
Mulan agreement.  Here, the community was granted petrol bowsers in return for 
a twice-a-day face-washing program for school children, in order to control 
trachoma (McCausland, 2005: online).  Another SRA, signed between the 
Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training, and the New 
                                                 
capita on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people for every $1 spent on the rest of the 
population” (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 8).  There are no set national benchmarks or targets to 
monitor and assess improvements in Aboriginal health outcomes (Oxfam Australia, 2007: 4 and 
9).  Equally, there has been no co-ordinated effort on the part of Federal, State and Territory 
governments to ameliorate the contributing factors to poor health outcomes for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people.  For further discussion on the human rights implications of 
Indigenous health outcomes and the implementation of SRAs see the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Justice Commissioner’s 2005 Social Justice Report (HREOC) 
67 Shortly after the Howard Government’s election in 1996, the government launched an 
extensive audit of 1122 ATSIC funded organisations.  This was part of an ongoing campaign to 
discredit the organisation through allegations of corruption and nepotism.  Only five percent of 
these organisations were found to be in breach of legal and accounting requirements, however 
these were mainly technical breaches such as late reporting.  In fact, the federal court of Australia 
“actually determined that audit was beyond the Minister’s powers under the ATSIC Act.  
Allegations of corruption nevertheless continued” (Anderson, 2007).  
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South Wales State Department of Education and Training links the funding and 
installation of air-conditioning in up to 200 community owned houses with 
improved living conditions, increased school attendance and a decrease in family 
violence (McCausland, 2005: online).  More recently, new housing has been 
provisioned to some families in remote communities.  Four families in the small 
town of Wudapuli in the Northern Territory (near Wadeye) have just ‘received’ 
new houses on the proviso children attend school regularly and the families 
maintain rental payments.  After two years, the families will be eligible to buy 
the houses from the Commonwealth (Graham, 2007: online). 
 
Critics of SRAs argue that mainstreaming Indigenous infrastructure and service 
provision is a radical shift away from Indigenous self-determination (Anderson, 
2006: online) and is assimiliationist in its intent (McCausland, 2005: online).  It 
is also argued that SRAs are racially discriminatory because conditions are 
imposed on Aboriginal people that are not imposed on other Australians for the 
same infrastructure and services; are paternalistic; coercive; and, make illogical 
connections between Indigenous communities immediate needs and broader, 
more profound social problems that are historically rooted.  Further, it is argued 
that SRAs work on a ‘blame the victim’ basis; provide no discernable measurable 
outcomes; and, negotiating positions between Aboriginal people and 
governments are fundamentally unequal (McCausland, 2005: online).  As Ruth 
McCausland writes: 
Under the Government’s new arrangements, SRAs have emerged as a kind 
of quasi-contractual arrangement that imply two parties – Indigenous 
communities and governments – are entering into them by choice, with 
both parties having equal responsibility for and benefit from the agreement.  
However, in reality there is an enormous power imbalance embodied in 
such agreements.  They make responsibilities for the provision of basic  
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services and infrastructure – which governments have to all citizens – 
conditional on specified behaviour change in Indigenous communities.  
They shift perceptions of responsibility for existing problems and lack of 
progress to Indigenous communities themselves (2005: online). 
 
In shifting the blame from governments to Aboriginal communities, governments 
are freed from having to make holistic assessments of the problems Indigenous 
communities face, and implementing integrated, multifaceted responses.  Of the 
housing project in Wudapuli, where children are required to attend school, Chris 
Graham of the National Indigenous Times asks: 
And just what school will “the children” be sent?  Our Lady of the Sacred 
Heart (OLSH) Wadeye, which last year had over 600 enrolments at the start 
of the year, but was given funding and teachers for less than 220 students at 
a school that can house around 300.  It’s worth noting the same number of 
enrolments turned up in 2007, and so did the same amount of funding 
(2007: online). 
 
Also, in the absence of broad, mainstream community awareness of the measures 
Aboriginal communities take in order to address social problems, the government 
is able to skew the results of SRAs, falsely proclaiming their achievements. For 
example, eighteen months before the SRA negotiations began in Mulan, the 
school had already commenced a face-washing program and incidents of 
trachoma had decreased to 16% in children aged sixteen years and under.  
However, when Brendan Nelson, the then Federal Minister for Education, 
Science and Training justified the agreement he cited pre-program figures, thus 
claiming the community’s success as the Government’s.  With reference to this 
McCausland argues: 
This raises significant questions about whether the Federal Government’s 
policy approach, endorsed by state and territory governments who are often 
party to such SRAs, is genuinely about improving the health and welfare of 
Indigenous people through community-driven negotiations that respond to 
local priorities, or about imposing a top-down framework to prove an 
ideological point (2005: online). 
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Finally, I argue that the implementation of SRAs fractures the ability of 
Aboriginal people to make broader, nationally based representations to 
governments.  The former Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Mal Brough, 
is on record as saying SRAs enable governments to engage in community 
consultation and respond to specific community need.  In other words, the 
government is able to couch the implementation of SRAs in language usually 
associated with Aboriginal self-determination.  However, while the Minister 
rhetorically appeals to self-determination, dealing with small communities in 
isolation disables their ability to frame their needs within a broader context of 
historical disadvantage and speak to the unique rights that accrue to them 
because they are first nations’ peoples who share the common experience of 
colonisation.  Further, subsequent to the abolition of ATSIC and the 
mainstreaming of Aboriginal services there is no identifiable peak Aboriginal 
political body
68 to represent specific Aboriginal needs to government. 
Consequently, political representations of ‘pan-Aboriginal’ interests are 
significantly thwarted and challenges to the legitimacy of white sovereignty are 
suppressed. 
 
‘Practical reconciliation’ has undermined the potency of the reconciliation 
movement, both in symbolic and (perversely) practical terms.   It has done this in 
two ways.  Firstly, it has undermined the notion of reconciliation as a ‘peoples’ 
movement’, galvanised by a morally defined common purpose to understand our 
shared history, bring about social justice for Aboriginal people and negotiate a 
formal document between Aboriginal and other Australians.  Secondly, practical 
                                                 
68 Although there was a board of Indigenous people with whom the former government consulted 
on Indigenous matters.  
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reconciliation has engineered a quantifiable diminution of rights and standard of 
living for Aboriginal people.  I argue that in broad terms, practical reconciliation 
shares many of the characteristics of crossing-over as the New Race Abolitionists 
advocate.  I make this claim because crossing over promotes an ahistorical mode 
of personal identification and eschews the importance of community based, 
morally defined, political action.  Because of this, I argue that while crossing 
over may be presented as a radical, anti-racist gesture, the very nature of its 
ahistoricity means that it plays into the hands of denialists whose primary 
concern rests with protecting and redeeming Australia’s national integrity and 
supporting the former government’s program of attenuating Aboriginal rights, 
assimilating Aboriginality into whiteness, all in the name of white sovereignty.  
 
The final point I make in my critique of the New Race Abolitionists relates to the 
political efficacy of aligning anti-whiteness activism with white race supremacist 
organisations in Australia.  Although I have had a passing acquaintance with the 
theoretical position of the New Race Abolitionists for over ten years, my 
understanding of their willingness to form coalitions with pro-white, neo-nazi 
groups and individuals is more recent and came about by chance when I read 
Flores and Moon’s 2002 article, Rethinking Race, Revealing Dilemmas: 
Imagining a New Racial Subject in Race Traitor.  Although Flores and Moon 
make reference to this element of the Race Traitor doctrine in their article, they 
do not offer a specific comment upon it, either in the affirmative or the negative.   
 
In contrast, I overtly reject the notion of forming strategic alliances with race 
hate organisations.  By way of focusing my response within the Australian  
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context, I make specific reference to research undertaken by the Nyungar human 
rights lawyer, Hannah McGlade, and her article, The International Prohibition of 
Racist Organisations: An Australian Perspective (2000).  The purpose of 
McGlade’s research is to explore the implications of Australia’s failure to 
comply with Article 4 (b) of the United Nation’s International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racism (ICERD) in the light of the rise of Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation Party in the 1990’s.  Article 4 (b) commands that signatory 
nations to the ICERD outlaw race hate organisations and participation in them. 
McGlade argues that Australia’s lack of compliance with the ICERD has led to 
the mainstream legitimisation of minority parties who advocate discriminatory 
practices against Aboriginal people.  This, in turn, has led to an increase in the 
activities of race hate organisations in Australia (including, but not limited to the 
American based KKK), which is accompanied by an increase in racist violence 
towards Aboriginal people.   
 
In focusing on McGlade’s discussion, I seek to draw attention to one Aboriginal 
woman’s analysis of the proliferation of race-based violence towards Aboriginal 
people during the late 1990’s.  Following from McGlade, I argue that should 
anti-white activists support strategic alliances with race-hate organisations they 
also support Australia’s continued violation of the ICERD.  Moreover, I argue 
that to ignore the evidence compiled by McGlade and the violence committed 
against Aboriginal people in favour of a political manoeuvre allegedly aimed at 
ending white race supremacy is disingenuous and takes us out of dialogue with 
Aboriginal people (including both the author of this article and those to whom  
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she refers to as victims of racist violence), negates recognition of their 
Sovereignty and supports the sovereignty of neo-colonial power relations.   
 
Strategic Relationships with Race Hate Organisations 
Australia has been a signatory to the ICERD since 1966 and our obligations 
under the ICERD were ratified in 1975 “following the implementation of the 
Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act (1975)” (McGlade, 2000: online).  
The obligations for signatory nations to the ICERD, Article 4 are clear: 
States parties condemn all propaganda and organizations which are based 
on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one 
colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial 
hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate 
and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, 
such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the uiversal [sic] Declaration of Human rights and expressly 
set forth in article 5 of this convention, inter alia;  
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority and hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, 
as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any group of 
persons of another colour or ethic origin, an [sic] also the provision of 
any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; 
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all 
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognise participation in such organizations 
and such activities as an offence punishable by law;  
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, 
to promote or incite racial discrimination (c.f. McGlade, 2000). 
 
The intention of Article 4 of the ICERD is to prevent the establishment of race 
hate organisations. While Australia has taken steps to criminalise the activities of 
members of racist organisations, it has failed to ban race hate organisations per 
se.  In 1991 Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(HREOC) Inquiry into Racist Violence explicitly recommended that “the 
Australian government…take steps to remove any qualification placed upon its  
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ratification of CERD and accept all obligations arising under it” (c.f. McGlade, 
2000: online). 
 
With reference to the HREOC Inquiry, McGlade points out that racist 
organisations have existed in Australia for about 60 years.  The League of Rights 
was established in the 1940’s; National Action was established in the 1980’s and 
its splinter group, the Australian National Movement, was established in Perth, 
Western Australia, in 1984.  While the Australian National Movement has not 
been declared illegal in Western Australia, some of its leaders have been 
prosecuted under “general provisions of the State Criminal Code” (McGlade, 
2000: online).  Although the Inquiry found that the KKK did not seem to exist at 
an organisational level in Australia, Aboriginal people from the Northern 
Territory, Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales reported “acts of 
racist violence and intimidation seemingly carried out by the KKK” (McGlade, 
2000: online).  Notably, since HREOC’s 1991 Inquiry, it has been confirmed that 
the KKK has established branches in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia (McGlade, 2000: online). In 2002, Oakley, a journalist for 
the Adelaide Advertiser reported there were two branches of the KKK in South 
Australia: the Australian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (K-KKK) and the Imperial 
Klans of America - Realm of Australia (IKA).  The latter provides a post office 
box address in the suburb of Welland. Also, the World Church of the Creator, a 
race based religion provides a post office box address in the suburb of Unley 
(Oakley, 2002: online).  There are also numerous reports of KKK style racist 
violence in Townsville, Far-North Queensland (McGregor, 2003: online).  While 
the presence of hate based organisations has been established, it is difficult to  
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ascertain the total number of Australian members to such organisations because 
it is possible to join American based Klans and pay dues over the internet 
(Oakley, 2002: online). 
 
McGlade argues the electoral success of Pauline Hanson in 1996 precipitated an 
increase in levels of racist violence against Aboriginal people.  As McGlade 
explains, Pauline Hanson was elected as an independent to the House of 
Representatives in the Australian Federal Parliament in 1996, partly on an ‘anti-
Aboriginal’ platform.  Following the formation of the One Nation Party in 1997, 
Pauline Hanson published The Truth, where she claimed Aboriginal people are 
cannibals.  Other anti-Aboriginal assertions included the spurious claim that 
Native Title was an Aboriginal ‘land grab’ and that Aboriginal people would 
own up to 80% of Australia; that the Stolen Generations was a conspiracy 
invented to guilt Australians into compensating Aboriginal people; and, that 
ATSIC was a corrupt, fraudulent organisation.  Hanson also accused Aboriginal 
people of gunrunning and having links with terrorists.  In fact, McGlade finds 
that One Nation “have courted disaffected gun owners, whose members are 
affiliated with private militia, and who have armed themselves with ‘truckfulls’ 
of weapons for ‘when the time comes’” (McGlade, 2000: online).  In 1999, Peter 
Coleman, a founding member of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, was 
revealed as the Australian leader of the Ku Klux Klan (Allum, 1999: online).  
Coleman’s anti-Aboriginal views are on the public record: “I am happy to shout 
it from the rooftops”.  “Our aim is for a white Australia, a fair Australia”.  
Australia’s Aborigines, he said, were “beyond help…the worst of the whites 
mixed in with the black” (c.f. BBC news, June 2, 1999: online). Coleman was  
  146 
subsequently expelled from One Nation.  In response to Coleman’s expulsion, 
the then Chairperson of ATSIC Gatjil Djerrkurra said: 
One Nation officials can talk until they are blue in the face about expelling 
people…but they know and we know they are responsible for giving them 
[the KKK] legitimacy (c.f. Allum, 1999: online). 
 
McGlade reports that subsequent to the electoral success of Pauline Hanson and 
her One Nation Party there were increases in the levels of racist violence 
committed against Aboriginal people.  In Perth 1997, the Nyungar Circle of 
Elders complained to the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission of increased levels of racism in doctor’s surgeries and hospitals, of 
people being chased down the street and of young people being frightened to use 
public transport.  In June 1998, 17 kilograms of explosives were left of the 
doorstep of the Perth Aboriginal Medical Service.  Later that day, the Medical 
Service received a fax, apparently from the Western Australian division of One 
Nation.  Clearly, the aim of the fax was to harass and intimidate Aboriginal 
people.  It stated: 
Perhaps we should have a National Sorry Day for Aboriginal people to 
apologize to the rest of the Australian community, for all the muggings, 
robberies, home invasions, car thefts, murders, child-rapes done by 
Aborigines over the years.  Apologize for Paris Way and all other trashed 
state housing.  Apologize for the millions of taxpayers money poured down 
the drain in booze etc.  Apologize for terrorizing the trains and train station 
and making the train unusable at night.  When we come to power you will 
have something to be ‘sorry’ about if you don’t learn how to behave 
decently (c.f. McGlade, 2000: online). 
 
Similar levels of violence directed towards Aboriginal people were also reported 
in Queensland and the Northern Territory.  For the Aboriginal Christian leader, 
Peter Walker, the climate of fear in Queensland was reminiscent of the times 
when “they (non-Aboriginals) went out shooting Aboriginals early in the 
century” (c.f. McGlade, 2000: online).  The Aboriginal Elder, Joe McGuiness  
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from the Northern Territory, likened the rise of racist violence in Australia to 
German fascism, “The system that we’re governed under allows this sort of 
thing…and some of those people (One Nation supporters) could be students of 
Hitler, you know?  We fought a war over Nazism in Germany, and this is how I 
see Australia at the moment” (c.f. McGlade, 2000: online). 
 
McGlade concludes her discussion with the observation that “Australia, like most 
state signatories, is not observing its obligations, although it is legally bound to 
do so” (McGlade, 2000: online).  She also writes: 
There are organisations in Australia which do promote and incite racial 
discrimination, some more directly and explicitly than others, against the 
Aboriginal people.  Thus far, these organisations and their members have 
been largely immune from the law (McGlade, 2000: online). 
 
Following from McGlade’s analysis, I argue that the New Race Abolitionists’ 
position that anti-whiteness activists seek strategic alliances with race hate 
organisations exacerbates Australia’s failure to comply with Article 4 of the 
ICERD and legitimises the ongoing violence experienced by Aboriginal people 
at the hands of race hate organisations.  
 
Further, as we have seen from McGlade’s discussion, incidents of race-hate 
based violence against Aboriginal people increase when the political right have 
their anti-Aboriginal views validated (electorally and ideologically) in the 
mainstream.  We also know that the new right gained momentum during the 
1990’s (both nationally and internationally) because of a perceived demise in the 
power of whiteness. With regard to this I have previously written (and I quote at 
length):  
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Various observers have already sought to explain how the perceived loss of 
class, gender and other identity markers has led to the resurgence of white 
pride and/or white supremacism.  It is argued that, as women, people of 
colour, gays and lesbians and other minority groups have gained a greater 
degree of social, political and economic power, there has been a growing 
perception of disadvantage amongst members of the mainstream white 
group.  Rapid social, political, technological and economic change over the 
last twenty years is also said to compound this.  Resorting to white racial 
identity as a pivotal marker for self-identity is understood to offer a sense 
of certainty and stability in a time of turmoil.  It is also a reclamation of 
power in the face of a perceived erosion of power. 
 
This analysis is useful because it locates the value of white race identity 
within a broader political, social and economic framework.  In addition, it 
offers a crucial insight into the social and political ramifications of the 
dominant group experiencing an ontological and epistemological crisis.  
The deconstruction of identity provokes a defensive reflex.  The 
reconstruction of identity inevitably involves a reclamation of power at the 
expense of those who are genuinely disempowered.  In Australia, the 
phenomenon of Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party firmly illustrates 
this point.  Overwhelmingly, Hanson’s supporters take pride in their 
Australianness, which translates into a pride in their whiteness (Brady and 
Carey, 2000: 279). 
 
I argue that to suggest anti-white activism can thrive when Aboriginal people live 
in fear of violence and intimidation is disingenuous and serves only to make 
those committed to anti-whiteness complicit in acts of brutality against 
Aboriginal people.   
 
I argue that should anti-whiteness activists pursue political coalitions with right-
wing race hate organisations, the dialogic relationship that would be entered into 
would be between groups of ‘white’ people, variously positioned as pro-white 
and anti-white, at the exclusion of Aboriginal people, thus removing the dialogic 
forum away from Aboriginal Sovereignty and (re)positioning it within white 
sovereignty. Moreover, while the dialogic agenda may be rhetorically defined as 
‘anti-white’, ultimately, its focus is on the demise of the American State.  Thus, 
that which presents itself as a liberationist, anti-whiteness gesture is ultimately  
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revealed as a negation of the interests and concerns of Aboriginal people in 
pursuit of self-defined and self-interested political objectives.  By way of 
underscoring the neo-colonial impulse implicit in the New Race Abolitionist 
agenda, it is worth remembering that at this particular political moment in time, 
Australia aligns its foreign policy objectives with those of the United States, the 
notable case in point being Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war.  My point 
here is that both political phenomenon turns out to be opposite sides of the same 
coin. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have contextualised my argument for the creation of the non-
Aboriginal subject as a response to critical whiteness studies.  To focus my 
discussion, I have provided an analysis of the New Race Abolitionists.  I 
presented this case study for a number of reasons.  Firstly, focusing on the New 
Race Abolitionists allowed for a closer examination of the general concerns I 
have with critical whiteness studies, insofar as it represents another discursive 
regime that perpetuates colonialist ideologies and their influence on relations 
between Aboriginal people and members of the invader/settler society.  I also 
argued New Race Abolitionists provide a forum whereby I could contextualise 
the personal narratives included in this thesis and which demonstrate movement 
between familial and political belongings, class identity and whiteness.  The 
purpose here is to speak to the ‘movement’ between these markers for identity 
and non-Aboriginality, which I explore further in Chapter Four. Thirdly, my 
focus on New Race Abolitionism represents a specific, Australian engagement 
with this corpus of work, which hitherto has been lacking in Australian work on  
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critical whiteness studies.  Finally, I explained New Race Abolitionists are 
unique in that they problematise the nexus between anti-white theory and 
activism.  As such, my critique engaged with both elements of their manifesto. 
 
In my critique of the New Race Abolitionists, I have argued against the notion of 
‘crossing over’ from whiteness into blackness.  I argued this validates a 
simplistic reversal of black and white binaries and this ensures skin colour is 
maintained as a means of attributing human qualities to different groups of 
people.  Moreover, it legitimises the appropriation of blackness as a mode of 
political identification with oppressed peoples; universalises blackness as a 
signifier of oppression; and, in corollary, universalises blackness as a key 
signifier for Aboriginality. Further, it normalises whiteness as a signifier of the 
oppressor.  Combined, this negates the experiences of cultural racism endured by 
cosmetically ‘white’ Aboriginal people and invalidates Aboriginal resistance to 
whiteness through strategic whiteness.  
 
I also argued that ‘crossing over’ (dis)places modes of political identification and 
activity out of historical context.  In so doing, it diminishes the importance of the 
original goals of reconciliation and plays into the hands of neo-conservative 
articulations of ‘practical reconciliation’. As I have argued, this eschews the 
importance of members of the invader/settler society cultivating an awareness of 
our shared history.  Further, it is associated with the diminution of Aboriginal 
rights and has seen a quantifiable decline in the social indicators for Aboriginal 
wellbeing.   
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Finally, I argued against the New Race Abolitionist’s proposal that anti-
whiteness activists form strategic alliances with pro-white, race hate based 
organisations.  In the first instance, I argued this places Australia in direct 
contravention of our international obligations under the ICERD.  My primary 
concern however, resides with the fact that entering into strategic relationships 
with pro-white groups takes us out of dialogue with Aboriginal people, which as 
I argue in Chapter Four, is essential to anti-colonial constructions of the non-
Aboriginal self.  Rather, these strategic alliances place us in dialogue with those 
who would see violence committed against Aboriginal people.  Because of this, I 
argue such alliances take us further away from being in Aboriginal Sovereignty 
and protects and upholds the interests of white sovereignty.   
 
As a postscript to this chapter it is worth reminding ourselves of the obscene 
desecration of Eddie Koiki Mabo’s grave with red swastikas and racist slogans 
the day after the time for the official mourning for his passing had concluded (see 
Graham, 1997). Eddie Koiki Mabo was the man behind the ‘Mabo decision’, the 
Australian High Court decision that overturned the doctrine of terra nullius, the 
foundation principle for white sovereignty in Australia.  Although the High Court 
stopped short of recognising Aboriginal Sovereignty, there is no doubt the impact 
of this decision on white Australia was profound. Indeed, the violation 
committed against Mabo’s final resting place (and the surviving members of his 
family) symbolises the hysteria and insecurity the Mabo decision induced in 
invader/settler Australians. The Mabo decision shook the very foundations of 
white sovereignty, and in so doing, the foundations of white ‘belonging’ in 
Australia.  Since 1992, the challenge for white Australia has been to renegotiate  
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the basis for our legitimate belonging in Aboriginal land.  I turn my attention to 
this matter in the following chapter. 
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In 1975 I received a letter from Nancy….It said: ‘I have one wonderful 
memory of your mother…. We went to Molly’s home, as you 
describe, for a meal.  Your mother was there.  She was sitting in a 
straight-backed chair surrounded by children, dogs, noise and 
general family bric-a-brac.  When we came in we went up to her and 
she said, ‘Welcome to my home and my land.’  She said it with such 
power and simplicity….She was a queen sitting there on her chair, 
and no one in Australia had even said “Welcome to my country” to 
us before.  It made a deep impression on me 
(personal correspondence from Nancy (a non-Aboriginal friend) to 
Margaret Tucker, cited from Tucker, 1994: 190, emphasis in the 
original). 
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Chapter 3:  
 
The Invader/Settler ‘Goes Native’: Appropriations of 
Aboriginality and the Indigenisation of White Australian 
Identity 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the ways appropriations of Indigeneity and/or 
Aboriginality work to construct invader/settler peoples’ relationship with 
Australian national identity.  I do so with specific reference to Germaine Greer’s 
Whitefella Jump Up: The Shortest Way to Nationhood (2003), which advocates 
the Aboriginalisation of white Australians’ identities.  I draw parallels between 
this work and another published a year earlier by Anthony Moran, As Australia 
Decolonizes: Indigenizing Settler Nationalism and the Challenges of Settler 
Indigenous Relations  (2002), which, in a similar vein, advocates the 
Indigenisation of white Australian national identity. 
 
In my exploration of these texts, I survey other recent works investigating settler 
belongings such as Peter Read’s Belonging: Australians, Place and Aboriginal 
Ownership (2000); David Tacey’s Edge of the Sacred: Transformation in 
Australia (1998); John Moloney’s The Native Born: The First White Australians 
(2000), and various, subsequent critiques of these texts.   
 
My purpose here is threefold: In the first instance, my concern is with the way in 
which these examples of post-colonial literature appropriate 
Aboriginality/Indigeneity in order to appease the insecurities of invader/settler 
belongings.  Secondly, I highlight the circular nature of the literature proposing  
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the appropriation of Aboriginality/Indigeneity to achieve a post-colonial national 
identity, and those counter critiques warning that such appropriations constitute a 
re-colonisation of Aboriginal peoples’ identities so that invader/settler 
‘belongings’ may be achieved.  I argue these polarised positions mark out the 
scope of this debate, but they do not offer productive ways through the issues the 
debate raises.  Following from Probyn
69 (2002), I argue this impasse is 
attributable to the positing of Aboriginal people as the impediment to settler 
belongings.  As she writes: 
Acknowledging the risk of appropriation is a means of registering 
complicity with imperialism – which is itself simultaneously presented as 
an obstacle to settler belonging (if not the obstacle), and at the same time 
the very reason why “belonging” is being sought after in the first place.  To 
take on settler belonging is taking on the imperial, colonial and postcolonial 
history of Australia and the discursive arrangements by which such ethical 
and moral questions of “belonging” have been asserted.  Consequently, the 
question of settler belonging must be situated within the epistemic violence 
that gives rise to it, or else it is in danger of becoming a sentiment which 
rejects imperialism as its obstacle and replaces it with Indigenous people 
themselves (Probyn, 2002: 76). 
 
Thus, I argue that positioning Aboriginal people as the impediment to 
invader/settler belongings constitutes a disingenuous refocusing away from the 
violence of invasion and the ongoing colonisation of Aboriginal people.  In short, 
this becomes one of the many discursive mechanisms available to invader/settler 
peoples to refute the fact of colonisation.  Just as the refusal to apologise to the 
stolen generations are part of the Australian discourse of denial, so too, are 
discourses of belonging that position Aboriginal people as obstructing 
invader/settler belongings.  In fact, the overwhelming obstruction is that 
members of the invader/settler society fail to fully account for the initial invasion 
and the ongoing dispossession of Aboriginal people. 
                                                 
69 Fiona Probyn (- Rapsey) lectures in the Department of Gender and Cultural Studies at the 
University of Sydney.  She researches and teaches in post-colonial feminism, transnationalism, 
critical whiteness studies and Australian literature and film.  
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This then, brings me to my third point.  I argue the appropriation of Aboriginality 
by non-Aboriginal people includes the appropriation of Aboriginal dispossession, 
thereby repositioning invader/settler peoples as ‘the dispossessed’.  This inverts 
the story of colonisation to reposition Aboriginal people as dispossessors of the 
invaders.  This is consistent with the discourse of denial.  As Colin Tatz writes, 
“denialism takes several forms…[including]…the bizarre counterview that 
whites have been the victims” (Tatz, 2001: 29). Colonialist representations of 
Aboriginality invoked within post-colonial works advocating the appropriation of 
Aboriginality testify to this.  Invariably, these representations rely on images of 
the primordial, traditional ‘native’. These images have the effect of concealing 
the physical and epistemic violence committed against Aboriginal people as part 
of the ongoing process of colonisation. Moreover, it works to identify an ancient 
peoples, trapped in pre-colonial time and culturally available to the exploitation 
of a dynamic and fluid dominant culture in order to substantiate and legitimate 
white sovereignty. 
 
My engagement with this discussion is not just to ‘add’ to this debate by taking 
the side of those arguing against appropriations of Aboriginality/Indigeneity.  
Rather, I argue that this debate contextualises my advocacy for anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality.  I argue that my position constitutes an 
alternative paradigm for identity construction processes and a way out of the 
‘post-colonial’ conundrum I referred to in my introduction. I argue my position 
enables a process of identity formation where settler identities and belongings are  
“translated as, and translated through, the terms of epistemic violence which give 
rise to” (Probyn, 2002: 76) these issues in the first instance and to galvanise non-
Aboriginality as a political identity for members of the invader/settler society.    
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Chapter Overview: 
In the following discussion, I begin by offering a synopsis of both Greer and 
Moran’s respective theses, and contextualise them within a broader discussion on 
the appropriation of Aboriginality/Indigeneity as part of the ongoing process of 
Australian nation building.  I argue that appropriations of Aboriginality occur 
within multiple and overlapping discursive realms including the academy, 
spirituality, geography, art, literature, marketing and ‘street’, or popular culture.  
As such, the notion that members of the invader/settler society must ‘Indigenise’ 
has a certain ‘common-sense’ value that continues to perpetuate itself, in spite of 
protestations that this constitutes the ongoing exploitation of Aboriginality for 
personal gain.  Indeed, if we draw a line between the ‘killing-times’ and the 
acquisition of Aboriginal land economic benefit and colonial expansion, and the 
appropriation of ‘Aboriginality’ in order to appease anxieties about the status of 
invader/settler ‘belonging’ to this land, the veracity of this argument is self-
evident.  It demonstrates that ultimately, Aboriginal people, and their 
Aboriginality, are expendable in the pursuit and maintenance of white 
sovereignty.  Indigenous lawyer and scholar Irene Watson
70 makes a similar 
point in her article, Settled and Unsettled Spaces: Are we Free to Roam? (2005).   
She writes: 
We can trace a history from the appropriation of our Aboriginal lands, our 
displacement and movement onto reserve mission stations, and into prisons, 
to a displaced Aboriginal identity resisting absorption.  In the process of 
absorption we are to be consumed by the state and its citizens and in their 
consumption of us, they are to become us.  They anticipate coming into 
their own state of lawfulness through the consuming of our sovereign 
                                                 
70 Dr Irene Watson is from the Tanganekald and Meintangk peoples of the Coorong and southeast 
region of South Australia.  Dr Watson is a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of 
Sydney, in The Sydney Law School.  She has worked as a legal practitioner and academic.  Her 
research interests include, legal theory, Aboriginal peoples and the law, gender and the law, 
International law and Envirnomental Heritage and the Law and has published extensively in these 
areas.  
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Aboriginality.  In this colonising process of us becoming white and white 
becoming Indigenous, white settlement deems itself as coming into its own 
legitimacy, as whites come into the space of our freedom to roam as 
Aboriginal peoples all over our Aboriginal places and spaces (Watson, 
2005: 41). 
 
Compounding the problem of ongoing colonisation, I further argue that those 
constructions of Aboriginality produced within colonialist discursive domains are 
critical to this process because they provide imagined versions of Aboriginality 
that are desired by the invader/settler nation and are able to be incorporated by 
the invader/settler self. 
 
In the first instance, I take the theoretical framework for my discussion from the 
Canadian scholar, Terry Goldie and his thesis on The Representation of the 
Indigene (1997).  Here, Goldie argues that Indigeneity must be ‘affirmed and 
denied’ by settler nationals who simultaneously require the existence of 
Indigeneity in order to conjure that which they seek to appropriate; and deny 
because the existence of actual Indigenous people disrupts the security of settler 
belongings. I extrapolate on Goldie’s position by turning to Hodge and Mishra’s 
(1990) post bicentenary working of the ‘bastard complex’; a conceptualisation 
that speaks to the illegitimacy of non-Aboriginal occupation of Aboriginal land. 
Like Goldie, Hodge and Mishra identify a dynamic between the affirmation and 
denial of Aboriginal existence, arguing that anthropological constructions of 
Aboriginality present Aboriginal people as being ahistorical ‘dreamtime’ people, 
unable to intervene, or speak back to the violence of ongoing colonisation.   
Finally, I turn to Gelder and Jacobs’s 1998 text Uncanny Australia: Sacredness 
and Identity in a Post Colonial Nation. Here, Gelder and Jacobs engage with 
Freud’s notion of the ‘uncanny’ in order to problematise the discomposing effect  
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of the 1992 Mabo decision on the invader/settler society. While I expand on 
Gelder and Jacobs use of the uncanny below, it is enough to say for the moment 
that the ‘uncanny’ describes the state of being where one is simultaneously ‘at 
home’ and ‘not at home’ in Australia.  Essentially, the uncanny describes the 
coincident experience of homeliness and alienation by identifying the ways the 
binary relationship between the two concepts collapses on itself to produce the 
‘uncanny’ effect of not knowing whether you are at home, or not (Gelder and 
Jacobs, 1998: 23; also see below).   
 
In her critique of Uncanny Australia, Moreton-Robinson takes Gelder and Jacobs 
to task, arguing that in reality “the majority of Indigenous people in Australia do 
not have land-rights nor do they have legal ownership of their sacred sites” 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2003: 30).  While I take Moreton-Robinson’s point, I also 
argue that Gelder and Jacobs’ analysis marks a temporal location from which we 
can decipher the significance of current claims to Indigeneity.  That is, at the 
precise moment claims to Aboriginal Sovereignty appear to gain ‘mainstream’ 
legitimacy (and make the illegitimacy of claims to white sovereignty all the more 
obvious); there is a concomitant need to step up claims for white sovereignty.  
Thus, I argue that the resurgent desire for Indigeneity by invader/settler peoples 
can be read as a longing to reinstate the binary relationship between being at 
home and not at home by ensuring that we are, indeed, at home because we are 
‘Indigenous’.  Therefore, once we are Indigenous, our claims to being at home 
are unequivocal and irrevocable.   
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However, in addition, I argue that Goldie and Hodge and Mishra’s analysis of the 
appropriation of Indigeneity through the process of recognition and denial 
enables the uncanny appropriation of Aboriginal dispossession to ensure 
invader/settler possession of both Aboriginality and, therefore, Aboriginal 
Sovereignty.  Representations of Aboriginality as pre-colonial, primordial and 
very often male facilitate this.  As I demonstrate in my discussion below, this 
dynamic is evident in all of the texts explored in this chapter.  However, to 
briefly illustrate my point it is worth diverting to Greer’s Whitefella Jump Up to 
see this dynamic in play.   
 
Germaine Greer is an expatriate Australian living in England.  She has long held 
the position that she will not return to live in Australia unless invited to do so by 
Aboriginal people.  Indeed, in the past she has even insisted on a delegation of 
Aboriginal people meeting her at the airport when she returns home for a visit 
(see Moreton-Robinson, 2000: xvii; also Moreton-Robinson, 2007 pers. 
comm.)
71.  Given the parochial defensiveness of some Australian commentators, 
it was perhaps not surprising some took umbrage at Greer writing Whitefella 
Jump Up from the purview of an ex-pat.  However, other observations were more 
discerning.  In her response to Greer’s thesis, Faye Zwicky writes: 
                                                 
71 On this occasion, Moreton-Robinson did meet Greer at the airport.  It would seem there was 
considerable pressure placed on her to do so.  She tells the story thus: “In Australia, in the 1990s, 
I was situated in three particular contexts in feminism as an embodied Indigenous subject…. The 
third experience came as a result of being asked by a university (with one day’s notice) to be part 
of a welcoming committee to meet a white feminist professor at the international airport at 
5.30am.  The professor had been invited to receive an honorary doctorate from the university, but 
she threatened not to come to Australia unless she was met and welcomed by Indigenous women.  
This seemingly noble but colonial gesture by the professor was soon eroded by her questioning us 
on what we were going to do at the Sydney Olympics about the denial of Indigenous rights in this 
country.  She offered her unsolicited advice about what we should do and wanted us to advise her 
about what we might want her to do.  Finally I responded by asking her to tell us what the limits 
were to what she would do.  She did not answer my question – instead she changed the subject” 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2000: xvi-xvii).  
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“Greer has rarely embarked on a project without energetic recourse to 
private demons and their exorcism.”  In her customary cat-among-the-
pigeons style, speaking out of the usual anxiety of exile, she again goes 
looking for a place of belonging, an authentic home to return to in order to 
reckon with what has made her (2003: 75).  
 
In identifying Greer’s expatriatism as ‘exile’, Zwicky’s insight enables us to 
deconstruct the dynamic of invader/settler dispossession/possession as it is 
enacted in Greer’s text.  By virtue of the fact that Greer will not return to live in 
Australia unless invited to do so, it appears that she imagines her exile 
(dispossession) as an expression of solidarity with Aboriginal people.  It is also a 
protest against those who dispossess Aboriginal people, of whom (apparently) 
she is not one. Therefore, like Aboriginal people, Greer is dispossessed by white 
Australians who, unlike her, do not recognise that this is Aboriginal land. Thus, it 
is only Aboriginal people who can ‘claim’ her back to Australia (as we 
subsequently see with her seeking adoption by her Kulin sisters and being given 
a skin name) all of which works to make Greer ‘Aboriginal’.  However, the 
Aboriginality Greer seeks is a sanitised, romantic version constructed within a 
colonialist framework and ultimately amenable to her western sensibilities.  As 
Greer writes: 
Though I can claim no drop of Aboriginal blood, twenty years ago Kulin 
women from Fitzroy adopted me…when  I asked about the possibility of 
assuming Aboriginality, the Kulin women said at once, “We’ll adopt you.”  
“How do you do that?” I asked, hoping I wouldn’t be required to camp in 
some bleak spot for a month or two, and be painted or smoked or cut about.  
“That’s it,” they said.  “It’s done.  We’ve adopted you”.  Since then I have 
sat on the ground with black women and been assigned a skin and taught 
how to hunt and cook shellfish and witchetty grubs, with no worse 
punishment for getting it wrong than being laughed at (2003: 23). 
 
Furthermore, the new Australian nation Greer imagines is a hunter-gather nation: 
the Aboriginal nation that will enable her to return ‘home’.  Confusingly, this  
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Aboriginal nation operates under a legal system informed by British common 
law, and with a parliamentary system not dissimilar to the one we have now.  
The role of Aboriginal people is mooted by Greer as advisory, (through a counsel 
of elders), ceremonial and educational (see Greer, 2003: 73-78).  My concern 
here is that as Greer invokes this traditional, tribal version of Aboriginality, she 
does not take account of the multifarious ways colonisation affects Aboriginal 
people.  Indeed, in Greer’s scenario, it is as though colonisation never happened.  
I argue this very basic omission is critical to refiguring her ‘exile’ as 
‘dispossession’ and, moreover, is what enables the unproblematic possession of 
Aboriginal land through the taking on of Aboriginality.   
 
As I extrapolate this element of my thesis in the body of this chapter, I do so with 
specific reference to Read’s Belonging (2000) and subsequent critiques by Fiona 
Probyn (2002) and Ken Gelder (2000). I utilise this extended discussion to 
demonstrate how similar dynamics operate in Moloney’s Native Born (2000) and 
Moran’s Indigenizing Settler Nationalism (2002).  Each of these texts is 
distinctly different in their subject matter, discipline approach and primary 
source material. However, they all serve to demonstrate that invader/settler 
‘dispossession’ emerges as a common theme and works as a strategic devise to 
conceal the actual dispossession of Aboriginal people and simultaneously justify 
invader/settler possession of Aboriginal land. As I have just argued with 
reference to Greer’s work, the possession of Aboriginality is critical to this 
process. 
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Following this, I argue the type of Aboriginality invader/settler people seek to 
possess relies on colonialist constructions of the primordial man.  A clear 
example of this is found in David Tacey’s Edge of the Sacred: Transformation in 
Australia (1998). As a Jungian philosopher, Tacey claims that Australians must 
‘invoke the archetypal aboriginal within’ in order to fulfil a spiritual relationship 
with the land.  In exploring the implications of Tacey’s thesis, I draw on Mitchell 
Rolls’ critique of Edge of the Sacred, published in the 1998 and 1999 editions of 
the Melbourne Journal of Politics, and Cowlishaw and Morris’ (1997) analysis 
of ‘cultural racism’.  Through this, I argue that although much contemporary 
‘post-colonial’ literature relies on cultural (as opposed to biological, racialised) 
notions of Aboriginality, the logic of ‘race’ persists. Aboriginality is rendered 
inert, while the dynamism of the dominant culture allows it to harvest imagined 
elements of Aboriginality for its own purposes, namely to construct a post-
colonial version of the ‘white’ aborigine, and legitimate the white, post-colonial 
nation. 
 
An Overview of Greer and Moran 
Greer’s essay was first published in the journal Quarterly Essay (Issue 11, 2003). 
A broad précis of her thesis reveals her commitment to cease the historical 
problematisation of Aboriginal people and reposition them as the solution to 
whitefella problems (2003: 2).  ‘Aboriginality’, argues Greer, is the panacea that 
can cure white Australia’s hatred of country, spiritual dislocation, alcoholism, 
racial segregation, racism, endemic environmental degradation, and materialistic 
individualism.  She argues the co-option of Aboriginality will secure a sense of 
place, or belonging, in Australia for invader/settler Australians, and offers the  
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means to envision a new republican national identity.  Look in the mirror, she 
implores, and tell yourself you live on Aboriginal land.  Then tell yourself 
“therefore I must be considered Aboriginal” (Greer, 2003: 14-15).  The ‘anti-
colonial’ (not that she uses this term and I use it here with deliberate facetious 
intent) position of Greer’s thesis is that she imagines that on this basis Aboriginal 
and other Australians can collectively forge an Aboriginal hunter-gatherer nation 
with international allegiances to other hunter-gatherer societies and finally 
dissolve colonial ties with Britain (Greer, 2003: 73-78). 
 
Given the high public exposure of Greer’s thesis, it invited a range of responses 
within intellectual and literary circles.  The subsequent edition of Quarterly 
Essay (Issue 12, 2003) published a range of correspondence that both criticise 
and defend Greer’s position.  Some, such as Lillian Holt
72, affirm her vision, 
lauding her creativity, imagination and capacity to “dream big” (Holt, 2003: 70).  
Holt rapturously approves of Greer’s willingness to refocus attention away from 
Aboriginal people and her capacity to say, “I don’t know” (Holt, 2003: 69) to 
things for which she has no answers.  While I appreciate Holt is responding to a 
propensity to ‘know all’ about Aboriginal people, and speak on their behalf, I am 
equally concerned that Greer’s capacity to say “I don’t know” extends to 
articulating an actualisation of her own thesis.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Lillian Holt is an Aboriginal educator and public speaker on ethnicity and race relations in 
Australia.  Currently, Holt is the Vice Chancellor’s Fellow at Melbourne University. Previously, 
she was the Director of the Centre for Indigenous Education at the University of Melbourne.  Her 
research interests include Australian culture, civil society and Reconciliation.  Holt is currently 
writing a PhD on Aboriginal humour at Melbourne University  
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Similarly, Tony Birch
73 relishes the ‘madness’ of Greer’s vision.  Although 
concerned with the generality of Greer’s argument, he sees the value of her thesis 
being published “at a political moment when the status of indigenous 
communities in Australia has been pushed to the margins once more, led by a 
federal government determined to recolonise the Indigenous body within a 
nominally post-colonial nation” (2003: 85).  While Birch does not seriously 
imagine that white Australians will look in the mirror and call themselves 
‘Aboriginal’, he advocates the need for greater “self-examination” (2003: 85) on 
their part.  To this he writes:   
I imagine that many people will want to dismiss Greer because they do not 
want to look in the mirror.  And while a lot of them may not want to be 
“considered” Aboriginal in the true sense, they will find it discomforting to 
consider more closely their own identity and its complicity in the effort to 
dispossess indigenous people…. If the white Australian tries to find his 
Aboriginal face in the mirror, he may come to see his own face as the face 
of the oppressor (Birch, 2003: 86-87). 
 
Conversely, Marcia Langton took issue with Greer, criticising the ‘disconnected’ 
nature of her argument.  Langton’s analysis highlights Greer’s apparent 
obliviousness to other “big picture” post-colonial visions for Australia at the end 
of the 20
th century and the success of neo-conservative resistance to these 
visions.  Further, Langton addresses Greer’s lack of engagement with 
contemporary literature on national identity, nationhood, and ‘belonging’; her 
ahistorical analysis of the impact of Aboriginal languages and culture on the 
(white) Australian accent and culture; and her lack of awareness on inter-
generational shifts in the intersubjective and intercultural exchange between 
Aboriginal and members of the invader/settler society.   Significantly, Langton 
                                                 
73Tony Birch is a Koori man and teaches creative writing at Melbourne University.  He is a 
widely published author including poetry, fiction and academic articles.  Dr Birch’s PhD is in 
Urban Cultures and Histories  
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also identifies Greer’s uncritical redeployment of ‘race’ as a means to defining 
national identity (Langton, 2003: 77).  As Langton writes: 
Essentialist ideas about identity – for instance that a person’s or nation’s 
identity is shaped by “race” – have permeated Australian life since the idea 
of an Australian nation was invented in the late nineteenth century.  Simply 
to flip the foundation of the nation from a fundamentally White identity to a 
Black one is to remain trapped by the racism on which the nation was 
founded in 1901 (2003: 77). 
 
With this said, however, Langton concludes with the diplomatic concession that 
at least Greer’s vision is one “that does not spring from hate” (2003: 82).  “Even 
if her essential idea is flawed with a romantic notion of race” writes Langton, 
“Dr Greer’s contribution throws into stark relief some of the myths that underpin 
the difficulty of overcoming the inherited frontier hatred that continues to drive 
racist discourse in Australian public life” (2003: 82). 
 
Similarly, Mary Ellen Jordan
74 argues the basic premise to Greer’s argument 
does not “hang together” (2003: 88).  Jordan condemns Greer’s cynical 
appropriation of Aboriginality, a specific case in point being the “offensive” 
claim that “Aboriginality” can cure non-Aboriginal alcoholism when alcohol 
abuse tears so many Aboriginal communities and families apart.  Jordan also 
criticises Greer’s generic use of the word ‘Aborigine’ and her glossing over of 
cultural differences between groups of Aboriginal people; and, her inattention to 
the different ways colonisation has impacted on various Aboriginal people.  
Equally problematic is her romanticisation and over-simplification of cultural 
similarities between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples at the expense of 
identifying the very real differences between us all.  By way of illustrating her 
                                                 
74 Mary Ellen Jordan is a writer, reviewer and editor.  She is widely published including in Peter 
Craven’s 2001 Best Australian Essays. Balanda is her first book.  
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point, Jordan reflects on some of those white Australians she encountered while 
living in the Aboriginal community Maningrida. She writes: 
Of course, even if you could quantify “culture”, you’d find equal amounts 
of it on both sides.  But, its harder to see your own culture, and easy to see 
the exotic and unfamiliar.  This romanticism often extended to the 
perception of all Aboriginal people as inherently good, and most non-
Aboriginal people as of less value.  I came to think of this as “positive 
racism”.  It involves judging people by their race, just as the old fashioned 
pejorative, excluding kind of racism does, but in reverse.  Most 
importantly, positive racism forms its own obstacles to intercultural sharing 
and understanding (Jordan, 2003: 91). 
 
Following from Jordan, I pursue many of these issues in my discussion below.  
However, before this, I turn to Moran’s As Australia Decolonizes: Indigenizing 
Settler Nationalism and the Challenges of Settler/Indigenous Relations (2002). 
 
In this text, Moran traces the peculiarities of Australian settler-colonialism and 
the role of ‘Indigeneity’ in constructing white Australian national identity.  In 
part, Moran’s thesis is in keeping with those post-colonial theorists
75 who argue 
that the presence of Aboriginal people provokes a deeply ‘unsettled’ feeling for 
invader/settler Australians (2002: 1025).  However, unlike those who argue 
against members of the invader/settler society people mediating this 
unsettledness through the appropriation of Indigeneity, Moran advocates the 
incorporation of ‘the Indigenous’ as an integral element of post-colonial nation 
building. He argues that subsequent to the reconciliation movement and the 1992 
Mabo judgement, Aboriginal people occupy a special place at the centre of 
national identity construction in a way that is unique amongst settler nations.  He 
writes: 
                                                 
75 Specifically, Moran draws on Terry Goldie (1997) and Hodge and Mishra, (1991) to make this 
point, I return to these authors below.  
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Today, the incorporation of indigeneity means the incorporation of the 
indigenous people themselves as present-day bearers of the oldest living 
culture known to humanity.  This entails the need for the indigenous, rather 
than non-indigenous caretakers, to represent their indigeneity themselves.  
To some extent Aboriginality is honoured by the public culture: by 
politicians, by the mass media, by the art world, and by at least some 
sections of the broader settler Australian populace.  While there is a strong 
humanitarian impulse, an anti-racism and a commitment to the acceptance 
of cultural diversity standing behind this phenomenon, settler nationalists 
also seek, through an embrace of the indigenous, to resolve the ambiguity 
of their national connection with the Australian land: through kinship with 
the indigenous, through sharing their wisdom and their culture, and through 
drawing them into a broader concept of the Australian nation…it is a form 
of nationalism that creates a specific place for the indigenous at the heart of 
the nation (Moran, 2002: 1033). 
 
Importantly, Moran acknowledges that the process of Indigenising settler 
nationalism in Australia “involves a mournful orientation…a full 
confrontation…with the shame involved in Aboriginal dispossession…a full 
disclosure that might clear the way for the future” (2002: 1034). He also argues 
that the consequential benefits to Indigenising settler nationalism include 
recognising and accommodating Indigenous peoples’ spiritual relationship with 
the land, and through this, provide frameworks and discourses through which 
invader/settler belongings can be articulated.  Rather than Aboriginality ‘un-
settling’, or destabilising settler belongings, it can stabilise connections with the 
land (2002: 1030).  Therefore, he argues, Indigenising settler nationalism can 
generate a process of “national renewal” (2002: 1031) and invigorate a new 
‘post-colonial’ notion of nationhood.   
 
Thus, there are important distinctions between Greer and Moran’s arguments.  
Firstly, where Greer explicitly advocates ‘Aboriginality’ for white Australians, 
Moran’s case is for a specific veneration of ‘Indigeneity’ in the construction of 
national identity.  On face value then, Moran’s position is a more mature  
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acknowledgement of the place of Aboriginal people in the nation and ostensibly 
offers a model for national identity building that does not hold the denial of the 
treatment of Aboriginal people post-1788 at the core of its modus operandi.  
However, I also argue that on closer reading, this turns out to be a semantic 
difference. In both cases, the authors posit Aboriginal peoples’ ‘Aboriginality’ as 
the means by which invader/settler ‘Aboriginality’ or ‘Indigeneity’ is to be 
achieved.  As such, both proposals require the consumption of the others’ alterity 
in order to be articulated and fulfilled.  Therefore, they constitute a continuation 
of the epistemic violence committed against Aboriginal people as part of the 
ongoing process of colonisation.   
 
Contextualising Greer and Moran: A Brief Historical Overview 
In focusing on these recent works, I do not mean to suggest appropriations of 
‘Aboriginality’ are anything ‘new’.  Indeed, it is critical to locate these proposals 
within a broader historical context.  Various manifestations of Indigenising 
Australian identity can be traced prior to federation and must be understood as 
integral to the process of creating a unique Australian identity.  Scholars of 
Australian settler-colonialism and nationalism generally agree that the first 
generations of white people born in Australia mobilised their ‘nativity’ in order 
to forge a unique white Australian identity (see McLean, 1998; Moloney, 2000: 
52, 54&55, 65).  This is captured in a poem by Henry Lawson, The Southern 
Scout (also titled The Natives of the Land) written in 1892.  In the final stanza 
Lawson writes: 
“It’s live or die!” you’ll hear ‘em sing, “so let the war begin 
For the rights of man and woman, and the land we’re living in. 
It’s right or wrong,” you’ll hear ‘em sing, “we’ll test it once again 
Ere greed shall rob the gardens where our mothers worked like men.”  
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And Eastward shall the army come with eyes all flashing grand 
When Freedom’s marching orders reach the Natives of the Land –  
Of the land we’re living in,  
The Natives of the land. 
         They’ll sing a rebel chorus yet and play it on a band, 
For the spirit of the country moves the Natives of the Land (c.f. Roderick, 
1967: 224). 
 
In a footnote to this poem, published in the Bulletin in 1892, Lawson wrote: 
The writer wishes to state, for the benefit of the majority of the English 
people, that Australians born of Europeans have been called ‘natives’ for 
many years.  Also that Australians are not all black, or even brown, neither 
are they red.  Likewise, that the progeny of Marster ‘Jarge’ or ‘Willum’ as 
went ‘abrard’ and come to Australia, are not necessarily little savages, 
unless, indeed, the Master Jarge or Willum aforesaid happens to live with a 
black gin (c.f. Roderick, 1967: 443). 
 
According to John Moloney, before the 1840’s, the term ‘native’ applied equally 
to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people born in Australia.  However, 
overtime, the distinction between the white ‘native born’ and ‘Aboriginal 
natives’ worked to discern between Aboriginal people and invader/settler people 
born in Australia and separate the citizenships rights and entitlements of both 
groups.  As Clark and Galligan write:  
The British tradition had been to refer to its indigenous populations as 
‘natives’…the terms ‘aboriginal’ and ‘aborigine’ became useful as 
international generic words for the European powers to employ when 
discussing each other’s indigenous inhabitants.  Australian usage at the turn 
of the last century, however, was quite different. The two terms, 
‘aboriginal’ and ‘native,’ when used individually, meant quite different 
things.  The first was used to refer to race, often described in terms of 
‘blood’, and the second to place of birth…. The term ‘native’ was imbued 
with the idea of nativity and meant birth in a particular place.  
‘Aboriginal’, on the other hand, had a related meaning but was given a 
different slant in early Australian usage.  Like the British ‘native’, 
‘aboriginal’ meant the original inhabitants or descendents thereof.  When 
finally defined, ‘aboriginal native’ was deemed a composite term meaning 
a descendent of the original race of a particular region who was also born in 
that place.  Thus, an ‘aboriginal native of Australia’ was a black indigenous 
person, whereas a ‘native’ referred to an Australian-born white person 
(1995: 524-525). 
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Subsequent appropriations of nativity continued into the 20
th century, with 
literary movements such as the Jindyworobaks
76 incorporating Aboriginal words, 
concepts and ‘spirituality’ into their writings.  Indeed, a brief survey of the 
glossary in The Jindyworobaks: Portable Australian Authors (Elliot, 1979) 
reveals the homogenised application of ‘Aboriginal’ words for the dreamtime, 
sacred ceremonial artefacts and sites, food, the stars, animals, law and order and 
people (see Elliot, 1979: 317-318).   Similarly, artists such as Margaret Preston 
incorporated Aboriginal designs and motifs into their artwork.   
 
Far from niche artistic and creative movements, these Indigenising projects were 
taken up within intellectual and scholarly circles.  For example, in 1940 the 
literary journal Meanjin was established, deliberately taking on an Aboriginal 
word as its name to describe “the Australian-ness of its criticism and writing” 
(Mclean, 1998: online). Also, between 1925-1941 Margaret Preston contributed 
four articles to Art and Australia “urging that Aboriginal art become the 
foundation and inspiration of a modern, national Australian art” (Mclean, 1998: 
online).  She was also an active member of the Anthropological Society of NSW 
and the prominent anthropologist A. P. Elkin supported Preston’s position. 
Together they played an important role in promoting Aboriginal art in the 1940’s 
and 1950’s.  In what was a mutually beneficial relationship, anthropology lent 
“credibility” to the burgeoning Aboriginal art movement, and art supported the 
changing philosophical paradigms in anthropological scholarship, which was 
rejecting “evolutionism” for “cultural paradigms” that were sympathetic to 
Aboriginal people and culture (McLean, 1998: online).  However, I make the 
                                                 
76 The Jindyworobaks was an Australian poetry movement, mainly between 1930-1940.  
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point that these ‘sympathies’ underpinned the ideological regime that ushered in 
the shift from biological absorption to cultural assimilation policies and 
compelled Aboriginal people to take on the cultural whiteness of their 
oppressors. 
 
Additionally, outside of these creative and scholarly circles, moves to Indigenise 
Australian national identity were evident in numerous areas of popular culture. 
Aboriginal characters and native animals were incorporated into children’s 
stories (Collins-Gearing, 2003); Indigenous foods were incorporated to create a 
distinctively ‘Australian’ cuisine (Craw, 2005); and, Indigenous words were also 
used to name homes, suburbs and streets (Birch, 1997: 18; Furphy, 2002). Tony 
Birch argues that appropriating Aboriginal place names “represents imperial 
possession and the quaintness of the ‘native’”.  He further writes:  
For the colonisers to attach a ‘native’ name to a place does not represent or 
recognise an indigenous history, and therefore possible indigenous 
ownership…. Imperial history cannot recognise the existence of indigenous 
histories…. An attempt to recognise the history of indigenous people 
creates insecurity, paranoia, even hysteria.  It ‘wipes out over 150 years of 
(British) history’ and ‘takes away that heritage’ (Birch, 1997: 18).  
 
Rather, as Sam Furphy observes, appropriating Indigenous place names points to 
the ways Aboriginal words have been coopted as “Australian words” enabling 
the cultivation of  “a distinct national feeling” and an important “element in our 
national culture” (Furphy, 2002: 65 & 68)).  He continues: 
This superficial appropriation of Aboriginal words and place names is a 
symptom of white Australia’s simplified and idealised understanding of 
Aboriginal culture.  It exemplifies how Aboriginal culture can be shallowly 
employed to indigenise Australian national identity (Furphy, 2002: 68). 
 
Contemporary appropriations of Aboriginality for the purpose of national 
identity building continue into the 21
st century.  However, unlike those  
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appropriations predicated on the doomed race theory, contemporary forms of 
appropriation incorporate Aboriginality into a national redemption narrative, 
“where Australian can reaffirm its most cherished beliefs about itself; that, as a 
fair minded, just and compassionate global citizen” (Batty, 1998: online). 
However, the transition has not always been a smooth one.  As Phillip Batty 
writes with reference to the closing ceremony of the Atlanta Olympic games in 
1996
77: 
…the organisers chose to represent ‘Australia’, through a pageant of the 
‘indigenous’, heavily laced with associated signs of the, ‘primordial’ and 
the ‘natural’.  Rising up in the centre of…a mass of flames…a group of 
painted Aboriginal musicians blew into their amplified 
didgeridoos…cyclists carrying blow up plastic kangaroos on their backs 
(decorated with the dots and lines of Australian Aboriginal art), also 
appeared.  Towards the end…in an awkward glance back to the days when 
Australia was secure in its modernity…a plastic replica…of the Sydney 
Opera House rose up in the background (1998: online). 
 
It is also worth noting that some of the ‘Aboriginal’ performers were white 
people, ‘blacked up’ to ‘look’ Aboriginal (Trees, 2006: pers. comm.). 
 
By the Sydney Olympics in 2000, the Boomerang was incorporated into the 
official logo (see Curthoys, 1997), and the opening ceremony featured a 
corroboree performed by 1,150 Indigenous people from Numbulwar, Yirrkala, 
Lalynhapuy, Ramingining, Maningrida, the Central Desert, Torres Strait Islands, 
NAISDA, The Aboriginal Dance Theatre in Redfern, Doonah Dance Company, 
and Bangarra Dance Theatre (Tenenbaum, 2000: online; Connell, 2000: online).  
As a symbol of reconciliation, the Aboriginal songman Djakapuura Munyarrayan 
and the young white girl, Nicki Webster walked off together, hand in hand, 
towards a perfectly harmonious post-colonial future.  The champion Aboriginal 
                                                 
77 In accordance with Olympic protocol, Australia, the next host country for the Olympic games 
to be held in Sydney in 2000, was an important part of the Atlanta Olympic games closing 
ceremony.  
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athlete, Cathy Freeman had the honour of lighting the Olympic Flame, and her 
gold medal win in the 400 metre race has been heralded as a critical moment for 
reconciliation (Tenenbaum, 2000: online)
78.  It must be noted, however, that the 
New South Wales State government also “brought in a range of law and order 
policies, in part to mitigate the negative effects of Aboriginal protest on our 
international reputation” (Carey, 2004: 17).  As I have previously written with 
regard to this: 
This highlights how white Australia tolerates Aboriginal people taking their 
culture and politics to the world in ‘white approved’ ways – so in this 
sense, its not literally taking Aboriginal culture to the world, it is about 
promoting a version of white Australian culture that is uniquely and 
identifiably Australian: connected with the land, ongoing and dynamic, 
tolerant, fair and just (2004: 17). 
 
It also makes good business sense. Where Aboriginality is used to brand 
international events, it also effectively works to ‘brand’ the nation with a unique 
‘Indigenous’, Australian identity that is very lucrative.  With reference to this, 
Elazar Barkan writes:  
In the meantime the new Australianess seems to have been fully accepted 
as a business proposition.  It includes everything from the strategy using 
Aboriginal paintings to help lobby for the Olympic games to the Aboriginal 
design “Wunala (kangaroo) Dreaming” painted on Qantas 747s; from the 
name change of a national park into traditional Aborigine to the marketing 
of the Northern Territory as an “exotic escape” decorated with Aboriginal 
designs and music (not withstanding the state’s [sic] rabid anti-Aboriginal 
policies). This is not only a restitution of identity, which is long overdue, it 
is also a profitable marketing decision (2000: 236). 
 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the promotion of Aboriginal culture is significant 
in attracting overseas tourists to Australia, and Aboriginal art is estimated to be 
                                                 
78 For further discussion on the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games opening ceremony see Michelle 
Hanna (1999), Reconciliation in Olympism: Indigenous Culture in the Sydney Olympiad; Robin 
Ryan (2002) Awakening ‘The Fire Within:’ Symbols, Rituals and Reconciliation; and Liz Reed 
(2002) ‘Awakening’: The Politics of Indigenous Control and Authenticity at Sydney 2000.  
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worth between $100-400 million dollars a year to the Australian economy
79 
(Northern Territory Government, circa 2006: online; also see Barstow, 2005: 2).  
Within scholarly circles, claims to Indigeneity are also asserted by some 
academics.  For example, as George Seddon writes in his 2002 article It’s Only 
Words: 
Forty thousand years is a long time, but it still does not make them literally 
indigenous as a people, although the term is in common use.  It is also a 
contested one: the Aboriginal view is that they are not immigrants but arose 
from the land.  At the level of the individual, of course, anyone who was 
born in Australia, as I was, is indigenous (2002: 249, emphasis added). 
 
 
Additionally, Gelder and Jacobs provide this example, originally reported in The 
Age Newspaper in October 1996, of a white Australian attempting to use Native 
Title provisions to have his Native Title established over Dare Island in Bass 
Strait.  They write: 
…William Hollier, a man of non-Aboriginal descent, was planning to lodge 
a claim for Deal Island in Bass Strait under the Native Title Act.  Hollier is 
an environmental scientist who has lived on the island with his family, as 
the sole occupants, for the past four years – not long in the Aboriginal 
scheme of things.  Nevertheless, with no prior evidence of Aboriginal 
occupation of the island, Hollier felt enabled enough, or indigenous 
enough, to make a claim for its possession.  Was he simply appropriating 
Native Title provisions for his own interests? Or was this an entirely 
unexpected example of convergence, drawing otherwise discrete groups 
together?  Hollier, naturally enough saw things in the latter terms, telling 
                                                 
79 It is difficult to get a more accurate figure.  The Northern Territory Government suggest four 
possible reasons for this variation: 
1.  The difference in the original sale price from the artist in relation to interstate and 
international market prices; 
2.  The variation between the low-end tourism market and high-end designer goods; 
3.  The number of fake, forged or counterfeit goods in the market place; 
4.  The difficulty in calculating the induced effect on the tourism industry and those seeking 
the ‘indigenous experience’ (Northern Territory Government, circa 2006: 9). 
 
Currently, there is a Senate Inquiry into the Indigenous Visual Arts and Craft Sector.  It is due to 
report in March 2007.  The Inquiry’s terms of reference include (but are not limited to): 
1.  The current size and scale of Australia’s Indigenous visual arts and crafts sector; 
2.  The economic, social and cultural benefits of the sector; 
3.  The overall financial, cultural and artistic sustainability of the sector.  
(Parliament of Australia, Senate Committee, Environment, Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts References Committee, circa 2006: online).  One would assume the 
report will provide a more accurate figure.  
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the reporter: ‘I am not trying to reduce the effectiveness of native title, I am 
trying to enhance it’.  The boundaries between minority provisions and 
majority access are certainly confused here.  The newspaper headline ran 
the following appropriate pun: ‘Scientist appeals for fair Deal’.  This man 
wanted to authorise his occupation of Deal Island through the uncanny 
procedure whereby it was impossible to tell whether he was 
‘Aboriginalising’ his whiteness, or whitening legislation which is 
specifically Aboriginal (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: xv). 
 
On a smaller scale, local appropriations of Aboriginality are similarly easy to 
identify.  The following example is one sourced within my local community.  It 
is a real estate advertisement for L.J. Hooker, found in the Fremantle Herald
80 on 
Saturday the 19
th of February 2005 (page 32).  Advertising a two-bedroom 
apartment with Indian Ocean and Swan River views, the slogan reads, “Swan 
River Dreaming”.  While the injudicious use of the word ‘dreaming’ is obvious, 
it also needs to be noted that the mouth of the river is also an important site for 
Nyungar creation stories and this is reasonably well known in Perth because of 
the Swan Brewery/Sacred Site dispute
81.  Thus, the desire (dream) to have such 
well located property also translates into the capacity to own a ‘dreaming’, a 
spiritual connection to the place one desires.  Thus, not only can one own the 
property in ‘proprietorial’ sense, one can belong to the property in an 
‘Indigenous’ sense. 
 
Thus, I argue that these multiple, overlapping sites of cultural identity production 
produce a “semiosphere” that has, at the core of its ideological purpose, the 
capacity to interpolate invader/settler Australians into Indigeneity (see Hartley 
and McKee, 2000) through the appropriation of Indigenous motifs, symbols and 
                                                 
80 The Fremantle Herald is a local, independently owned newspaper, distributed around 
Fremantle (Western Australia) and surrounding suburbs. 
81 An account of the Swan Brewery dispute can be found in, Martha Ansara’s, Always Was, 
Always Will Be: The Sacred Grounds of the Waugal, Kings Park, Perth, WA: The Old Swan 
Brewery Dispute (1990).  
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images. However, as I argue in the following section, the dynamic of identity 
appropriation is not a straightforward one.  In his analysis on the function of 
‘representations of the indigene’ in settler nations, the Canadian academic Terry 
Goldie argues settler societies such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia “have 
a clear agenda to erase this separation of belonging” (1997: 234; also see Probyn, 
2002: 77) caused by the presence of Indigenous peoples
82.  This, he argues, is 
achieved through the paradoxical recognition and denial of the existence of 
Indigenous people in order to engage in their own process of “indigenisation” 
(see Goldie, 1997: 234; also see Brady and Carey, 2000: 277).  That is, symbols 
of Indigeneity are recognised and incorporated by the settler population while, 
simultaneously, the existence of the Indigenous population is denied.  
 
I have already pointed to the ways words, place names, artefacts, notions of 
Indigenous spirituality and the very notion of Indigeneity or nativity itself are 
‘incorporated’ by invader people
83.   Denial, can manifest in various ways 
including the physical denial of Aboriginal peoples’ presence and the denial of 
an independent Indigenous consciousness and perspective on historical events 
that profoundly impact on their lives and cultural survival.  Other examples 
include (but are not limited to)’ the ‘discovery’ of Aboriginal lands and artefacts 
by settler colonists/nationals; the persistent belief in ‘traditional’ Aboriginality in 
order to deny the Aboriginality of those who have survived regimes of biological 
                                                 
82 Michael Hatt’s (1997) article Ghost Dancing in the Red Indian Salon also provides a lucid 
example of this dynamic in the United States.  
83 I am also mindful of interventions by Aboriginal people into renaming/reclaiming place names.  
Here, the dynamic in play is one of Aboriginal people speaking back to the presumption of 
invader/settler peoples to claim and name land in the image of empire.  Restating pre-existing 
place names represents a fundamental challenge to the logic of terra nullius.  That is, it makes a 
statement about the survival of Indigenous people, culture and knowledge and an assertion of 
Indigenous sovereignty in the face of white sovereignty.  
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absorption and cultural assimilation; the exclusion of Indigenous people from 
national histories of economic development and modernisation; and, the active 
disremembering of atrocities committed against Indigenous peoples. Thus, the 
dynamic of recognition and denial enables a process whereby the existence of the 
Indigenous population is made ambiguous and subsequently, the threat they pose 
to settler belongings is mitigated.  This is the process of erasing the ‘separation 
of belonging’, and it is through this that the status of the settler population “as the 
‘real’ Indigenous population is assured” (Brady and Carey, 2000: 277). 
 
Putting Greer and Moran in a ‘Post-Colonial’ Context: 
Following from Goldie, but closer to home, I am also mindful of those Australian 
engagements theorising the relationship between invader/settler and Indigenous 
societies.  In their post-bicentenary, pre-Mabo publication Dark Side of the 
Dream: Australian Literature and the Post-Colonial Mind (1991), Hodge and 
Mishra challenge the legitimacy of white Australians’ occupation of Aboriginal 
land through a concept they call the ‘Bastard Complex’ (1991: 23-49). As the 
authors explain, there is a particular Australian usage of the word ‘bastard’, one 
that connotes mateship, solidarity and quintessential Australian-ness.  Indeed, 
this usage is “definitionally Australian: only the true Australian can call his 
‘mate’ a ‘bastard’” (Hodge and Mishra, 1991: 23).  However, beyond the 
particular quirks of Australian colloquialisms, Hodge and Mishra point out that 
this shared Australian understanding of bastardry speaks to the illegitimacy of 
white Australian occupation of Aboriginal land.  Thus, it also serves the 
paradoxical ideological function of pointing to the “anxiety about legitimacy in 
the national psyche” while also affirming “illegitimacy in order to evade anxiety  
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about origins” (1991: 23).  That is, national Australian identity is forged out of a 
shared recognition of illegitimacy. There is also a shared understanding that the 
anxieties produced by illegitimacy must be circumvented through the 
appropriation of illegitimacy in order to evade the real causes of illegitimacy in 
the first instance. 
 
Within this schema, argue Hodge and Mishra, Aboriginal people occupy a 
“contradictory and ambiguous” (1991: 23) place in the construction of an 
Australian identity.  In a position not dissimilar to Goldie’s, they argue that the 
presence of Aboriginality is affirmed and denied through a “discursive regime” 
(1991: 26) that simultaneously suppresses Aboriginal speakers and viewpoints 
from “dominant” discursive “domains” and allows permissible representations of 
Aboriginality which over-rely on “anthropological” constructions of the 
“dreamtime”. This situates Aboriginal people without “historical consciousness”, 
or capacity to “comprehend linear history in the European mode” (Hodge and 
Mishra, 1991: 27-28).  As such, Aboriginal people are denied the “ability…to 
establish an alternative account of the foundation event and its aftermath, an 
account that might refuse to contain the violence and illegalities within the 
moments of innocence” (Hodge and Mishra, 1991: 28).  Ultimately, this serves to 
conceal the illegitimacy of the self confessed bastards and enable the 
‘schizophrenic’ (Hodge and Mishra, 1991: xiv-xv) valorisation of illegitimacy as 
a source of national identity and pride.   
 
Further, in their post-Mabo thesis Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in 
a Post-Colonial Nation, Gelder and Jacobs (1998) problematise the instabilities  
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of settler belongings with Freud’s notion of the ‘uncanny’.  As Gelder and Jacobs 
explain, the uncanny expresses the relationship between heimlich (that which is 
homely, familiar and accessible) and unheimlich (that which is unhomely, 
unfamiliar, strange and inaccessible).  Specifically, Freud’s working of the 
uncanny says these two concepts are coexistent because the binary relationship 
between homely and unhomely/familiar and strange collapses on itself to 
produce the uncanny.  Thus, the uncanny is not merely an expression of the 
unfamiliar. It is an expression of the familiar and unfamiliar simultaneously, “of 
being in place and ‘out of place’” at the same time (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 
23).  In connecting the uncanny to post-Mabo Australia, Gelder and Jacobs write 
“[i]n this moment of decolonisation, what is ‘ours’ is also potentially, or even 
always already, ‘theirs’: the one is becoming the other, the familiar becoming 
strange (1998: 23).  Thus Gelder and Jacobs, argue that the value of the uncanny 
is:  
…it refuses the usual binary structure upon which much commentary on 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations is based.  We often speak of 
Australia as a ‘settler’ nation, but the ‘uncanny’ can remind us that a 
condition of unsettledness folds into this taken-for-granted mode of 
occupation (1998: 24). 
 
 
Following from this, and in an observation that is resonant with Hodge and 
Mishra’s ‘bastard complex’, Gelder and Jacobs argue that the uncanny also 
problematises white Australian’s relationship with ‘guilt and innocence’.  That, is 
whether white Australians are free (innocent) from implication with the 
processes of colonisation, or, inherently guilty by virtue of the fact we/they live 
in Australia and continue to share in the benefits of Aboriginal dispossession.  
Thus, they write:  
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In postcolonial Australia, however, it may well be that both of these 
positions are inhabited at the same time: one is innocent (‘out of place’) and 
guilty (‘in place’) simultaneously.  And this is entirely consistent with 
postcoloniality as a contemporary moment, where one remains within the 
structures of colonialism even as one is somehow located beyond or ‘after’ 
them (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 24). 
 
In drawing attention to the chronology of Goldie’s, Hodge and Mishra’s and 
Gelder and Jacobs respective theses, I seek to situate Greer and Moran’s work – 
and others of this genre – within a specific temporal location.  In the first 
instance, it is important to note the broader social and political milieu of the time 
and the enmity of those opposed to apparent gains made by Aboriginal people in 
the legal recognition of their land rights through Mabo 2, the Native Title Act 
(1993) and the High Court’s Wik decision.  As Curthoys argues in her article 
Expulsion, Exodus and Exile in White Australian Historical Mythology (1999), 
white Australians responded to these gains through the ‘memory’ of originally 
having been made ‘homeless’ from England (that is, living in exile from the 
original home), and seeing the formalisation of Aboriginal land rights as a threat 
to being made ‘homeless’ again.  According to Curthoys, it was Pauline 
Hanson
84 “who lead the public expression of hostility to Aboriginal claims to 
land” (Curthoys, 1999: 17).  Indeed, in her maiden speech to parliament in 
September that year, Hanson said: 
I am fed up with being told “This is our land”.  Well, where the hell do I 
go? I was born here and so were my parents and children…I draw the line 
when told I must pay and continue paying for something that happened 
over 200 years ago.  Like most Australians, I worked hard for my land; no 
one gave it to me (c.f. Curthoys, 1999: 17-18). 
 
 
                                                 
84 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Pauline Hanson was elected as an independent to the 
seat of Oxley in Queensland in the 1996 federal elections.  
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As an aside, I am concerned that Curthoys’ analysis disengages with the rabidity 
of the Liberal-National Coalition government’s and industry lobbyists such the 
National Farmers Federation and the Australian Mining Industry Council
85 
opposition to Aboriginal peoples’ Sovereign rights during this time.  Equally, I 
also suggest that she fails to recognise and give agency to those other Australians 
who protested against the racist claims of conservative politicians and their 
supporters.   
 
Indeed, in Curthoys’ narrative, there is no room for the actions of those 
individuals, such as pastoralist Camilla Cowley, (interviewed in the documentary 
element of this project) who actively sought out ways to actualise a vision for co-
existence with Aboriginal people through processes of cooperation and mutual 
understanding.  In Camilla’s case, negotiations with the Gungerri people of 
southwest Queensland to share the land on ‘her’ property, Yancho, was a 
landmark event.  Subsequently, Camilla became a prominent spokesperson, 
protesting the Liberal-National government’s 10-point plan that sought to 
diminish the High Court’s Wik findings. For many reasons, including the fact 
that Camilla was a pastoralist and the timing of the event, I suggest that her 
address at an anti 10-point plan /pro Wik rally on the steps of parliament house in 
Canberra in 1997 is as historically important as Hanson’s maiden speech to 
parliament.  Certainly, it is the more generous and aspirational of the two. 
 
However, I acknowledge that Curthoys’ argument speaks to a particular 
pathology within the broader Australian community at the end of the 20
th 
                                                 
85 Now the Minerals Council of Australia.  
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century; one which continues to persist.  This pathology inverts the role of 
invader/settler people as the dispossessors of Aboriginal people and repositions 
Aboriginal people as those who have the power to dispossess ‘us’.  As Curthoys 
writes: 
Hanson articulates widespread non-Aboriginal fears of a direct loss of land, 
that Aboriginal land claims may somehow affect their own land holdings, 
whether rural farm or urban home.  Equally strong is the fear of a symbolic 
loss, of the legitimacy and permanency of the non-Aboriginal Australian’s 
sense of home.  In this phenomenology, if we fully recognise Indigenous 
claims to the land, if we have a sense of living in someone else’s country, 
we are, in a metaphorical if not a literal sense, perhaps in danger of 
homelessness again, of having to suffer yet again the original expulsion 
(1999: 18). 
 
As such, I argue that Greer and Moran’s work (and the work of others to which I 
refer below) cannot be lifted out of, or separated from, this broader social and 
political milieu.  As such, this work constitutes a specific response to both these 
public debates and these earlier post-colonial problematisations of settler 
belongings; a response that ultimately serves to ‘settle’ settler anxieties through 
the (re)appropriation of Aboriginality/Indigeneity (back) into the settler self.  
Thus, I argue, these responses re-enact the colonial desire to “erase this 
separation of belonging” (Goldie, 1997: see above) through the (re)statement of 
invader/settler Indigeneity. Moreover, this is achieved through the dynamic of 
affirmation and denial (of Aboriginality), as is identified by both Goldie and 
Hodge and Mishra.  Colonialist discursive regimes affirm the existence of 
‘Aboriginality’, but situate Aboriginal people as pre-colonial, ‘dreamtime’ 
‘natives’.  Through this, the impact of colonisation on Aboriginal people is 
eluded, and it is possible to appropriate those elements of Indigeneity desired by 
invader/settler people and incorporate them into the settler self. This includes  
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acquiring Aboriginal dispossession as our own dispossession so that ‘possession’ 
can take place.  I pursue this discussion below.  
 
Following from Probyn (2002), I argue that a clear illustration of what I mean 
can be found in Peter Read’s
86 Belonging (2000). I focus here on the interplay 
between three key passages in his Introduction, Chapter One and Conclusion.  In 
the first instance, he explains his personal response to post-colonial 
problematisations of Australia’s colonial history, with specific reference to 
revisionist histories accounting for the dispossession of Aboriginal people from 
their land.  Secondly, he speaks to his reasons for wanting to write the book, 
which as he explains, is a response to wanting to feel ‘at home’ in Australia 
while the presence of prior Aboriginal existence forces him to question his 
homeliness (the dynamic of the uncanny). Thirdly, we see a resolution to the 
problems of the uncanny in the Conclusion when Read invokes the language of 
19
th century nationalists and refers to himself as the ‘native born’.  The first 
extract to which I refer reads: 
Confrontation with the role of the British in the dispossession brought not 
only a long overdue restraint and reflection to our national history, but to 
many of us, including myself, self-doubt and potential paralysis.  Some of 
us took on the burden of guilt so earnestly that we half believed ourselves 
unworthy even to be here…. Everyone I have quoted so far, so far as I 
know, is like me: university-educated, urban, middle-class and Anglo-
Celtic.  Perhaps it is only this group which feels itself to be trapped.  May it 
be that other Australians…may not perceive the problem as they do?… 
They may not apprehend what I am presenting to be a problem at all (Read, 
2000: 4-5). 
 
 
                                                 
86 As I engage in this discussion, I wish to make it clear that although I have deep reservations 
about this specific text, I also acknowledge and respect that Peter Read (alongside others) has 
played a critical role in bringing the history of the Stolen Generations to mainstream Australians.  
  185 
The first point to be made here is that Read seems to want to negotiate the 
uncanny relationship between guilt and innocence in order to mitigate the effects 
of his ‘paralysis’.  As such, there is a need to redeploy, or reinstate the binary 
relationship between the two concepts, and it is the way that he does this that is 
interesting. Reinstating the initial binary relationship between guilt and 
innocence necessitates reinstating the binary relationship between the heimlich 
and unheimlich. Firstly, he acknowledges Aboriginal dispossession, then he 
appropriates this dispossession as his own and then; finally, he claims possession 
through the appropriation (in this case, ‘discovery’) of Aboriginality and 
declaring himself one of the ‘native born’.  However, as we shall see, this is not 
straight forward, and therefore requires a number of convoluted strategic moves. 
 
Firstly, as Probyn identifies, Read displaces the causes of being ‘unsettled’ away 
from Aboriginal people and locates post-colonial historians as the source of his 
anxieties.  Effectively, Read repositions the ‘Othering’ process away from 
Aboriginal people, towards post-colonial scholars (Probyn, 2002: 80-81).  
Seemingly, Read does this in order to state his allegiance with other white 
Australians who do not perceive a problem (those who are, effectively, innocent).  
However, what becomes clear is that Read, despite his protestations that 
invader/settler belongings should not be predicated on Aboriginal belongings 
(see Read, 2000: 15), is actually aligning himself with Aboriginal people.  In the 
first instance, this occurs through positioning himself as dispossessed (“we half 
believed ourselves unworthy even to be here”).  Thus, what he has ‘in common’ 
with, or makes him ‘like’, Aboriginal people is dispossession.  As Probyn (2002: 
81) and Gelder (2000: online) note, this is a critical tactical move because his  
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dispossession is a necessary pre-requisite to claiming ‘possession’, or 
‘belonging’
87.   
 
Additionally though, Read must also ‘affirm and deny’ the presence of 
Aboriginal people in order to claim his own ‘Aboriginality’.  Affirm because it is 
precisely the presence of Aboriginal people that enables Read to speak to the 
‘depth’ of belonging he desires, and deny because the living presence of 
Aboriginal people stands in the way of his ‘belonging’, which ultimately must 
manifest as his ‘Aboriginality’. It is here that the passage in Chapter One of 
Belonging is instructive.  I pick the story up, part of the way through its telling:  
I scrambled about a kilometre up the steep slope and there, half an hour 
after leaving the boat, in a silent and deserted clearing which looked as 
though it hadn’t been visited for a century, I made a discovery that haunts 
me yet.  Under a ledge of rock less than a metre high was a little pile of 
clam shells.  By their remote position, the low shelf, and the finely 
discernible layer of dust in this serene and silent site, they were clearly 
Aboriginal, maybe 150 years old.  The rocky ledge and its silent contents 
gave me a shiver of excitement that I still carry…. My discovery revived in 
me all the problems of wanting to belong in this breathtaking country of 
deepest personal and family memory [this area is a place of significance for 
Read’s family].  The hushed shell-pile reminds me that Cowan Creek is 
deep Aboriginal country also.  I ask myself: Do I have a right to belong in 
this soul-country?  Do Aboriginals belong in some deeper way that the rest 
of us, even though none as yet lays a Native Title claim to it?  Would such 
a pre-emptive claim of belonging – if that is what a Native Title claim is – 
reduce or disqualify my own sense?  If so, must it always?  Considering 
those questions, and how non-Aboriginal Australians are grappling with 
them, is the subject of this book (Read, 2000: 9; also see Probyn, 2002: 77). 
 
                                                 
87 Indeed, Gelder elaborates this position by contextualising Read’s Belonging with his 1996 
publication Returning to Nothing: The Meaning of Lost Places.  Here, Gelder writes that Read’s 
earlier book “enacts a particularly disturbing strategy in relation to all this – as a first step on the 
road to settler paradise.  Here, he looks at what he calls ‘place deprivation’ for non-Aboriginal 
Australians – the experience of loss through a range of events, some spectacular…and some 
bureaucratic…. What is interesting is that Read expresses the settler experience of ‘place 
deprivation’ in exactly the same way that one might account for the Aboriginal experience of 
dispossession…. settler and Aboriginal people, through this strange mirror effect, have 
dispossession in common.  Dispossession is in fact necessary in order for such belonging to 
occur, which explains why this book came first and Belonging came afterwards” (Gelder, 2000).  
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At this point of the analysis, it is useful to bear in mind Hodge and Mishra’s 
definition of ‘affirmation and denial’ and its dependency on situating Aboriginal 
people as fixed in the dreamtime, unable to understand “linear history in the 
European mode” (Hodge and Mishra, 1991: 27). I argue this is exactly the 
process we see being enacted in the above passage and this enables Read to claim 
his Aboriginality.  This is his ‘belonging’: his being ‘at home’. 
 
Firstly, according to Read, no Native Title claim has been made on the area so 
there is no ‘contemporary’ or ‘documentary’ evidence (rather, that which would 
count as evidence in this scenario) of this place being occupied by, or being 
important to, Aboriginal people.  Secondly, the shell middens Read discovers are 
150 years old, no one has been here for a century, they are silent and hushed, 
unable to speak for themselves until Read, the discoverer, finds them and speaks 
their history and longevity for them.  Thirdly, Read introduces the relationship 
between Aboriginality and ‘deep-time’
88 (“deepest personal and family 
memory”, “do Aboriginals belong in some deeper way…?”), which, as Probyn 
argues, also conflates with dreamtime (Probyn, 2002: 79; also see Griffiths, 
2000); a spiritual connection to his “soul-country”. The point I make here is that 
Aboriginality is present through the invocation of ‘deep’, or ‘dream’ time, yet it 
is denied because being in the dreamtime also makes Aboriginal people absent.  
However, if dreamtime ‘Aboriginality’ conflates with ‘deep’ and if Read’s 
attachments are also ‘deep’ then he is, by discursive sleight of hand, also 
positioning himself as ‘Aboriginal’, with a spiritual connection to place that is 
something like a ‘dreaming’; a mystical experience that continues to ‘haunt’ him.  
                                                 
88 The relationship between Aboriginality, deep-time (‘dreamtime’) and true belonging recurs 
frequently throughout Read’s book.  
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Thus, in this passage, Read’s discovery of the shell middens becomes, his 
discovery of his own Indigeneity.   
 
Indeed, by the final passages of Read’s text, his claim to Indigeneity is an 
explicit one. He writes: 
During this chapter I’ve used for the first time the phrase ‘native-born’ 
about myself…. I’ve engaged with my fellow Australians, who have 
convinced me that, although there are many ways to belong to this land and 
to this nation, none should be taken for granted…. We need the metaphors, 
the connections, the songs and the art.  I need the Gai-mariagal stories, I 
need to believe that the voices in the river will never be silent, that the land 
bears our mark now as well as theirs…. My sense of the native-born has 
come – is coming.  It comes through listening but with discernment; 
through thinking but not asserting; through good times with my Aboriginal 
friends but not through wanting to be the same as them; through 
understanding our history but being enriched by our sites of past evil as 
well as good.  It comes from believing that belonging means sharing and 
sharing demands equal partnership (Read, 2000: 222 - 223). 
 
Of course, this is the disingenuity of the crisis of settler belonging.  Ultimately, 
the desire to share and offer equal partnership only comes from the belief that 
this is ‘ours’ to share.  As Gelder and Jacobs argue, the uncanny reminds us that 
“what is ‘ours’ is also potentially, or even always already ‘theirs’” (see Gelder 
and Jacobs, 1998: 23; also see above). Claims to “sharing” and “equal 
partnership” are, in this context, the final move in reinstating the binary between 
‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ by making ‘theirs’, ‘ours’. What looks like a divestment of 
power then, is ultimately the very expression of power, and ultimately, white 
sovereignty. As Probyn writes in response to Read: 
Read doesn’t have to negotiate a sense of belonging through a different set 
of cultural beliefs, he doesn’t have to deal with a legal system that is 
incommensurable to his own, he doesn’t have to negotiate his belonging to 
a specific place…and he doesn’t have to foreground his indebtedness to the 
experience of Aboriginal dispossession.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the 
book ends up with a feeling of success and a rehearsal of common aims: 
“belonging means sharing and sharing demands equal partnership” (223).   
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This is uncontroversial precisely in the sense that it doesn’t really go 
anywhere – and it doesn’t go anywhere because the author has not had the 
opportunity to experience the dispossession that he uses as an existential 
prop for articulating a sense of “belonging” (2002: 79-80).  
 
Aileen Moreton-Robinson succinctly echoes this point when she writes, “there 
can be no equal partnership while there is illegal dispossession” (2003: 27) of 
Aboriginal people from their land.  Sharing may be a worthwhile sentiment, but 
sentiment is all it can be while the Sovereign rights of Indigenous people are not 
validated.  In the absence of this, ‘sharing’ and ‘equal partnership’ can only work 
to corroborate and legitimise white sovereignty.  
 
Further to this, I argue Read’s self-reference to the ‘native born’ marks a return 
to the nationalist sentiment that first underpinned the term in the 19
th and early 
20
th century.  Indeed, closer examination of John Moloney’s text The Native 
Born: The First White Australians (2000) supports this view.  In the following 
discussion, I explore how the re-invocation of this terminology enables a 
conflation of Indigenous and invader/settler identities, again, through the 
paradigm of invader/settler dispossession and obtaining possession through the 
appropriation of Aboriginality, with the ultimate objective of valorising the white 
nation. 
 
John Moloney’s Native Born: The First White Australians (2000) is a (self 
confessed) ‘idealised’ (Moloney, 2000: 10) historical study of the native-born 
white Australians, born in New South Wales before 1850.  It is an examination of 
the birth of Australian national identity; the social, educational, economic and 
religious boundaries placed around the lives of the native-born, and their 
relationships with those who had power and influence over their lives.  It is also a  
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discussion about their relationship with the land, and by implication, Aboriginal 
people (see Moloney, 2000: 1-10)
89. 
 
Moloney argues that the first generations of the Australian native born had a 
unique and special relationship with the land, which underpinned their growing 
sense of Australian national identity.  While this is not a particularly unique 
observation in itself, Moloney goes on to interpret this relationship as being 
equivalent to Aboriginal peoples’ relationship with the land. Moreover, like 
Aboriginal people, colonial officials and free settlers also dispossessed the white 
native-born from the possibility of owning land.  As Moloney writes: 
Consequently, although they did not suffer the same deprivation as the 
Aborigines who lost almost all, the growth of a relationship with the land, 
or one of belonging to it, could only come about in other ways than by land 
ownership among most of the native-born.  For them, that relationship had 
perforce to stem fundamentally from the original fact of their nationality 
based on birth.  In effect, they could, and did, claim to be Australians 
because they were born here.  What the vast majority of them could not 
claim was to possess any part of the land.  Nevertheless, they sensed their 
oneness with the land in its physical manifestation in sea, coast, mountain, 
river and plain, in its fauna and flora, its abundance, vulnerability and 
scarcity, in its tender welcome or harsh rejection.  All this was as natural to 
the majority of the white native-born as it was to the Aborigines.  Like 
them, the native-born did not need to possess the land though individual 
and private ownership.  Its spirit was their birthright (2000: 4; also see 66). 
 
 
Thus, in the first few pages of the book, Moloney makes a similar strategic move 
to Read, in that he identifies the native-borns’ connection with the land as 
spiritual (“oneness with the land”, “all this was as natural to the majority of the 
native born as it was to the Aborigines”, “its spirit was their birthright”).  This is 
                                                 
89 John Moloney chaired the history taskforce on the Bicentennial History Program and was 
author of The Penguin Bicentennial History of Australia (1988).  Of this text Stuart Macintyre 
writes: “Moloney took to his brief ‘to write of the land and its white peopling’ and said little 
about Aboriginal history – other than an apologetic ‘sorry mate’ – on the grounds that I am not 
one of them and therefore could not tell their story” (Macintyre, 2004: 113).  
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integral to the Indigenising process.  As we have seen, so too is identifying 
invader/settler people as dispossessed from the land (“what the vast majority of 
them could not claim to was to possess any part of the land”, “the native born did 
not need to possess the land through individual and private ownership”).  
Additionally, by way of underscoring the similar dispossession experienced by 
both Aboriginal people and the native born, Moloney is at pains to point out that 
the native born were, in no way, responsible for the dispossession of Aboriginal 
people.  He writes in his introduction to the book:  
The native-born, because they held so little land in proportion to their 
number, were never significant as land owners or, subsequently as 
squatters.  Therefore, they were much less involved in the process of land 
alienation from the Aborigines and not motivated in the same way to use 
violent means to drive them from it.  Furthermore, stemming from their 
own innate sense of birth in the same land, many of the native-
born…generally had much more humane and precious relations with the 
Aborigines than did the convicts, emancipists and free immigrants.  Added 
to the factors of birth and landlessness was a common sense of inferiority.  
To the degree that the Aborigines were regarded as partaking of the lot of 
common humanity, they were seen, and put, on the lowest step of the 
ladder of the human race in early Australia.  One rung above them stood the 
native-born…it is not the first white Australians, the native-born, that they 
ought to hold responsible for the initial act of white invasion and its later 
consequences (Moloney, 2000: 4-5). 
 
Indeed, Moloney is so committed to this idea that he repeats it on the final page 
of his book, writing, “[i]t is unquestionable that the first generations of the 
native-born were rarely numbered among the dispossessors and the decimators of 
the Aborigines, as is the fact of widespread wrongdoing” (2000: 213).   
 
In part, this can be read as simple denialism.  A refusal to account for the fact 
that current generations of invader/settler Australians continue to benefit from 
Aboriginal dispossession on a daily basis. However, the conclusion of Moloney’s 
book serves another strategic function: releasing contemporary white (‘native  
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born’) Australians from feelings of guilt for the dispossession of Aboriginal 
people.  In his final redemption of the native born, Moloney argues, “the 
decedents of the native-born, by blood or adoption, know that no act of 
repentance for the wrongs of the past are too great.  They know also that, without 
that act, all else on the path to reconciliation becomes a mockery and a sham 
because true reality has not been faced” (Moloney, 2000: 213).  Thus, Moloney’s 
conclusion makes an unequivocal statement about the intrinsic moral worth of 
native-born Australians, and this, I argue, can be interpreted as making a claim 
for the intrinsic moral worth of the contemporary white Australian nation. 
Indeed, as Tatz points out, morality and Australian-ness are often cast as 
mutually inclusive terms.  He argues “[a] curious national belief is that simply 
being Australian is sufficient inoculation against deviation from moral and 
righteous behaviour” (2001: 17), thus suggesting that one cannot behave 
immorally by virtue of the fact that we are Australian. Thus, not only are we ‘not 
guilty’, we are, more importantly, ‘innocent’ and, in spite of our innocence, we 
are able to take responsibility for that for which we are not responsible.   I argue 
this allows us to justify possession of Aboriginal land.  Thus, not only does this 
reinstate the binary relationship between guilt and innocence, it restores the 
relationship between home and alienation, heimlich and unheimlich, as well.   
This is possible because we are all, effectively, Indigenous. As Gelder writes, in 
freeing the native-born from the burden of the dispossession of Aboriginal 
people, Moloney contrives the ‘native born’ as a “a kind of a meta category – 
under which Aboriginal people are duly subsumed” (Gelder, 2000: online).  “By 
taking the ‘non’- from ‘non-Aboriginal’, [Moloney wants]… settler Australians  
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not only to become indigenous but to supplant Aboriginal people in the process”  
(Gelder, 2000: online, emphasis in the original).  He continues: 
What looks like an innocent tribute to an apparently neglected class of 
people becomes in effect a ghastly return to some kind of ‘white Australia’ 
policy – or perhaps to give it a postcolonial spin, we should say: a ‘white 
(Aboriginal) Australia’ policy (Gelder, 2000: online). 
 
Indeed, by the conclusion of Moloney’s text, this is practically a fait accompli, 
with the dispossession of Aboriginal people resulting in their final effacement 
from the Australian landscape and populace.  As Moloney writes in his epilogue: 
No epilogue on the native-born could conclude without turning to the first 
native-born of this continent whose origin is hidden in the sweep of 
millennia…. It was inevitable that dispossession would result in the 
decimation of the black people because, without their land and, in many 
cases deprived of their children, they were nothing.  In large measure they 
became as mere shadows and remnants of a people flitting from place to 
place across what had been one with their very being (2000: 212-213). 
 
Thus, the concluding paragraphs of Moloney’s book achieve three things.  
Firstly, it maintains Aboriginality as a subset of the native born so that it 
symbolically stands for the ‘white Aborigines’ continuity with place; their 
Indigeneity (“no epilogue on the native-born could conclude without turning to 
the first native born”). Secondly, it invokes the message of the ‘doomed race 
theory’ (“whose origin is hidden in the sweep of millennia”, “decimation”, “they 
were nothing”, “shadows”, “remnants”), thereby reinstating the fiction of terra 
nullius and the ideological preconditions upon which white Australia claimed 
‘nativity’ in the nineteenth century.  Therefore, as it did then, this provides a 
space for invader/settler people to become the ‘white Aborigines’.  Finally, it 
privileges white sovereignty at the expense of acknowledging Aboriginal 
Sovereignty.  The final lines of Moloney’s text read:  
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That the decedents of the native-born should stand with those others who 
have become Australians and share the same nationality of place and 
people with the Aborigines is vital.  Without that unity no independent 
Australia is possible.  To strive for other than such an Australia is to mock 
the native-born, both black and white (2000: 213). 
 
Thus, what at first glance looks like a progressive and inclusive vision for 
Australian nationalism in the 21
st century turns out to be a vision that is not so 
very different to that of 100 years ago. 
 
These processes of dispossession/possession are also evident in Moran’s 
Indigenizing Settler Nationalism (2002).  Unlike Read’s work where these 
processes are evident within his personal narrative, or Moloney’s where they are 
revealed in the ways history accounts for the contemporary, post-colonial 
dilemma of settler belongings. Evidence of this dynamic at work in Moran’s 
thesis is apparent in the theoretical framework of his text.   
 
The significant contribution of Moran’s work to post-colonial theory is his 
analysis of the differences between settler and non-settler colonies/nations and 
the impact of Indigeneity in constructing colonial and national identities (see 
Moran, 2002: 1013-1014).  As he writes: 
Settler colonialism, and in particular settler nationalism, have been 
neglected in the study of colonialism and imperialism.  The post-colonial 
theorists who, since the 1980’s, have taken up the lead of writers like Fanon 
and Memmi have been predominantly concerned with non-settler colonies, 
often adopting in the process a monolithic colonial category that has served 
to subsume settler colonialism and its specific structures and forms (Moran, 
2002: 1013-1014). 
 
However, while Moran’s claims that settler colonialism and settler nationalism 
“have been neglected in the study of colonialism and imperialism”, he draws on  
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the work of Goldie (1989) and Hodge and Mishra (1990) – authors who 
specifically engage with settler colonialism and nationalism – to make the claim 
that the presence of Indigenous peoples ‘unsettles’ the settler populace (2002: 
1025; also see above).   
 
Even with this acknowledgment, Moran subsequently neglects the ‘other part’ of 
Goldie and Hodge and Mishra’s respective theses, which, as we have seen, 
highlights the ways settler communities affirm and deny the existence of 
Indigenous communities in order to produce an ‘Aboriginality’ that stands for, or 
represents, their own Indigeneity.  I suggest that it is because of this oversight 
that Moran produces an unproblematic claim for the Indigenisation of the white 
Australian settler nation.  Thus, I argue that despite the fact that Moran makes the 
important distinction that settler and non-settler colonialism/nationalism need to 
be problematised differently, it is, paradoxically, precisely the identification of 
settler colonialism/nationalism (dispossession from the original homeland) that 
produces the pre-conditions for desiring possession of the national territory 
through Indigeneity. 
 
Therefore, in corollary to Moran’s position that we must problematise the 
monolithic category of colonialism, I argue that this problematisation must 
include an analysis of the ways invader/settler political and national interests 
work to limit, or contain, the potency of Aboriginal political and cultural gains.  
For instance, where Moran argues that  Aboriginality “is honoured by the public 
culture: by politicians, by the mass media, by the art world, and at least by some 
sections of the Australian populace” (2002: 1033; also see above) we must also  
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acknowledge that it was conservative politicians who withdrew funding and 
finally dissolved ATSIC
90 in 2004, who refuse to apologise for the Stolen 
Generations and continue to oversee the violation of Aboriginal human rights
91. 
Moreover, the mass media continues to allow anti-Aboriginal racial vilification 
to be broadcast and published
92.  Further, we must acknowledge that 
unscrupulous art collectors, dealers and galleries trading in forgeries and second-
rate works openly take advantage of Aboriginal art and artists for considerable 
financial gain.  In addition to undermining the income of Aboriginal people, this 
exploitation also has the capacity to undermine Aboriginal people and their 
culture in the eyes of the broader Australian populace.  As the art collector Colin 
                                                 
90 ATSIC (Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Commission) came into existence in March 1990 
with Lois O’Donoghue as the chairperson.  ATSIC was intended to provide official, elected 
political representation to Aboriginal people.  In her critique of ATSIC, Irene Watson writes: 
“Over recent years we have been deemed culturally deficient and poor managers of our own 
affairs; this has been ‘proven’ and is illustrated in our alleged maladministration of ATSIC.  The 
federal government [Liberal Government under Howard] has been largely successful in its 
discrediting of the ATSIC structure, through a public media campaign waged against ATSIC, and 
also the appropriation of an Aboriginal critique of ATSIC.  The blame for the failings of ATSIC 
was laid at the feet of Aboriginal peoples.  The gaze was not once turned upon the state, the state 
which in any event held power to determine a different course for ATSIC, in terms of it being a 
failure or success.  Aboriginal peoples are not in a position of power to question the state’s 
motive in initially implementing ATSIC, or of its defunding, and the erosion of the power and 
duties of ATSIC.  How could a structure like ATSIC, based as it was upon hierarchy, patriarchy, 
and entrenched colonialism, serve the Aboriginal community?…That’s what we got with ATSIC, 
a white, patriarchal model of political representation….We never got to a place of empowering 
community to share equally.  ATSIC was not an Aboriginal model; it was a colonialist model that 
served to entrench white values and ways of being.  Aboriginal ways of sharing never surfaced, 
and Aboriginal poverty and disadvantage remained the dominant discourse.  Aboriginal peoples 
were given an under-resourced white model to perform the impossible task of caring for 
Aboriginal Australia.  From the beginning, the ATSIC project was doomed and set up to fail, and 
when it did, white racism laid the blame in black hands” (Watson, 2005: 45). 
91 I note here that Moran’s thesis, although published in 2002, over-relies on documentation of 
political events prior to the election of the Liberal National Federal Government in 1996.  For 
example, as evidence to the ‘political honouring’ of Aboriginal rights, Moran cites the former 
Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating’s Redfern Address.  This was delivered in 1992, some ten 
years earlier than the publication of this article. 
92 See for example, the transcript from 6PR’s broadcast, cited in the methodology.  For a related 
discussion also see Hannah McGlade (2000), especially pages 198-201.  Here McGlade tells of 
her attempts to seek redress for racist comments made by Ross Lightfoot, then a member of the 
West Australian Parliament, and published in the West Australian (Western Australia’s only daily 
newspaper).  McGlade lodged a racial vilification complaint with the Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission.  The commissioner hearing McGlade’s case dismissed it 
under section 25x of the racial vilification act, “which allows the commission to dismiss 
complaints it considers ‘frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance’” (McGlade, 
2000: 200).  
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Laverty, told Nicholas Rothwell in a recent interview for the Weekend 
Australian: 
So far, art has been the key way that Australia at large has come to 
understand and learn about and have respect for Aboriginal people, and 
there’s been tremendous respect for the achievements of the artists.  So its 
not just the monetary value that’s at risk here.  If the art is seen as being 
without cultural authenticity, and it can’t be sold, there could be a lessening 
effect for Aboriginal people through that effect (Rothwell, 2006: 22). 
 
My point here is that it is important to not simply identify the incorporation of 
‘Aboriginality’ into the Australian public domain and utilise this to make 
uncritical statements about the maturation or moral virtue of the nation.  Rather, I 
argue, that we need to understand these celebrations as contested sites of cultural 
and national identity where Aboriginal people intervene and make strategic 
representations for their Sovereign claims in the face of ongoing angst over the 
legitimacy of invader/settler occupation of their land.  Moreover, where these 
public representations of Aboriginality are genuine expressions of cross-cultural 
collaboration and learning, we must affirm the success of the cross-cultural 
educational strategies utilised by Indigenous people.  Anything less constitutes 
not only a disingenuous appropriation of Aboriginality, it represents a refusal to 
acknowledge the generosity of those Aboriginal people who share their culture in 
mainstream public forums as part of cross-cultural education, and a denial of the 
multifarious ways Indigenous people engage with the notion of ‘nation’ in order 
to stimulate public awareness on their Sovereign claims. 
 
This leads me to my second point; that the problematisation of settler colonialism 
must also be responsive to, and inclusive of, the political strategies of Indigenous 
peoples.  For instance, in Australia, the very notion of a ‘settler’ nation is 
challenged by Aboriginal people with the re-casting of the ‘settler’ as the  
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‘invader’
93, and the legitimacy of the white nation is disputed through claiming 
Aboriginal country/ies as ‘nations’. Both of these strategies underscore the point 
that possession was taken of Aboriginal land ‘without treaty or consent’.  Thus, 
many in the Aboriginal community know Australia day as ‘Invasion Day’ and/or 
‘Shame Day’ (see Langford-Ginibi, 1992: 106-111). Indeed, on Australia Day in 
1988 the Aboriginal activist Burnum Burnum played out an audacious parody of 
the invasion of Aboriginal lands by planting an Aboriginal flag on British soil 
and declaring that he, “a nobleman of ancient Australia do hereby take 
possession of England for Aboriginal people” (See Norst, 1999: n.p.)
94.  Thus to 
return to Gelder and Jacobs’ observation that the uncanny challenges the 
presumption of white Australia as a settler nation
95, I argue that Moran’s 
commitment to Australian settlement – as opposed to invasion – is a commitment 
to unfolding the uncanny relationship between settlement and invasion, and on 
behalf of the national story, reinstating the legitimacy of the story of settlement. 
 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the nation state is called into question with the 
positioning of Aboriginal groups as ‘nations’, meaning that nations (Indigenous 
Sovereignty) continue to exist within the settler nation and that the presumption 
of sovereignty by the nation state does not negate the Sovereignty of Aboriginal 
                                                 
93 Also see the Introduction. 
94 Taken from the ‘Burnum Burnum Declaration’.  In this declaration, Burnum Burnum promised 
to bring no harm to the British natives, to teach Pitjantjarjara to British people and to teach them 
how to have a spiritual relationship with the Earth.  He also promised not to desecrate the remains 
of people, to poison their food and water supplies, or to quarry the earth.  He promised to 
preserve the Caucasian race “as an interest to antiquity” and at the “end of two hundred years we 
will make a Treaty to validate occupation by peaceful means and not by conquest”.  He promised 
to “unite peoples, communities, religions and notions in a common, productive and peaceful 
purpose” (see Norst, 1999: n.p.)   
95 “We often speak of Australia as a setter nation, but the uncanny can remind us that a condition 
of unsettledness folds into this taken for granted mode of occupation” (1998: 24, also see above).  
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people.  In an earlier publication (published in 1998) Anthony Moran engages 
with this point, asking:  
Are indigenous communities nations?  Not, perhaps, according to the 
concept as it emerged in Europe.  But the claim to nationhood is also a 
political statement, not simply an intellectual argument concerned with 
conceptual niceties.  Indigenous people have claimed that they belonged to 
sovereign nations at the time of invasion, and that they belong to a unified 
Aboriginal nation today (Moran, 1998: online). 
 
However, Moran continues to suggest that we should “discard the term 
‘nation’…and use instead ‘political community’” (1998) to distinguish between 
“the indigenous” and other ethnic groups who comprise the settler nation and 
identify the unique political status of Indigenous people within the settler nation 
(1998).  While this distinction is at least more useful than the claim for 
Indigenizing settler nationalism that he makes in his subsequent article (and 
where the political interests of Indigenous people are saved as a qualifying 
statement in his conclusion), we can see that claims for Indigenous Sovereignty 
continue to be subsumed by the sovereign status of the settler nation.   
 
Recognising the political rights of Aboriginal people is not equal to recognising 
Aboriginal Sovereignty.  This is evident when the former Prime Minster, John 
Howard, responded to renewed calls for a Treaty with Aboriginal people by 
saying a nation cannot make a Treaty with itself, but acknowledges the need for 
‘practical reconciliation’ (see the Introduction and Chapter Two).  This is the 
manifestation of recognising Indigenous communities’ political interests, but 
denying their Sovereignty. Therefore, I argue a more useful application of 
Moran’s notion of ‘political community’ is to those ‘non-Aboriginal’ Australians  
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who question legitimacy of the white nation in support of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty.  I elaborate this point in the following chapter. 
 
However, before I move on to this element of my discussion, I turn to the ways 
Indigeneity is represented within texts such as Greer’s Whitefella Jump Up, and 
Moran’s Indigenizing Settler Nationalism. Firstly, I argue ‘Aboriginality’ is 
constructed within the paradigm of colonialist naming conventions and these 
carry concomitant colonialist meanings.  However, in identifying the impositions 
of these naming conventions as one aspect of the ongoing violence of 
colonisation, I also argue that they support the illusion that colonisation never 
happened.  In developing this point, I also refer to David Tacey’s Edge of the 
Sacred.  Thus, I argue there is a paradoxical relationship between the discursive 
mode through which Aboriginality is known, and the function of this discourse.  
On one hand, it fundamentally speaks to the process of colonisation because the 
very terms ‘Aborigine’ and ‘Indigenous’ are colonial constructions.  On the 
other, it denies the fact of colonisation because these naming conventions invoke 
romantic images of the pre-colonial, primordial ‘native’.  The violence of 
colonisation is absent from this picture. I argue the affect of those texts 
advocating invader/settler Indigeneity is to perpetuate colonial power relations 
while positioning relations between Aboriginal people and other Australians as 
‘post-colonial’, thereby offering a redemption narrative for the white nation. 
 
Desiring Aboriginality: Which one shall we choose? 
In the Introduction of this thesis, I noted the etymology of the word ‘Aborigine’, 
and the way words such as ‘Aborigine’, Indigenous’, ‘native’ and ‘black’ serve  
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as containers for pejorative, colonialist constructions of Aboriginality and 
enforce the hierarchialised relationship between ourselves and Aboriginal 
‘Others’.  I also noted how such labels demean and diminish Aboriginal ways of 
self-knowing.  As Collard, Harben and van den Berg write, “to describe Koori, 
Nyungar, Mulba, Murri, Nunga, Pallawah, Wongi and Wyba as Aborigines or 
Indigenous Australians denies us our own diversity and identity within our own 
theoretical and applied epistemology” (2004: 11).  The authors argue that while 
the etymology of the word ‘Aborigine’ may serve to validate Aboriginal peoples’ 
status as Australia’s first nations’ peoples, it says nothing about the “richness of 
each of our own cultural, language and geopolitical systems”.  Rather, “It simply 
tells us we are the original peoples of Australia” (2004: 10-12).  
 
I also argued it is possible to make interventions into the constraints of 
colonialist naming practices.  With reference to Moreton-Robinson’s notion of 
Aboriginality as an ontological relationship to land, I argued it is possible to 
‘reinvest’ colonialist naming conventions with meanings that support Aboriginal 
Sovereignty
96.  Indeed, it is in this context that I use such labels in this thesis. 
 
However, I make the point that the writers referred to in this chapter do not 
demonstrate an equivalent or appropriate critique of the language they are using.  
For example, I take issue with Anthony Moran’s designation of Indigenous 
people as “the indigenous”; a term he uses repeatedly throughout his text (2002).  
I argue the constant reference to “the indigenous” works to displace Aboriginal 
people from their country and renders ‘Indigeneity’ an abstract concept in 
                                                 
96 I provide further discussion on this in the following chapter, with reference to the ways 
invader/settlers peoples can make similar, anti-colonial interventions into naming practices we 
choose for ourselves.  
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relation to place.  The effects of this are twofold. Firstly, just as the name 
‘Aborigine’ homogenises the multiculturalism and multilingualism of Aboriginal 
people and denies the complexity of discrete Aboriginal societies and their 
relationship to country, “the indigenous” fails to acknowledge the humanity of 
the Indigenous people to which he refers and the places where they belong. 
 
Jordan makes a similar point in response to Greer’s use of ‘Aboriginal’ in 
Whitefella Jump Up.  She writes:  
After all, what is Aboriginality?  Greer acknowledges that this concept 
wasn’t even thought of before colonisation, when Aboriginal groups were 
distinct from each other and had no need to think of themselves 
collectively.  In fact, in places like Arnhem Land, the concept of 
Aboriginality remain meaningless to those it identifies, with people 
identifying themselves by their tribe or language group, not with a 
collective “Aboriginal” group.  But, the collective concept is at the heart of 
Greer’s essay, because the idea is that white Australians would be absorbed 
into this imagined community, and we will all be Aboriginal.  White 
Australians are still learning that each Aboriginal group is distinct, with its 
own language; that there is no such thing as one Aboriginal group or one 
Aboriginal culture.  Greer simultaneously exhorts non-Aboriginal people to 
learn about this diversity while amalgamating Aboriginal people into a 
collective identity at the heart of her argument (Jordan, 2003: 90). 
 
This then begs the question, what is this ‘Aboriginality’ so desired by white 
settlers?  As I have argued, the primary function of ‘Aboriginality’ in settler 
discourses of belonging is to “”erase” the “separation of belonging”” (Goldie, 
1997: see above) experienced by settler nationals and to symbolically stand for 
the continuity and permanency of the nation.  Thus, the Aboriginality that is 
invoked by settler nationals within these discourses rely on stereotypical 
representations of the primordial, traditional man, such as those produced within 
the discourse of race.  As I have already shown in the beginning of this chapter, 
this is exactly the type of Aboriginality Greer invokes in her advocacy of a 
hunter-gather nation (Greer, 2003: 73-78; also see above).     
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Parallel ideas of Aboriginality are also found in David Tacey’s Edge of the 
Sacred: Transformation in Australia (1998a).  Tacey is a Jungian philosopher 
and his central thesis is that secular Australian society must undergo a process of 
resacralisation in order to redress the “disenchantment” (Tacey, 1998a: 2, 
emphasis in the original) that besets the modern era. Resacralisation, argues 
Tacey, necessitates forging a spiritual connection to land through conjuring the 
archetypal aborigine within.  According to Tacey, Australians are privileged in 
this endeavour.  He writes that because of our “historical and geographical 
conditions” we are “close to primordial reality by default” (1998a: 5).   
 
 
Tacey identifies similar benefits to Aboriginalising ourselves as Greer.  He 
argues it can break down the secular defensiveness and cynicism of 
contemporary Australian society. It can also cure alcohol and drug abuse and 
violence in both Aboriginal and white communities; produce a new ecological 
awareness and facilitate reconciliation between “black and white” Australians 
(see Tacey, 1998a: 8-11).  However, Tacey argues that “no true reconciliation is 
possible until white Australians have first reconciled themselves to the 
indigenous, mythically oriented person in their own souls” (1998a: 11).   
 
Ostensibly mindful of the pitfalls of identity appropriation, Tacey maintains there 
is a distinction between sourcing the archetypal aborigine within and 
appropriating Aboriginality (1998a: 129-133).  Thus, he distinguishes between 
(small ‘a’) archetypal aboriginality and the (capital A) Aboriginality of 
Indigenous people (also see Rolls, 1998: online).  Moreover, Tacey insists that 
when he refers to archetypal aboriginality it equally refers to one’s own  
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European indigeneity (for example, Celtic indigeneity). He explains this with 
reference to Rodney Hall’s novel The Second Bridegroom, writing that: 
Hall indicates that the politically responsible way for psychic renewal is the 
remythologising of one’s own spiritual heritage.  In the case of European-
descended Australians, this means digging deep, deeper than even our 
Judeo-Christian tradition, which may be too dried out, too conscious or 
institutionalised, to foster spiritual renewal.  Activating the indigenous 
archetype…may mean activating the lost or repressed ‘indigenous’ 
elements within the European traditions.  But the challenge is to stimulate 
the mythic possibilities in one’s own psyche, rather than to parasitically 
draw on others (Tacey, 1998a: 174; also see 173 and 137). 
 
 
However, it is also clear from Tacey’s text that the aboriginality he has in mind 
for his ‘archetype’ is the Australian Aboriginal person.  For instance, the 
aboriginality Tacey requires is ‘Black’ (see for example, page 8 of Tacey’s 
Introduction and Chapter Seven, Black and White Australia); and is 50,000 years 
old, which approximates, “the time that scientists believe that Aborigines have 
been in Australia” (Rolls, 1998: online).   Thus, as Mitchell Rolls points out, 
“there is no doubt that the people he is locating in the non-Aboriginal psyche are 
Aborigines, not merely some hidden aspect of ourselves” (Rolls, 1998: online).   
 
Moreover, the aboriginal archetype to which Tacey refers is able to provide 
invader/settler Australians with a ‘dreaming’. Taken at face value, what Tacey is 
referring to here is the Jungian belief that dreams reveal archetypal processes.  
He argues that many invader/settler people have dreams that include Aboriginal 
people and ceremonial activities and this is part of the process of being 
“aboriginalised from within” (See Tacey, 1998a: 135-136).  However, it is also 
clear that Tacey calls upon the western discursive arrangements by which 
Aboriginal spirituality is described in order to add an ‘Indigenous’ authenticity to  
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the proposal that we should aboriginalise (see for example, the title to chapter 8, 
Toward a New Dreaming, 148-176).  The critical misunderstanding in this 
conflation of terms and concepts is evident in this response by ‘one Aborigine’ 
(unnamed in the text) to the question “Is English a very adequate sort of tool to 
describe Aboriginal Dreamings and lifestyles and that sort of thing?” in an ABC 
radio interview in 1990.  The interviewee answered: 
…I think that the word dreaming in English is sleeping-you know, sleeping 
what you dream about.  But for us it’s got nothing to do with that 
whatsoever (Bowden and Bunbury, c.f. Hodge and Mishra, 1991: 28).
97 
 
Thus, I argue Tacey’s notion of ‘Dreaming’ has very little to do with genuinely 
learning about Aboriginal cosmology.  Rather, it works to lend a (so called) 
spiritual innateness to white occupation of Aboriginal land.  As such, it is but one 
example of the way Tacey is able to infuse his Jungian purview with colonialist 
ideology and vice versa
98.   
 
In addition, I also argue that this dynamic is evident in the ways in which Tacey 
situates archetypal aboriginality as ‘black’ (reducible to colour); 50,000 years old 
and out of the dreamtime (pre-colonial and innately spiritual); and archetypal 
(static).  I argue that he clearly demonstrates an over reliance on biologically 
determined, raced understandings of Aboriginality that are intrinsically 
                                                 
97 In her Report for the Western Australian Law Reform Commission’s Inquiry into Customary 
Law Kathryn Trees (2005) notes the inadequacy of the English language to speak to customary 
law and the ‘dreamtime’.  She writes:  “To understand customary law it is necessary to appreciate 
the relationship between the inadequate concepts of ‘dreamtime’ and ‘law’.  These terms are both 
impositions on Aboriginal cultures.  Both the use of English and needing to speak to people 
outside of their language groups has required Aboriginal people to use such terms (or variations 
of them).  ‘Law’ and ‘customary law’ are inadequate because they cannot be free of the western 
concepts and power ascribed to the word law and the status of law as somehow above or separate 
from other aspects of our daily lives.  ‘Dreamtime’ is a derisory and simplistic term for an ancient 
belief system.  It is necessary to have the information in both of these concepts, and a sense of 
spirituality, to understand customary law, because they are indistinguishable” (Trees, 2006: 218). 
98 For more on the debate between Mitchell Rolls and David Tacey see Rolls 1998 and 1999, and 
Tacey 1998b.  
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colonialist in structure and definition.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that 
these constructions of Aboriginality continue to support the power relationships 
inherent in these discourses.   
 
By way of explaining this further it is useful to look at the ways the commonly 
shared view that ‘raced’ understandings of Aboriginality have given way to 
‘cultural’ definitions.  However, it is also conceded that notions of race permeate 
the new, more palatable cultural ones. Thus, while Aboriginal people may not be 
biologically determined, they remain culturally determined.  What is more, these 
determining features have been foregrounded in the earlier discourses of race.  
As Cowlishaw
99 and Morris
100 put it: 
The current appeal to ‘culture’ in defining Aboriginality turns out to be not 
so different from the explicitly racial definitions of an earlier era.  It is 
participation in fixed pre-colonial forms of Aboriginal sociality [and] 
‘native custom’…‘Aboriginal culture’ is itself seen as fixed and ahistorical, 
not something moulded out of shared historical experiences such as 
[colonisation] (1997: 6). 
 
In addition to this, I also argue that the movement away from understanding 
Aboriginality as biologically determined, and towards being culturally 
determined, has other specific benefits for invader/settler people.  The focus on 
‘culture’ also enables notions of fluidity within the invader/settler cultural 
location.  In this context then, culture takes on a different meaning.  Here it refers 
to personal agency and a “chosen way of life, or ‘lifestyle’, as expressed in 
aesthetic forms and in voluntary social practices” (see Cowlishaw and Morris, 
                                                 
99 Gillian Cowlishaw is the ARC Professorial Fellow in the Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, University of Technology, Sydney.  Her research interests include contemporary 
Indigenous issues, race relations, social and ethnic identities and anthropology. 
100 Dr Barry Morris is senior lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University 
of Newcastle.  His research interests include social theory, social change, contemporary 
Australian society and Indigenous rights and race relations.  
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1997: 5).  Therefore, while Aboriginal people remain ‘trapped’ in culture, 
invader/settler people have the cultural freedom, sophistication and sufficient 
personal autonomy to ‘pick and choose’ from those elements of Aboriginality 
most highly prized by members of the invader/settler group: that which connects 
invader/settler people to ‘country’ and provides a language to speak to history, 
longevity and place. Indeed, Greer, who clearly covets the ‘mysteries’ of 
Aboriginal belonging, and seeks to attain a similar level of insider knowledge 
attained by some non-Aboriginal men writes: 
Aboriginality is not a matter of blood or genes; Aborigines themselves have 
to learn Aboriginality.  They have to master knowledge of their own 
country, and of their relationships with neighbouring peoples, and the 
languages appropriate to trade, negotiation and celebration.  Who may learn 
what is dictated primarily by willingness, evinced in readiness to undergo 
ordeal in order to be admitted to the deepest secrets, and has nothing to do 
with colour.  It follows that whitefellas can achieve a measure of 
Aboriginality and historically they have done.  Full-blood white men have 
been initiated and instructed in the law, and have played their part in the 
clans (Greer, 2003: 15). 
 
Thus, I argue the logic of race further reveals itself by virtue of the fact that it 
continues to hierarchialise the relationship between Aboriginal and 
invader/settler culture.  That which is fluid is able to consume that which is 
static.  It does this by situating invader/settler people as without culture (as in, 
non-raced) while over-determining the (racialised) cultural attributes of those 
who are positioned as our exotic others, with cultural qualities we desire for 
ourselves so that we may substantiate occupation of their geopolitical territories 
in the name of white sovereignty. 
 
Secondly, Cowlishaw and Morris’ analysis of Aboriginality as culturally 
determined speaks to an ahistoricity and a refusal to engage with the ways the  
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violence of colonialism shapes Aboriginal identity.  Thus, there is a profound 
level at which the discursive arrangements by which Aboriginality is ‘known’ is 
vital to the discursive regime that conceals the fact of colonisation and its effects.  
 
I note, for example that those who make such proposals never summon images of 
third world living conditions, grinding poverty and acute welfare dependency.  
Nor do they covet the brutal realities of extraordinarily high infant mortality 
rates, shorter life expectancy, poor educational and employment outcomes for 
themselves and their children, disproportionate incarceration rates, appalling 
substance abuse that, in some dire instances, causes communities to implode, or 
the daily violence of endemic racism.  They do not longingly search for the 
opportunity to fight for cultural survival in the face of a dominant culture that is 
largely hostile to their own.  
 
Equally, they do not seek to internalise the Aboriginality of community leaders, 
magistrates and legal practitioners, academics and scholars; those with the 
capacity, eloquence and the authority (as it is defined by non-Aboriginal people) 
to use educated, formal, mainstream English to challenge the colonialist 
discursive paradigms that constructs their Aboriginality as benign, romantic and 
safe to consume.  Thus, I argue that the failure to recognise the ‘post-colonial’ 
havoc wrought on Aboriginal people and communities in these constructions of 
Aboriginality not only represents a denial of the very fact of colonisation, it also 
represents a refusal to acknowledge the ongoing benefits that accrue to 
invader/settler peoples by virtue of the fact that colonisation did take place.  
Finally, it represents a rejection on the part of invader/settler people to  
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investigate the hegemonic power of colonialist constructions of the self and 
Other, or a concomitant unwillingness to undermine this hegemony.  Ultimately, 
this is because the discursive arrangements by which white Indigeneity is 
configured is critical to the processes of national history making and the 
legitimacy of the nation.  It is critical to the support of white sovereignty over 
and above Aboriginal Sovereignty. 
 
Conclusion:  
In this chapter, I have argued recent texts problematising invader/settler 
belongings validate the appropriation of Aboriginality/Indigeneity as a process of 
identity formation that substantiates occupation of Aboriginal land and 
legitimates white sovereignty. 
 
I have formulated my argument with an analysis of five key texts published over 
an eight-year span during and shortly after the official end of the reconciliation 
period.  Particular reference was given to Germaine Greer’s Whitefella Jump Up 
(2003) and Anthony Moran’s As Australia Decolonizes (2002). However, Peter 
Read’s Belonging (2000); John Moloney’s The Native Born (2000); and, David 
Tacey’s Edge of the Sacred (1998a) were also considered.  Within these texts, I 
identified several ideological and paradigmatic confluences underpinning each 
author’s respective theses. I argued these texts similarly operated within 
colonialist frameworks because the Aboriginality/Indigeneity they desire is 
positioned as pre-colonial, primordial and ‘traditional’, thus erasing the violence 
of colonisation and Aboriginal peoples’ survival.  Simultaneously, and 
paradoxically (paradoxically because dispossession is a consequence of the  
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colonisation that is actively disremembered in the previous construction), 
Aboriginal people are positioned as dispossessed, thereby enabling 
invader/settler peoples to appropriate dispossession as their own and constructing 
claims to Aboriginal land as rightful possession. 
 
In my problematisation of these texts, I drew on theoretical work by Terry Goldie 
(1997); Hodge and Mishra (1991).  I acknowledged similarities in Goldie’s and 
Hodge and Mishra’s positions, arguing they both recognise the dynamic between 
the ‘affirmation and denial’ of Aboriginal existence.  Further, I argued Gelder 
and Jacob’s use of the ‘uncanny’ provided a useful post-Mabo appropriation of 
Indigeneity by invader/settler Australians.  I argued contemporary claims to 
Indigeneity by invader/settler peoples serve to settle the problem of the uncanny 
by reinstating the binary relationship between ‘home’ and ‘alienation’ by 
ensuring we are at home because we are Indigenous.  While I appreciate the 
insights this theoretical work makes available, I am also mindful it does not 
provide ways forward or through the issues these insights raise.  To this end, I 
argue for alternative, anti-colonial considerations of settler identity and 
concomitant belongings.  I turn my attention to this in the following chapter, 
Transformation and Transcendence: Creating the Non-Aboriginal Subject. 
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If it is true that consciousness is a process of transcendence, we 
have to see too that this transcendence is haunted by the problems 
of love and understanding.  Man is a yes that vibrates to cosmic 
harmonies.  Uprooted, pursued, baffled, doomed to watch the 
dissolution of the truths that he has worked out for himself one after 
another, he has to give up projecting onto the world an antinomy 
that coexists with him (Fanon, 1967: 8, emphasis in the original). 
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Chapter 4: 
Transformation and Transcendence: Creating the Non-
Aboriginal Subject. 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
 In this chapter, I develop my argument for creating the non-Aboriginal self.  I 
argue that this is an integrated three-part process that includes recognising an 
ontology of non-Aboriginality; naming the ontological experience as ‘non-
Aboriginal’; and, defining non-Aboriginality as a political identity constructed in 
commitment to achieving an anti-colonial process of identity formation.  In 
making this argument, I propose a strategy whereby invader/settler peoples can 
articulate a political identity, formed out of a profound and irrevocable 
understanding of being in Indigenous Sovereignty, and in relationship with 
Indigenous people as Sovereign subjects.   
 
In the first instance, I argue ‘non-Aboriginality’, as an anti-colonial process of 
identity formation, is a critical response to those who propose the abolition of 
whiteness. In Chapter Two, I argued the theoretical and practical frameworks of 
the New Race Abolitionists reinscribe colonialist ideologies.  In my discussion, I 
focused on ‘crossing over’ from whiteness into blackness, and the proposition 
that anti-whiteness activists form strategic alliances with white race-hate groups. 
In my critique I argued ‘crossing over’ enables the epistemological (re)centring 
of whiteness in relationship to blackness. Consequently, this ensures that colour 
retains its status as an a priori, in social organisation and in problematising the 
effects of this phenomenon. Moreover, whiteness and blackness can only be 
known through their binary relationship to each other.  This ensures that  
  213 
Aboriginality can only be known as blackness. Thus, the importance of culture, 
kinship, the insider knowledge of what it means to be colonised and the strategic 
interventions Aboriginal people make into whiteness, are absent from the 
purview of whiteness.  I also argued that ‘crossing over’ from whiteness into 
blackness disconnects whiteness from historical memory and context and 
undermines the original goals of reconciliation and supports conservative 
ambitions for ‘practical reconciliation’.  Therefore, as a political methodology, 
crossing over stands in contradiction to my argument for ‘substantive 
reconciliation’.  Finally, I addressed the idea that anti-whiteness activists should 
enter into political partnerships with white race supremacist organisations.  I 
argued such allegiances move us away from being in Indigenous Sovereignty and 
undermine the importance of intersubjective dialogic relationships with 
Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects. 
 
Secondly, I argue that ‘non-Aboriginality’, as an anti-colonial process of identity 
formation, represents a radical departure from those processes of identity 
formation discussed in Chapter Three, where the white self is constructed in 
relationship with the white nation, which in turn co-opts ‘Aboriginality’ as a 
means to fulfilling its own Indigenising objectives.  I argue in this context, non-
Aboriginality rejects colonialist constructions of Aboriginality and the function it 
plays in Indigenising non-Aboriginal people.  Further, it rejects those discursive 
frameworks that deny Aboriginal dispossession and co-opts this as our own 
dispossession.  Finally, it rejects the presumption of white (aboriginal) 
sovereignty and demands the construction of non-Aboriginality within the 
context of Aboriginal Sovereignty.   
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The anti-colonial intent of my argument is to provide both a discursive and 
theoretical framework that articulates the significance of meaningful intercultural 
and intersubjective relationships between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples 
in producing non-Aboriginal subjectivities.  I argue that such relationships play a 
pivotal role in bringing non-Aboriginal people into relationship with Aboriginal 
Sovereignty.  Therefore, the purpose of this discussion is also to undermine the 
continuing colonialist logic that silences, ignores, denies or forbids the existence, 
and importance of these relationships in bringing invader/settler peoples into 
Aboriginal Sovereignty, and in corollary, non-Aboriginal subjectivities into 
being. 
 
With this said however, I must offer this important caveat. On a practical level, it 
is unreasonable; indeed, impossible to ask Aboriginal people, who constitute a 
mere 2.5-3% of the Australian population, to take responsibility for the identity 
development processes of ‘non-Aboriginal’ people. Thus, the ongoing purpose of 
this discussion, and my role as a self-identified non-Aboriginal woman within 
this discussion, is to speak to these ideas in the hope that they provide a language 
and theoretical framework with which other non-Aboriginal people can engage.  
This point is further underscored in my bringing together the different and 
diverse stories of other non-Aboriginal people in the documentary element of this 
project. 
 
Chapter Overview: 
In this chapter, I begin my discussion by developing a process I call ‘an ontology 
of non-Aboriginality’.  I position my discussion as an elaboration of Marcia  
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Langton’s notion of the third domain
101 as an anti-colonial dialogic space shared 
by both Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples.  Although Langton’s concern 
primarily rests with the ways anti-colonial constructions of Aboriginality are 
produced within the third domain, my analysis extends her work to focus on anti-
colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality.  By way of differentiating the 
dynamics of Langton’s theoretical framework from other ‘post-colonial’ theories, 
I contrast Langton’s third domain with Homi Bhabha’s third space.  This part of 
my discussion is informed by the work of Yinjibarndi academic, Denise Groves, 
who identifies similarities in the two concepts.  While there are elements of 
concurrence between Groves’ view and my position, I also argue that there are 
critical differences between the third domain and the third space.   
 
Bhabha’s third space prioritises the problematisation of migrant and diasporic 
identity in relation to the colonial centre, thus producing hybrid identities, 
whereas, Langton’s third domain allows for situating the construction of non-
Aboriginality within the locus of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  In developing my 
critique of the third space I make specific reference to Ian Anderson’s rejection 
of hybridity as the re-colonisation of Aboriginal bodies, and Moreton-Robinson’s 
explication of Aboriginal ontological relationships with land.  I take both as an 
assertion of Indigenous Sovereignty, and argue that non-Aboriginality is an 
ontological experience born out of a profound recognition of being in Indigenous 
                                                 
101 Langton does not actually use the word ‘domain’, preferring instead the word ‘category’ (see 
Langton, 1993, 34-35).  I take the word ‘domain’ from Palmer and Groves (2000: 22), who use 
this term in their own discussion on Langton’s thesis.  I note however, that they also inter-change 
the term ‘domain’ and ‘space’.  I suggest this is because they see similarities between Langton’s 
third domain and Homi Bhabha’s ‘third space’ (see Palmer and Groves, 2000: 23). In my own 
discussion I use the term ‘domain’ to distinguish between Langton’s argument and Bhabha’s 
notion of the ‘third space’.    
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Sovereignty, as distinct to an ontological experience informed by a relationship 
with the colonial centre. 
 
As I progress my discussion, I argue that recognising the ontological experience 
of non-Aboriginality brings with it ethical obligations to work towards 
developing a discourse that both articulates our non-Aboriginality and non-
Aboriginal peoples’ political responsibilities towards Aboriginal Sovereignty.  I 
position this as a counter-hegemonic discourse to those discursive paradigms that 
privilege constructions of self within colonialist frameworks. I do this in two 
ways.  Firstly, continuing with my commitment to autobiographicalise this text, I 
relate a personal account of how I have come to understand my non-
Aboriginality.  In so doing, I provide just one specific example of the ways I 
position my own subjectivity within a broader historical and political context. I 
conclude with reference to Levinas’
102 (1999) Alterity and Transcendence thesis 
and argue that  recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginality is a process of 
‘transforming’ the white Australian self into a non-Aboriginal person, and this 
necessitates an affirmation of our alterity to Aboriginal people as Sovereign 
subjects.  
 
Secondly, returning to an academic discursive mode, I make a case for ‘naming’ 
our non-Aboriginality as a subject position within Aboriginal Sovereignty, and 
defining non-Aboriginality as an overtly political identity.  I argue non-
Aboriginality is innately political because it exists in juxtaposition to those 
versions of Australian-ness that co-opt Aboriginality as part of our own 
                                                 
102 Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) was a influential philosopher concerned with ethics.  
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Indigenising processes and in affirmation of the Sovereign status of Aboriginal 
people.  By way of illustrating my point, I make reference to some of the 
interventions Aboriginal people make into colonialist naming conventions as an 
assertion of their Sovereignty.  I argue that we too can make critical anti-colonial 
interventions into our self-naming conventions.  Further to this, I draw on and 
theorise the anti-colonial possibilities that arise out of autobiographies by self-
declared whitefellas in Duncan Graham’s compendium of essays Being 
Whitefella (1994).  My political problematisation of the views and experiences 
expressed in these essays is informed by some of the work published in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand on politicising Pakeha identity.  While I note critical 
historical, political and cultural differences between Australia and Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, Paul Spoonley’s (1991 and 1995) exploration of a politicised Pakeha 
identity existing in negotiation with Maori political and sovereign interests is 
instructive.  Finally, by way of forging a connection with Spoonley’s thesis and 
my own, I turn to the work of Farida Tilbury (2000).  Tilbury utilises Spoonley’s 
ideas to formulate a politicised ‘Wadjula’ identity in the context of Nyungar 
Sovereignty.  Then, by way of bringing the threads of my argument together I 
extrapolate on Aboriginal constructions of pan-Aboriginality and Tilbury’s 
problematisation of Wadjula identity to argue for pan-non-Aboriginality existing 
in dialogue with Aboriginal people in the context of their Sovereignty. 
 
Developing an Ontology of non-Aboriginality: 
In this section, I explain a process I call ‘developing an ontology of non-
Aboriginality’.  I argue that recognising one’s own non-Aboriginality is an 
ontological experience born out of meaningful intersubjective and intercultural  
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exchange between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples within the context of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty.  Importantly, I do not claim that all intersubjective, 
intercultural encounters between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples lead to 
the recognition of an ontology of non-Aboriginality.  Indeed, as I develop my 
argument, I am mindful of not falling into the trap of bestowing upon Aboriginal 
people ‘mystical’ qualities that magically induce a state of non-Aboriginality in 
the invader/settlers.  Simplistic reversals of propositions mooted by writers such 
as David Tacey (see previous chapter) similarly rely on notions of colonialist 
constructions of Aboriginality. Nor do I claim that every invader/settler person 
who engages with Aboriginal people buys into this ontological experience.  Such 
is the potency of colonialist ideologies that all too often, entrenched ways of 
inter-relating confirm rather than dispel the validity of those very ideological 
paradigms.  However, I do claim that where this ontological experience is 
evident, it occurs in relationship with Aboriginal people and in recognition of 
their status as Sovereign subjects (see Tilbury, 2000: 80-81). 
 
In making this case, I build on the position articulated by Marcia Langton in her 
1993 essay, Well I Heard it on the Radio and I saw it on the Television.  Here, 
Langton argues that productive, anti-colonial, filmic representations of 
Aboriginality occur when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people engage in 
intercultural, intersubjective, dialogic relationships with each other.  The 
significance of Langton’s thesis is that it paved a path whereby creative, 
collaborative partnerships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people could 
be negotiated.  Following its publication, some mainstream media producers and 
funding bodies have implemented Protocols and Codes of Practice relating to the  
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production of media content representing Aboriginal people and culture
103 (see, 
for example, Bostock, 1997; Johnson: n.d; ABC Cultural Protocols for 
Indigenous Reporting in the Media: n.d.).  Typically, these documents insist on 
consultation in every stage of the production process and provide guidelines on 
the portrayal of land, people, events and stories in an effort to ensure that 
representations do not merely reproduce caricatures of Aboriginality fashioned 
out of colonialist modes of knowledge production.  Moreover, these Protocols 
and Codes of Practice highlight the importance of Aboriginal peoples’ 
substantive input in not only producing anti-colonial representations of 
Aboriginality, but also ensuring that the production process itself, follows anti-
colonial practice.   
 
As I develop my argument, I seek to extend Langton’s analysis beyond that 
which applies to film and television. I argue that the theoretical position offered 
in her thesis, and the methodologies promoted in Protocols and Codes of Practice 
not only provide frameworks for best practice in producing anti-colonial 
representations of Aboriginality within film and television. They also speak to 
new paradigms of engagement whereby invader/settler peoples must work and 
reckon with Aboriginal people in the context of their Sovereignty.  Thus, my task 
here is twofold.  Firstly, to build on Langton’s argument, and theorise the ways 
in which intersubjective and intercultural dialogues between Aboriginal and 
invader/settler peoples situate invader/settlers in the context of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty and in so doing, provide the social, cultural and political milieu 
                                                 
103 Langton’s thesis is also cited by Aboriginal writers concerned with constructions of 
Aboriginal identity.  See, for example, Michael Dodson’s Wentworth Lecture In the End the 
Beginning: Re(de)finding Aboriginality (1994) and Darlene Oxenham et al, A Dialogue on 
Indigenous Identity: Warts ‘n’ All (1999).  
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necessary to produce anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality. Secondly, 
I expand Langton’s thesis by arguing that not only do intercultural encounters 
between Aboriginal and invader/settlers produce new ways of representing and 
constructing Aboriginality, they also produce new ways of constructing ‘non-
Aboriginality’.  As I make this case, I seek to underscore the point that processes 
of identity construction are not one way.  If non-Aboriginal interventions into 
constructions of Aboriginality produce new ways of representing Aboriginality, 
then equally, Aboriginal intervention impacts on and affirms new constructions 
and representations of non-Aboriginality.  That is, not only do invader/settler 
peoples have agency in producing Aboriginal identities, Aboriginal people have 
agency in producing non-Aboriginal identities. 
 
As I develop my discussion, I provide an overview of the three separate domains 
of identity development for Aboriginal people as Langton defines them.  Then, 
drawing on the work of Denise Groves (Palmer and Groves, 2000), I point to 
some of the similarities between Langton’s ‘third domain’ and Homi Bhabha’s 
‘third space’, identifying each concept as critical sites of identity negotiation.  
However, I argue that while Bhabha’s notion of the third space enables a 
problematisation of identity construction between migrant and diasporic 
communities in relationship to the colonial centre, its ability to advance a 
problematisation of migrant and diasporic communities in relationship to 
Indigenous Sovereignty is limited.  As I develop this element of my argument, I 
provide a synopsis of Bhabha’s theorisation of the third space, including the 
valorisation of difference over diversity, cultural translation and hybridity 
(1990).  In part, I argue that the value of Bhabha’s thesis lies in its focus on  
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identity formation processes for migrant and diasporic peoples.  Although his 
intention is to problematise these identity formation processes in terms of 
migration away from colonised countries and back to ‘the metropolis’, I argue 
the very focus on migration and diaspora compel a recognition of non-Aboriginal 
peoples’ migrant and/or diasporic status.  Following from this, I suggest that 
Bhabha’s analysis of the fragmentation of identity for migrant and diasporic 
peoples and his discouragement of notions of the sovereign self facilitates ways 
for invader/settler Australians to critique (and relinquish) their investment in 
white sovereignty. My reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, I argue that Bhabha’s 
focus on difference over diversity enables invader/settler peoples to position 
themselves as Other to Aboriginal people as sovereign subjects.  Secondly, I 
argue that processes of cultural translation also position non-Aboriginal people as 
Other to invader/settler Australians in pursuit of their own Indigenisation.   
With this said though, I argue that the limitation of Bhabha’s thesis is revealed in 
his declaration that the third space is a ‘hybrid’ space (Bhabha, 1990: 211).  I 
argue that the redeployment of hybridity in the context of invader societies such 
as Australia produces a position that is antithetical to that which Bhabha 
proposes.  I argue that this is because the locus of identity construction is 
positioned within the sovereignty of the colonial centre, which, in turn negates 
the legitimacy of Indigenous Sovereignty.  Moreover, through the negation of 
Indigenous Sovereignty, hybridity produces a homogenising effect, compelling 
Indigenous people to ‘fragment’ their identities through the co-option of 
whiteness. In other words, there is a continuum between those processes of 
identity construction that are endemic to the colonisation of Indigenous people 
and those processes that are purported to represent ‘post-colonial’ identity.  As I  
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develop this point, I draw firstly on the work of Ian Anderson (1994 and 1997) to 
argue that hybridity rejects ‘difference’ in favour of sameness through whiteness 
and as such, represents the re-colonisation of Aboriginal bodies.  This profoundly 
impinges on the right of Aboriginal people to exist as their own Sovereign 
beings.  Secondly, drawing on the work of Aileen Moreton-Robinson I argue that 
the process of cultural translation, when applied to Aboriginal people, works to 
weaken Aboriginal peoples’ claim to Sovereignty through undermining essential 
processes of identity development formed through ontological relationships with 
land (see Introduction).  Therefore, in contradistinction to Groves, I argue that 
there is a critical difference between Bhabha’s notion of the third – or hybrid – 
space, and Langton’s third domain.  I argue Bhabha’s third space diminishes 
Indigenous peoples’ claim to Sovereignty, whilst Langton’s third domain centres 
Indigenous Sovereignty and positions it as a critical dialogic junction between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. I argue, this reveals the political potential 
of the third domain as a space where non-Aboriginality is constructed in 
relationship with Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects, and in the context of 
their Sovereignty as it is configured in terms of their ontological relationship 
with land.   
 
In Well I Heard it on the Radio and I saw it on the Television (1993), Langton 
argues that  ‘Aboriginality’ is a socially produced process of identity formation 
in a constant state of reinvention and rearticulation through three separate, yet 
interconnected sites.  Firstly, there are the modes of self-representation that, 
although not completely closed to outside intervention, are internal and private to 
Aboriginal people and their communities (Langton, 1993: 33-34).  Secondly,  
  223 
there are the notions of Aboriginality I referred to in my Introduction, the 
misrepresentations of Aboriginality produced and perpetuated by invader/settler 
peoples operating within colonialist knowledge production conventions.  As I 
have already noted, these constructions are ideologically driven, and are best 
characterised by their reliance on myth and stereotypes, and the absence of actual 
Aboriginal input and intervention (Langton, 1993: 35).  Thirdly, (and most 
importantly for the purposes of this discussion) there are other models of 
representation; those that are “generated when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people engage in actual dialogue” (Langton, 1993: 35, emphasis added).  
Langton argues that in these instances of exchange:  
…individuals involved will test imagined models of the other, repeatedly 
adjusting the models as the responses are processed, to find some 
satisfactory way of comprehending the other.  It is in these dialogues…that 
working models of ‘Aboriginality’ are constructed as ways of seeing 
Aboriginal people, but both the Aboriginal subject and the non-Aboriginal 
subject are participating (1993: 35). 
 
In her engagement with Langton, Denise Groves offers a timely reminder that 
dialogic relationships between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples are not 
straightforward ones and can carry with them the legacy and dynamic of colonial 
power relations.  However, Groves also identifies resemblances between 
Langton’s third domain and Homi Bhabha’s “notion of the third space, a space 
where identity is a process of negotiation” (Palmer and Groves, 2000: 22-23).  
The example Groves uses to illustrate her point is an interesting one.  In dialogue 
with her colleague David Palmer, she tells of her efforts to ‘disrupt’ her non-
Aboriginal students’ assumptions that only she, as an Aboriginal woman, should 
lecture on ‘Aboriginal women’.  She does this by inviting David, a male, non-
Aboriginal academic to do a guest lecture.  At the same time though, she  
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strategically engages with his ‘authority’ to speak on behalf of Aboriginal 
women from the privileged purview of a white man. Groves explains her 
reasoning thus:  
I employed this strategy, asking you to do the lecture on “Aboriginal 
Women,” to further disrupt people’s thinking.  Sometimes I get the feeling 
that people are slipping into a comfort zone and creating simple theories to 
understand relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.  
This is when I like to employ strategies like this. 
 
…  
 
Don’t forget Dave that I was there at the lecture in the same way 
Indigenous people are always here.  I was there and was able to throw in 
my challenges, ask questions and find ways to make you and the group 
uncomfortable.  I would not have let you off the hook.  We must never 
forget that Indigenous people are active players who have a long and 
extended history of being sly and calling the coloniser into account (Palmer 
and Groves, 2000: 35-37). 
 
In identifying a correlation between Langton’s third domain and Bhabha’s third 
space, Groves points to the intrinsically political nature of identity reproduction 
and representation; the importance of strategic interventions into representations 
that are typical of the second domain, and the radical potential of engaging in 
identity negotiation; “of calling the coloniser into account”.  However, I suggest 
that the anti-colonial possibilities that arise from Groves’ methods lay not so 
much in her deployment of Bhabha’s third space in order to explain the dynamic 
of Langton’s third domain.  Rather, I suggest that an alternative reading of the 
text reveals the ways in which Groves asserts her Sovereignty as an Aboriginal 
woman (“I was there at the lecture in the same way Indigenous people are always 
here”) to challenge the authority of post-colonialism and its relevancy to the 
(self)representational processes of Aboriginal people. 
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To explain this further, I argue that we must be mindful that the purpose of 
Bhabha’s third space is to problematise the ways in which patterns of migration 
from former colonies back to the metropolis inform the identity development 
processes of diasporic communities in relationship to the metropolis; the centre 
of colonial power.  Bhabha seeks to explore the political possibilities that arise 
from the dislocation and fragmentation of identity through migration, and the 
potential of conceiving identities as multiply constituted. As Aileen Moreton-
Robinson elaborates, the third space explains processes of displacement for 
migrant and diasporic communities and the ways new, “multiple and hybrid 
identities” emerge as diasporic subjects negotiate experiences of dislocation and 
disruption of prior cultural traditions from the original homeland and experiences 
of “subordination and oppression in the new country” (2003: 28).  
 
It is also Bhabha’s intention to problematise the influence of these new ‘post-
colonial’ processes of identity development in disrupting the grand narratives 
that comprise and reinforce the authority of the metropolis.  As Bhabha writes 
with reference to the “return of post-colonial people to the metropolis” (1990: 
218):  
Their very presence there changes the politics of the metropolis, its cultural 
ideologies and its intellectual traditions, because they – as a people who 
have been recipients of a colonial cultural experience – displace some of 
the great metropolitan narratives of progress and law and order, and 
question the authority and authenticity of those narratives.  The other point 
I’m trying to make is not only that the history of colonialism is the history 
of the West but also that the history of colonialism is a counter-history to 
the normative, traditional history of the West (1990: 218, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
However, the important distinction to make here is that in Australia, unlike post-
colonial nations such as Algeria, Malaysia and India, the colonisers have not  
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‘gone home’
104 (see Moreton-Robinson, 2003: 30). The dominant community in 
Australia continues to be the invader/settler society whose primary point of 
cultural and political identification continues to be with the colonial centre.  
Thus, the disruptions to the grand narratives of colonisation in the Australian 
context come not so much from invader/settler Australians, but from Indigenous 
people who, speaking from the context of their Sovereignty, position all others as 
migrants.  Moreover, this positioning reveals that we cling to the grand narratives 
of colonisation in order to resist fragmentation, maintain the discursive 
paradigms that give our identities coherency and integrate our processes of 
identity construction within the locus of colonial power
105. As Moreton-Robinson 
writes: 
In postcolonizing settler societies Indigenous people cannot forget the 
nature of migrancy and we position all non-Indigenous people as migrants 
and diasporic.  Our ontological relationship to land, the ways that country is 
constitutive of us, and therefore the inalienable nature of our relation to 
land, marks a radical, indeed incommensurable, difference between us and 
the non-Indigenous.  This ontological relation to land constitutes a subject 
position that we do not share, and cannot be shared, with the postcolonial 
subject whose sense of belonging in this place is tied to migrancy…. This 
                                                 
104 Also see Anthony Moran’s argument in the previous chapter. 
105 I am mindful that the shift from the White Australia Policy to Multiculturalism can be 
interpreted as an example of mainstream Australians attempting to disrupt the paradigm to which 
I refer here.  However, in Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society Ghassan Hage 
(1998) identifies the presumed prerogative of whites to manage the (white) national space as a 
key element of white nationalism within a multicultural society.  The former Prime Minister 
justifies draconian and inhumane refugee policies by asserting “every nation has the right to 
effectively control its borders and decide who comes here and under what circumstances” 
(Kingston, Sydney Morning Herald, 2001).  Further, the former Federal Government’s recent 
implementation of Australian Values and English language tests as part of a Citizenship Test is 
regarded by some as a return to the White Australia Policy (see WISHIN, 2006) and a breach of 
Australia’s human rights obligations (see van Vliet, 2006).  Certainly, it is illustrative of Hage’s 
thesis that whites presume to control the national space through the admission and control of 
those it designates as its others.  In contrast, it is worth noting that representatives from the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra have offered political asylum to refugees detained in 
Australian detention centres.  In a formal press release, Tent Embassy representatives said 
“Although the embassy has offered asylum to a number of individuals…this is the first time in 
60,000 years that representatives of Aboriginal Australia have offered formal sanctuary to any 
peoples who have entered our shores” (c.f. Elder, Ellis and Pratt, 2004: 218).  With regard to this 
offer of asylum, Elder, Ellis and Pratt write, “ The Tent Embassy’s invitation offered a direct 
challenge to the assumptions upon which the legitimacy of the White nation-state is based.  In 
doing so it exposed the contradictions that are at the heart of discursive configurations of White 
Australian Nationhood” (2004: 219).  
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subject position cannot be erased by colonizing processes which seek to 
position the Indigenous as object, inferior, other and its origins not tied to 
migration (2003: 31).
106 
 
Thus, to return to Groves, the point I make here is that she is not speaking from 
the position of a post-colonial migrant who is re-contextualising her identity in 
relationship with the metropolis. Rather, Groves is speaking as a Sovereign 
subject within the context of colonial power relations and revealing the ways the 
colonisers’ identity/ies is impacted within the context of her Sovereignty.  I 
therefore argue Groves’ refusal to let us “off the hook” radically displaces 
processes of identification and representation out of the sovereignty of the 
coloniser and into the Sovereignty of the colonised.  I develop this point below, 
beginning with an overview of Bhabha’s working of the third space.  I then 
elaborate my critique of the third space with reference to Ian Anderson and 
Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s analysis of hybridity.  
 
The Third Space meets the Third Domain:  From the Metropolis to 
Aboriginal Sovereignty. 
Bhabha explains that there are two key components to understanding the third 
space. Firstly, Bhabha considers that the ‘third space’ is a response to the West’s 
                                                 
106 It is worth noting that occasionally invader/settler Australians do insert a recognition of our 
migrant and diasporic status into the mainstream public domain.  Usually this recognition is a 
satirical comment upon white Australians’ paranoia of being ‘invaded’ by people from countries 
that do not have Anglo-Saxon origins.  Examples of this include cartoons published in the mid 
1980’s when there was a large influx of refuges following the Vietnam War (see Hutchinson. 
1984: 190-191). More recently, a community based organisation called ‘We are all Boat People’ 
formed to protest the former Federal Government’s policy on refugees and asylum seekers.  With 
regard to this organisation, Elder, Ellis and Pratt write, “the central tenet of this campaign is the 
circulation of an image of the British colonisers invading Australia accompanied by the caption 
‘Boat People’.  According to the campaign’s website (We Are All Boat People, nd), the image is 
‘our way of providing a simple, clear and powerful message that expressed the feelings and 
concerns’ of many ’ordinary Australians’, aimed at reminding the government and people 
everywhere that ‘all (non-indigenous) Australians are in fact, “Boat People” (2004: 220; also see 
www.boat-people.org).  
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predilection towards accommodating cultural diversity (most often expressed in 
terms of multiculturalism), whilst containing cultural difference.  Bhabha argues 
that the West’s valorisation of diversity over difference may well represent an 
‘appreciation’ of other cultures, but it also ensures the authority of the “host 
society or dominant culture” (1990: 209) by maintaining the “universalist and 
normative stance from which it constructs its cultural and political judgments” 
(1990: 209).  From this, the dominant culture compels ‘sameness’ from divergent 
cultures and their cultural practices.  This is the way cultural difference is limited 
or controlled.  For Bhabha, the value of difference (vis-à-vis diversity) is that it 
allows for recognition of the incommensurability of cultures and cultural 
practices, and provides a space whereby one can position themselves in relation 
to different cultures “in the spirit of alterity or otherness” (1990: 209).  
 
The second element to Bhabha’s notion of the third space is one of “cultural 
translation” (1990: 209).  Bhabha argues that if we understand all cultures as 
processes of translation between the “signifier and the signified” (1990: 210) 
then we also understand that what enables cultures to relate to each other across 
difference is not dependent on the “familiarity or similarity” (1990: 210) of 
cultural content.  Rather, it is the similarity in the ways cultures are reproduced 
and represented within the symbolic realm, and the ways subjects are constituted 
by, and interpellated into cultural practices and meanings via the process of 
signification (1990: 210).  In corollary, Bhabha argues that because all cultures 
are processes of translation, there is a level at which all subjects are alienated 
from the “prior” or “originary” culture in and by the very act of translation 
(1990: 210).  As he explains, the process of making meaning out of signs and  
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signifiers (translating the “icons and symbols, the myths and metaphors” 1990: 
210) necessitates objectifying those very signs in order to comprehend their 
significance and deduce meaning from them.  For Bhabha, identifying this 
process of alienation or displacement is a critical element in subverting the 
authority of the notion of original, authentic or essential representation of culture.  
This, in turn, opens up a space whereby it is possible to articulate a position that 
is Other internal to a culture, and from this, produce “different… 
incommensurable cultural practices and priorities” (1990: 210-211) that are not 
dependent on notions of the sovereign self.  As he writes, “[i]t is only by losing 
the sovereignty of the self that you can gain the freedom of a politics that is open 
to the non-assimiliationist claims of cultural difference (1990: 213). 
 
From these processes, Bhabha argues, a new process of cultural identification 
emerges, a process he identifies as cultural hybridity.  The political significance 
of hybridity is that it “denies the essentialism of a prior given original or 
originary culture” (1990: 211), affirms that all cultures undergo dynamic 
processes of change, both in ways that are internal to that culture, and in relation 
to each other.  However, argues Bhabha, the real political potency of hybridity 
lies not in tracing the “two original moments from which the third emerges” 
(1990: 211) but rather identifying that hybridity is the “‘third space’ which 
enables other positions to emerge” (1990: 211).  As he writes: 
This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new 
structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately 
understood through the received wisdom…. The process of cultural 
hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and 
unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation 
(Bhabha, 1990: 211). 
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In broad terms, Bhabha’s analysis offers a productive way through developing 
the dynamics of Langton’s third domain as it relates to invader/settler peoples.  
This is possible because he speaks primarily to the processes of identification for 
migrant and diasporic people, which as I have already discussed with reference 
to Moreton-Robinson, is the way we/they are positioned by Indigenous people. 
For example, his discussion on difference vis-à-vis diversity goes some way to 
articulating a principle of engagement within the dialogic forum for members of 
the invader/settler society.  It serves as a reminder that invader/settlers must 
negotiate their own cultural standpoints as different from, and Other to, 
Aboriginal people.  This reversal in the Othering process subverts those 
processes that are typically in play within colonialist paradigms, those articulated 
in Langton’s second domain.  Moreover, the focus on difference as distinct to 
diversity does not presuppose consensus, sameness, or an unproblematic co-
existence as desirable outcomes of intercultural and intersubjective exchange 
between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples.  Rather, it embraces intercultural 
negotiation as intrinsically political: encompassing ideas and dynamics that are 
subversive, transgressive and potentially revolutionary (Bhabha, 1990: 216).  
Indeed, the very notion of difference as an articulation of the non-sovereign self 
marks out a new discursive terrain that undermines the authority of white 
sovereignty and the radical potential of repositioning the white self in the context 
of Indigenous Sovereignty.  
 
The significance of such a repositioning is underscored by the fact that in order 
for invader/settler peoples to position ourselves as Other to Aboriginal people, 
we must also position ourselves as Other to those constructions of self that are  
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produced within our own cultural modes of signification.  This necessitates 
positioning ourselves as Other to those white Australians who valorise whiteness 
whilst coopting Aboriginality as an expression of their identity.  Thus, I argue 
that in this instance, the radical potential of the third space is that it allows scope 
for Aboriginal political expression that repositions white, Australian identities as 
non-Aboriginal.  However, this then begs the question: is this new marker of 
identity for non-Aboriginal people best expressed as a ‘hybrid’ identity?  How 
easily do notions of difference over diversity capture the place of Indigenous 
people in Australian history and contemporary society, and how adequately does 
the process of cultural translation speak to Indigenous peoples’ internal 
reproduction of culture and their relationship to colonial power? 
 
I argue that if the purpose of the third-space is to displace “the histories that 
constitute it”, set up “new structures of authority”, and “new political initiatives”, 
(Bhabha, 1990: 211, also see above), then conceiving it as a ‘hybrid’ space is 
counter-productive in the Australian context. Not only does hybridity not 
displace histories, it ensures they are re-enacted through the redeployment of old 
terminology and ideologies that have, at the core of their purpose, the intention 
of erasing Aboriginal difference through an assimilation into sameness through 
whiteness.   Indeed, the Pallawah scholar Ian Anderson argues the notion of 
hybridity, when it applies to Aboriginal people, simply describes the colonial or 
anthropological fixation with the need to locate the position of those designated 
‘mixed blood’, ‘urban’ and ‘non-traditional’ (see Anderson, 1997: 13; Anderson, 
1994: 117) within “the colonial order” (Anderson, 1997: 6).  ‘Hybridity’, in this 
context, names those who are deemed to be neither white nor black and who are,  
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consequently living in what was described by the anthropologist A.P. Elkin as a 
“cultural hiatus” (Anderson, 1997: 7; Anderson, 1994:117). Anderson writes: 
Unlike those connotations associated with the word hybrid that allude to the 
creative and constructive potential of the fusion of distinctive beings, the 
‘hybrid’ in the context of Australian colonial discourse is both (self-) 
destructive and sterile.  As a being without history or culture, the ‘hybrid’ 
can only resolve the paradox of its own existence by transforming itself (or 
being transformed).  According to [the historian] Plomley, the descendents 
of ‘mixed race’ unions are precluded from having cultural expression or a 
historical consciousness.  So Plomley denied my mob some of the most 
fundamental qualities of human subjectivity.  And his solution? ‘If they 
wish to obtain a history, they must wholly identify themselves with the 
culture of one or other of the parents.  If they do not wish to do so they 
must follow a pathway of independence from both, one adapted to their 
own needs’ (1977: 66).  The fate of the ‘hybrid’ is to assimilate completely 
with either part of their heritage, or remain forever dislocated in a socio-
historical void.  Yet, at the same time, a return to the realm of Aboriginal 
‘authenticity’ was either impossible or, alternatively, it was made 
undesirable.  Consequently, the ‘hybrid’ could only be productively 
transformed one way: white (1997: 7-8). 
 
Anderson’s resistance to being transformed into ‘white’ is clear.  He appropriates 
that which cosmetically ‘appears’ as whiteness while unequivocally claims this 
as evidence to his Aboriginality.  This is underscored through the observance of 
protocol; kinship connection; the shared history of colonisation; and, the shared 
experience of negotiating the effects of colonisation within contemporary 
Australia (Anderson, 1997: 4-8).  As he writes: 
As I am an Aborigine, I inhabit an Aboriginal body, and not a combination 
of features which may or may not cancel each other.  Whatever language I 
speak, I speak an Aboriginal language, because a lot of Aboriginal people I 
know speak like me.  How I speak, act and how I look, are outcomes of a 
colonial history, and not a particular combination of traits from either side 
of the frontier…. In the transforming experiences through which Aboriginal 
people grow, those qualities which constitute our identities are constantly 
reforming as we engage and re-engage our world.  This is one experience 
which coheres us, despite all ambiguities and contradictions (Anderson, 
1994: 121-122).   
 
Recently, there have been some attempts to recast Anderson’s rejection of 
hybridity as evidence of a hybrid identity specific to the Australian location.  His  
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refusal to claim a hybrid status is interpreted as a rejection of ‘happy hybridity’ 
(hybridity that produces sameness) and presented as politically mobilised ‘anti 
anti-essential’ identity negotiated in hybrid space between essentialist notions of 
Aboriginality (those produced within colonialist ideological paradigms) and post-
colonial Aboriginality (see Ang, 2001, c.f., Haggis, 2004a: 53-54 and 2004b).  
However, Jane Haggis draws on Moreton-Robinson’s notion of Aboriginal 
ontological relationships, to land and her critique of the essentialism/strategic 
essentialism debate, to produce a counterview.  Haggis argues that Anderson’s is 
a claim to a continuous identity which is articulated through a “history and 
memory” of Australian colonisation.  This, she argues, enables his claim to an 
‘essential’ identity which both resists notions of “fixity or authenticity” and the 
Western compulsion to conceive a sense of self that is alienated, displaced, 
fractured (Haggis, 2004a: 54 and 2004b, also see Moreton Robinson, 2003: 32).   
 
Indeed, Moreton-Robinson writes that given Aboriginal peoples’ ontological 
relationship with land, hybridity offers little to elucidate the place of Indigenous 
identity in ‘post-colonising’ societies such as Australia.  Rather, processes of 
Indigenous ‘cultural translation’ do not so much fracture Indigenous identity, but 
ensure the continuance of identity and protocol in the face of colonisation.  In her 
elaboration of this she writes:  
We are not migrants in the sense that we have moved from one nation state 
to another, but the policies of removal transferred different indigenous 
peoples from their specific country to another’s.  This dislocation in effect 
means that Indigenous people can be out of place in another’s country but 
through cultural protocols and the commonality of our ontological 
relationship to country we can be in place but away from our home country.  
This is a different experience of migrancy to that of a postcolonial subject.  
It is not a hybridity derived from a third space; a kind of menagerie of fluid 
diasporic subjects.  Instead there is an incommensurable doubleness 
superimposed by marginality and centring. Marginality is the result of  
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colonization and the proximity to whiteness, while centring is achieved 
through the continuity of ontology and cultural protocols between and 
among Indigenous people (Moreton-Robinson, 2003: 33). 
 
Moreton-Robinson argues that because hybridity is dependent on the “metaphor 
of migrancy” (2003: 28; also see Bhabha, 1990: 212), it privileges the experience 
of displacement through migration over the experience of dispossession through 
colonisation, which in the Australian context is enabled through ongoing 
processes of migrancy and settlement. Following from Moreton-Robinson, I 
argue hybridity contains a tendency to conflate the experiences of diasporic 
displacement and Indigenous dispossession and theorize both phenomenon 
through a discursive framework designed to problematise the relationship 
between diasporic communities and the dominant culture within the locus of the 
dominant culture.  This renders Indigenous dispossession as a marginal – if not 
invisible – experience within the discourse of migrant and diasporic 
displacement. The consequences of this are threefold:  Firstly, it obfuscates the 
ways migration and diaspora are integral to the colonising process, and facilitates 
the mythology of Australia as a settler nation as distinct to an invaded one.  
Secondly, conflating the experiences of Indigenous dispossession with diasporic 
displacement precludes Indigenous experiences of dispossession from the very 
counter histories that are said to destabilise the dominant narratives of 
colonisation.  I argue this reinstates the authority of colonialist discourses and 
perpetuates the discursive arrangements that dispossess Indigenous people of the 
right to speak to their own dispossession. Thus, rather than destabilising the 
dominant narratives of colonial power, they are restabilised through this act of 
marginalising Indigenous experiences.  Thirdly, it privileges the relationship 
between diasporic communities and the dominant culture whilst excluding the  
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experiences and relationships between diasporic communities and Indigenous 
people.  I argue that this forecloses on any possibility of radically undermining 
the authority of colonialist discourse in shaping the identities of migrant and 
diasporic communities.  I argue that in invader societies such as Australia, a truly 
radical displacement of the authority of the colonialist discourse in constituting 
the identities of migrant and diasporic communities and individuals requires 
repositioning the locus of identity formation within the context of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty. 
 
Thus, to return to Langton, I argue there are critical differences between her 
conceptualisation of the third domain, and Bhabha’s third space.  His is the space 
where diasporic and migrant communities meet the metropolis, whilst hers is the 
space where Indigenous and invader/settler peoples meet in the context of 
Indigenous Sovereignty and which contains the potential to reveal non-
Aboriginal subjectivities. In elaborating on Langton’s argument, I suggest that 
intercultural and intersubjective relationships between Aboriginal and 
invader/settler peoples provisions invader/settler people with the opportunity to 
access knowledges and representations of Aboriginality that are produced within 
the first site of identity production to which she refers.  With reference to 
Moreton-Robinson, this necessitates a fundamental recognition of the ways 
ontological relationships with land and ongoing dialogic relationships with 
colonial processes of identity formation constitute Aboriginalities. From this, I 
argue the third domain provides a space whereby invader/settler peoples have 
access to understandings of Aboriginality that are more complex, compelling and 
multi-dimensional than those which invader/settler peoples usually come into 
contact with: that is, those produced within Langton’s second site, informed by  
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colonialist modes of knowledge production.  The political potential of this 
reveals itself when we consider the ways invader/settler peoples construct 
ourselves in relationship to models of Aboriginality that are usually produced 
within the second domain.  Therefore, I argue that the political value of 
intersubjective, intercultural relationships between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people radically destabilises the prior informational and ideological 
tools by which we usually construct self-identity.  This is revealed most clearly 
by this informant (a community worker) to Palmer’s study, when they say:   
You come in as one person, or at least with some ideas about Aboriginal 
people – and you very quickly have this challenged…. So the person you 
were is not the person you become (Palmer, 1999: 323, ellipses in the 
original). 
 
Moreover, these informational and ideological tools typical of the second domain 
are further destabilised when invader/settler peoples come into contact with the 
knowledges that are produced about us/them by Aboriginal people within the 
first domain.  This contact brings about the realisation that just as Aboriginalities 
are historically and socially constructed by invader/settler peoples, so too, are our 
identities by Aboriginal people.  The knowledge that Aboriginal people make 
psychoanalytical readings of us; communicate histories about us and our 
predecessors; pass on intelligence about us; tell jokes and stories about us; mimic 
us in an effort to diffuse the pressure of our presence in their lives; strategically 
deploy whiteness to their own advantage; use unflattering names for us; 
intervene in the bureaucratic regimes that impact on their lives; critique the 
exercise of power in their lives; invent theories about us in order to deconstruct 
some of the culturally incomprehensible things we do – and so on – is 
confronting for those of us who have internalised the mythology of Aboriginal  
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passivity and compliance (see Morris 1994; Langton, 1993; Arthur, 1996). These 
mythologies keep ‘Aboriginality’ at a safe distance from white sovereignty and 
ultimately support the terra nullius of the imagination.  
 
However, I argue that intersubjective and intercultural relationships between 
Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples provide new informational and ideological 
tools that undermine the sustainability of white sovereignty. Moreover, I argue 
that it is the proven capacity of the invader/settler subject to reflect upon, 
negotiate and mediate their own investments in their white sovereignty that 
builds trust between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people and enhances the 
creative potential of the third domain. Learning and abiding by the protocols of 
the third domain, and engaging with Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects is 
the manifestation of our non-Aboriginality.  It is a new ‘way of being’ that is 
irrevocably situated within Aboriginal Sovereignty.  
 
However, I argue that this ‘way of being’ is by-and-large, without a discursive 
framework through which it can be articulated.  The reminder of this chapter is 
dedicated to addressing this. I argue that non-Aboriginal people have an ethical 
obligation to name their non-Aboriginality as a political identity within the 
context of Aboriginal Sovereignty, and to imbue our non-Aboriginal status with 
overt political meaning that supports Aboriginal peoples’ sovereign claims.  I 
argue this builds on, yet distinguishes itself, from the discourse of reconciliation 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people because it affirms Aboriginal 
peoples’ Sovereign claims in the face of ongoing attempts by white Australians 
to preserve white sovereignty and negate Aboriginal Sovereignty.  
  238 
A Story about non-Aboriginality 
To explain this further, I will share with you a story – or rather a pastiche of 
events that combine to tell a story – of how I came to recognise the ontology of 
non-Aboriginality for myself.  I acknowledge that in the working through of this 
story that I unfortunately lose some of the discrete, but poignant, events that also 
contribute to this realisation.  However, despite the fact that I am ‘skimming the 
surface’, I hope that I offer a coherent narrative that resonates with others’ 
experiences and provides some productive insights for those seeking to identify 
their own non-Aboriginal, ontological experience.  Where possible, I will also 
refer to other non-Aboriginal peoples’ stories to elaborate my discussion. 
 
As I work through this narrative, I move towards a pivotal moment when I first 
had the ‘language’ to describe what I think happens when people come to realise 
their non-Aboriginality.  The word was ‘transformation’ and I first heard it used 
by Jackie Huggins in 1998 at the Women, Citizenship and Human Rights 
Conference at Melbourne University.  Although I return to this below, it suffices 
to say for now that this moment was so profound I concluded the final chapter of 
my Masters thesis writing: 
Undergoing such a transformation requires an intrinsic emotional shift in 
the non-Indigenous person’s sense of self…. In affirming their non-
Indigenous-ness, non-Indigenous people must simultaneously affirm 
Indigenous people and their knowledge of and relationship with the land.  
Through this mutual affirmation both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people can be unified under the knowledge that while Indigenous people 
are the sovereign owners of the land we share a duel responsibility towards 
it (Brady and Carey, 1998: 3).  It is this duel responsibility that forms the 
basis for our mutual inclusion as inhabitants of this land now called 
Australia (Carey, 1998: 80-81). 
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The notion of transformation remains pivotal to my discussion, and, I argue, 
integral to the process of recognising the ontology of non-Aboriginality.  Within 
the following discussion, I locate the significance of the word ‘transformation’ 
within the broader discursive framework for reconciliation, specifically the 
notion of spiritual healing and growth.  In order to link the concept of 
transformation back to the importance of intersubjective exchange in producing 
anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality, I draw on Emmanuel Levinas’ 
Alterity and Transcendence thesis (1999).  Through Levinas’ reworking of the 
notion of transcendence from one associated with the sacred to one that is 
intimately connected with the “birth of subjectivity” (Hyat, c.f. Levinas, 1999: 
ix-x), I am able to bridge-the-gap between notions of the spiritual back to actual 
relationships between people.  From this, I am further able to argue that the 
transformative (transcendent) process is fundamentally connected to the 
recognition of ‘our’ alterity to Aboriginal people (as opposed to the colonialist 
assumption of Aboriginal people’s alterity to ‘us’) and consequently locates us 
within Indigenous Sovereignty. 
 
In November 1996, I deferred from my Master’s degree at Sydney University, 
took a months leave from my job at a Sydney radio station and went to work at 
CAAMA (Central Australian Aboriginal Media Association).  My job was to 
train and mentor the young woman who was staffing the newsroom.  Although I 
had had some limited experience working with Kooris in Sydney at Tranby 
Aboriginal Co-operative College, I had neither been to the desert nor worked in a 
really sustained way with Aboriginal people before.  Given the point of this story 
is to highlight my own cross-cultural illiteracy, I probably don’t really need to  
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point out that notwithstanding my radio training skills, on a whole range of levels 
I was ill equipped and under skilled for the job.  But, the truth is, I was:  
embarrassingly so.  
 
When I got to Alice Springs, a woman from CAAMA had come to pick me up 
from the airport. As we headed back into town she pointed out a few of the local 
landmarks: The Alice Springs race track, the Todd River and the site at The Gap 
where CAAMA got started.  I also got the drum on the demographics of Alice 
Springs.  “Most of the whitefellas live on the eastern side of town” she said.  
“The whitefellas who don’t mind living with the blackfellas live on the western 
side of town”.  “I live on the west, down Larapinta Drive”, she said.   
 
We stopped for coffee in a café in Todd Mall and chatted on a bit more.  Then 
we headed to the supermarket to pick up a few of the necessaries (in my case, tea 
bags, coffee and milk).  Her tip – buy lots of bottled water:  If you’re not used to 
the local stuff that comes out of the tap, you’ll need it, she said.  I tried to follow 
this advice, but with all the arrogance of any other city interloper, I slacked off 
after the first three days.  The gastro lasted for over a week.   
 
Before I left Sydney, I had the idea that I would work during the week and use 
the weekends for sight seeing.  However, because of the heat, my feet had 
swollen up to spongy size nine-and-a-half balloons.  Then, because the air was so 
much drier than I was used to, I was getting daily nosebleeds.  Add the lingering 
wonky tummy to this and it was clear that I was staying close to home.  So, I’d  
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pass the time loitering in the air conditioned comfort of Ford Plaza, just off the 
main drag, and occasionally, the cinema.   
 
When you’re by yourself, you unconsciously find yourself eavesdropping on 
other people’s conversations. Its not that you’re wanting to be rude, its that 
people talk about different things in different ways, and you take notice of this 
when you’re away from home. Listening for the differences in syntax is one of 
the ways of  ‘sussing’ the nuances and inter-personal dynamics of being in a 
different place.  The ‘realisation’ that something ‘unusual’ was happening to me 
occurred when I was sitting in Todd Mall and I consciously recognised that I was 
surrounded by Australian languages that were not English.  And along with this, 
I recognised, for the first time, my language was different, and foreign to this 
place.  Indeed, the exact words that went through my head were “my language is 
not from here”.  Along with this, then, came the recognition that I am not from 
here. What a thing to discover when you’re sitting on a park bench in the middle 
of a shopping mall with swollen feet, a bloody nose and a belly ache! 
 
I am at a loss to explain why this specific experience proved to be such an 
epiphany. Could it be that that it resonated with a similar experience ten years 
earlier in Ireland? I had been approached by ‘native’ Gaelic speakers who did not 
realise I could only speak English until I told them so.  Could it be a metaphor? 
Did my inability to understand language also signify my inability to comprehend 
my own and their cultural difference in a profound and productive way? In truth, 
I cannot provide any substantive answers to these questions.  However, through 
this experience I learnt something Indigenous teachers already know: the  
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capacity of language to teach whitefellas a lesson in the existence of an 
independent Indigenous consciousness, ontology(ies) and epistemology(ies).   As 
David Palmer and Denise Groves write of one of their colleagues:  
He, as an Aboriginal academic, represents everything the architects of 
assimilation and integration policy regimes would have wanted.  He is 
articulate, formally educated and is the head of a university programme.  
Having talked to his students I know that when they first meet him many 
have their ideas confirmed.  One might say that he provides substance to 
the idea that Indigenous people who live in urban settings have lost their 
culture and become modernists.   However, sometimes when he is 
presenting a lecture he will begin by talking Nyungar.  He may continue for 
ten minutes and it is always interesting to watch the students respond.  This 
immediately flips on its head people’s ideas that Nyungar culture is dead 
that his Aboriginality is somehow lost (2000: 34). 
 
 
 
When I got back to Sydney, I had the lingering feeling that something inside me 
had shifted, I needed to find ways to articulate the questions that were forming in 
my mind and hopefully, get some tools to answer them.  When the 1997 
academic year commenced, I had decided that the units available in the Master of 
Gender Studies course I was doing were not going to help me.  Without really 
knowing what I was asking for, I rang the Koori Centre at the university and was 
put through to Dr. Wendy Brady.  Wendy agreed to supervise a reading course 
with me, which ostensibly would have seen me through to the end of my degree.  
Later, I asked her if she’d supervise me if I upgraded my degree.  I am eternally 
grateful that she said yes.  The thesis, Deconstructing Whiteness – Constructing 
non-Indigenousness: Reconceiving White Racial Identities in Invader Societies 
(1998) is the genesis to the work I am engaging with now. 
 
In addition to talking about the readings I was working with, and what I was 
writing, Wendy and I spent a lot of time yarning.  In part, this process of  
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intersubjective and intercultural exchange is an example of what I referred to in 
my Introduction as ‘storytelling as a methodological and pedagological approach 
to learning anti-racism’.  However, in broad colloquial terms, ‘yarning’ allows 
me to capture some of the more ‘human’ dynamics of this ‘methodological 
process’.  Like all good yarns, we meandered, got off the point, got back to the 
point and, together, shared some of the stories of our lives.  I also uncovered in 
myself attributes many of us share when we are learning how to participate in 
meaningful cross-cultural communication and exchange.  I was naive, ‘well 
intentioned’, occasionally defensive, vulnerable to simplistic conflations of life 
experiences between Aboriginal and invader/settler people and, too easily 
influenced by my own cultural and political frameworks.   
 
My storytelling allowed me to reveal these things to myself, and Wendy’s 
storytelling gave me a point of reflection and self-assessment whilst never really 
telling me I was wrong.  Because of this, I had the luxury of working through 
how I could engage with the issues we were dealing with, without being 
embarrassed in the process.  Yarning gave me an alternative model: new ways of 
thinking about myself as a working-class, white, Australian woman.  It gave me 
new ways to place myself in my world.  I placed myself as a non-Indigenous 
person.  It also revealed a ‘new’ world to me – a world that pre-existed the 
arrival of my ancestors from England and Ireland – a world of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty.  
 
In the intervening years, I have come to understand that there is another point to 
make about ‘yarning’.  Yarning not only describes conversation between people.   
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In my experience, in Aboriginal English, yarning can also describe doing 
‘business’,
107 or talking about and doing political and cultural work.  “We’ll have 
a yarn about that”, often means there is ‘business’ to be done.  I make this point 
because I want to emphasise that this yarning was a ‘business’ transaction.  
Wendy was doing the political and cultural work of getting me to understand that 
I was in Aboriginal Sovereignty.  Specifically, in her presence, I was in her 
Sovereignty as a Wiradjiri woman, and as an educator and academic within the 
Koori Centre at Sydney University.  While my ‘white sovereignty (we didn’t 
actually use those words) was brought into question, I was never actually 
disempowered (in the pejorative sense of the word).  Rather, I was re-
contextualised within this specific milieu. This process of learning gave me a 
new context, a new framework for positioning myself in other dialogic or 
yarning transactions with Aboriginal people.  It has given me some skills, 
confidence, and new ways of engaging with and interpreting intercultural and 
intersubjective relations.  Because of this experience, I now recognise, that in a 
multitude of personal and professional relationships, and, depending on whose 
country I am on, I am re-constexutalised and remade within the site of Aboriginal 
Sovereignty on a daily basis.  
 
In 1998, Wendy and I co-presented a paper at the Women Citizenship and Human 
Rights Conference at Melbourne University.  We decided to share our 
experiences of storytelling in a paper called The Role of Storytelling in 
                                                 
107 The Oxford Aboriginal English Dictionary describes ‘business’ as “Aboriginal ceremony and 
ritual” (Arthur, 1996:17).  The examples they provide include, “business camp” , “men’s 
business”, “women’s business” and “sorry business” (1996: 17-18).  I take from these examples 
that they mean business as it relates to ‘traditional’ activities.  However, the context in which I 
usually come across this word means ‘cultural work’.  The dictionary does not contain a 
definition for ‘yarning’ and I have defined it according to the ways I usually hear it said.  
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Overcoming Racism.  It was an opportunity for us to speak to the role of 
storytelling in affirming to each other our respective subject positions as 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal women.  In the presentation, Wendy shared a 
personal story of her own, and I told the story of how the inscription in a family 
bible provided the link between my Australian identity and, connected to this, my 
non-Aboriginality. 
 
The Bible to which I refer was a gift to my great, great, great, great grandmother 
from her sister when she left England for Australia in 1832.  My great, great 
grandmother passed it on to my Nan in 1932.  Nan used to keep the Bible in the 
third drawer down in her wardrobe, and when I was a kid I’d love to hear her 
read the scrawled, cursive inscription to me… 
Martha Poulter 
Cowhinge 
Suffolk 
1832 
Read this with prayerful attention and it will make you wise unto salvation. 
 
And then on the next page: 
Martha my Dear, may this blessed volume prove 
A faithful guide as still you onward move. 
Receive it as a snap by Jesus given 
And it will lead you to his feet in heaven 
Heaven did I say.  Yes, that blessed region where questions and doubts forever 
Banished are united there with all the … throng.  Aloud may we their blissful 
theme 
Prolong nor fear those perfect joys will we decay 
Throughout one cloudless everlasting day. 
 
 
After my Nan passed away in 2001, I went to the third drawer in her wardrobe 
and claimed the Bible as my own.  Shortly after, I left Melbourne, the city she 
had lived in all of her life, and moved west.  I now keep it in my wardrobe, in my  
  246 
house, in Fremantle, Western Australia. As I see it, the story of this Bible is that 
it is part of a mystical, continuous thread that crosses generations, continents and 
oceans.  The immediate parable here is that it tells the story of two sisters who 
experience a profound and physical separation, but assuage their grief and remain 
united through the belief that they will meet again, some day in heaven.  
However, the story is a bigger one than that, as this simple inscription links me to 
an ancestral line that takes me beyond my home in Fremantle, beyond this place 
we now call Australia, to a place to which some of us are Indigenous.  This bible 
brings past and present, home and dislocation, together in a truly ‘uncanny’ way. 
 
At the same conference, Indigenous academics Jackie Huggins and Isabel 
Tarrago and their non-Indigenous colleague, Kaye Saunders also presented a 
joint paper; Reconciling Our Mother’s Lives.  In it, they charted the lives of three 
women, who, by virtue of race and class led such different lives (also see 
Huggins, Tarrago, Saunders, 2000).  More than this though, through the act of 
storytelling, the mother’s daughters revealed a basis for building mutually 
respectful relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.  In her 
reflection on this paper Wendy Brady has written: 
The responsibility for revelation was shared and each learnt from the other 
and the listeners were able to learn from all three women.  This coalition of 
women sharing their stories gave me a brief glimpse of what might be 
possible in a world where power was relinquished and shared.  Mutual 
respect and honouring underscored their words.  In life we occasionally 
have the opportunity to participate in or be witness to an event where hope 
in the future reignites and where we can imagine that the generations to 
come may have a better world in which to live.  That was such a moment 
(1998: online).  
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However, for me, the most profound moment occurred during question time.  In 
response to a question that was put to her, Jackie Huggins
108 said “Non-
Aboriginal people are transformed when they meet Aboriginal people…”
109  
 
Although I cannot swear to know exactly what Huggins meant, I knew on an 
intuitive level that this word, this concept, resonated for me.  I felt that over the 
preceding couple of years I had undergone a ‘transformation’, a life changing 
experience from which I would never turn back. Nevertheless, identifying the 
constituent elements of this transformation is a much more complex task.  When 
I try to form mental lists it seems perfunctory, as if I am describing an action, but 
not what motivates or inspires it.  Transformations, because of their magnitude, 
touch every area of your life.  As Palmer found in his study, when non-
Aboriginal people share rich intercultural lives with Aboriginal people, their 
“language …[is] …enriched, their attitudes to family changed, their 
epistemological frameworks expanded, their work practices improved, their 
professional values challenged, their friendships augmented, their self-
assessment illuminated, and their cultural lives extended” (1999: 324).   
 
By way of seeking confirmation of my experience, I seek out the ways other non-
Aboriginal writers engage with their own ‘transformations’.  Fiona Nicholl, for 
example, refers to an experience she calls “falling out of perspective”; a notion 
                                                 
108 Jackie Huggins AM is of the Bidjara and Birri-Gubba Juru peoples.  She is the Deputy 
Director of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Unit at the University of Queensland.  
Amongst her many public offices, Huggins is co-chair of Reconciliation Australia.  She is also 
(co) author of her mother’s biography Auntie Rita (1994). 
109 I cannot vouch that this quote is verbatim because I am calling on an 8 year old memory as I 
write this.  However, I do believe it is close to what was said.  
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that describes falling out of white sovereignty when we come to face to face with 
Indigenous Sovereignty.  As she explains:  
In my experience, white people are as unlikely to voluntarily ‘fall’ from 
perspective as we are to ‘give’ space to others or to ‘unlearn’ our 
privileges.  Rather, the existence and agency of Indigenous sovereignty are 
evident in the fact that, when any of these things do happen, it is in 
response to particular challenges to white sovereignty (Nicholl, 2004: 29, 
emphasis in the original).   
 
Alternatively, Martin Flanagan describes something close to transformation 
when he writes, “…I never approached Aboriginal people without something 
happening, a preconception being overturned, a door of perception opening” 
(2002: 105).  When I interviewed Martin for the documentary part of this project, 
we explored this further.  With reference to what he had learned in his 
experiences with Aboriginal people he said, “once you’re on the path you can’t 
get off it” (July, 2004).  In addition, in her biography/autobiography, Dingo: The 
Story of Our Mob Sally Dingo (who is a non-Indigenous Australian) sums up her 
experience of living with and learning from her Aboriginal extended family.  The 
final sentence of her book concludes, “I had learned so much more than I had 
ever dreamed for myself” (Dingo, 1997: 229).   
 
Upon reflection, I wonder if the reason Huggins’ use of the word 
‘transformation’ rang true for me is because it resonated more broadly with the 
language of reconciliation.  By the mid-to-late1990’s, reconciliation had been 
cast as a ‘spiritual journey’ with an urgent and profound ‘higher purpose’ that 
was ultimately linked to the recognition of Aboriginal people’s status as first 
nations’ people and the need for mainstream Australians to own the past and 
engage in a process of national healing.    
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The challenge remains, however, to anchor these ideas and experiences to actual 
relationships between people.  Indeed, while the words ‘spirit’, ‘spiritual’, and 
‘spirituality’ spoke to the political, social and cultural profundity of 
reconciliation, there was (and is) a danger that somehow it could represent an 
appropriation of Aboriginal spirituality, or imagined, colonialist notion of 
‘spiritual Aboriginality’, that ultimately compromises the integrity of anti-
colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality. 
 
For me, Emmanuel Levinas’ Alterity and Transcendence thesis (1999) provides 
the way forward to consider this issue and hook it back into the significance of 
intercultural and intersubjective relationships discussed in the theoretical 
overview for this chapter.  For Levinas, the advent of western philosophy 
required the reconfiguration of transcendence from an ephemeral experience 
mediated through the sacred, to a cognitive experience that “accompanies the 
birth of human subjectivity” (Hyat, c.f. Levinas, 1999: ix-x).  For Levinas, 
transcendence occurs at the precise moment we come face-to-face with the other.  
Our first impulse is to seek ourselves in the face of the other and have our own 
subjectivity confirmed by their existence.  When this fails, we are driven by our 
own narcissistic desire to resolve the other into ourselves and make them the 
same as ‘us’.  When this inevitably fails, we experience a crisis in our own 
subjectivity.  What Levinas teaches us is that this crisis is resolvable through the 
recognition of our own alterity to the other, and the honouring of the Others’ 
alterity to us.  
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In broad terms, I suggest Levinas’ insights speak to, or resonate with, the 
dynamic of Aboriginal and invader/settler relations throughout the 20
th century.  
For example, seeking to confirm our own subjectivity through the existence of 
others, lies in the appropriation of ‘native’ identities as a means of national 
cohesion and legitimacy.  Further, biological absorption and cultural assimilation 
policies speak to the desire to make Aboriginal people the ‘same as us’.  The 
monumental failure of these programs in social engineering has caused 
incalculable cultural dislocation, pain and sorrow for Aboriginal people.  As 
evidence of this has made its way into the mainstream Australian consciousness, 
this has induced a ‘crisis’ in the moral and political legitimacy and challenged 
the national identity processes of many Australians.  In its early days, the 
reconciliation movement was an earnest attempt to resolve this crisis (see 
Keating, c.f. Gratton, 2000: 60-61).  However, I argue current programs of 
practical reconciliation, which seek to compel the (re)assimilation of Aboriginal 
people, and concurrent  attempts to (re)appropriate Aboriginal identity 
exacerbate and perpetuate this crisis.  Therefore, I argue, the only meaningful 
way out of this crisis is to engage in a process of substantive reconciliation, 
which necessitates ‘transforming’ (or, in Levinas’ terms, transcending) into a 
‘non-Aboriginal’ person.  
 
For Levinas, ‘transcendence’ occurs with the realisation that we are unable to 
absorb the other into ourselves and the mutual and unique subjectivities of the I 
and the other are confirmed.  Upon this confirmation, a recognition of our 
responsibility to the Others’ humanity is also born.  As Levinas writes: 
Thus there emerges, from that fear of the other man, an unlimited 
responsibility, one that we are never discharged of…. A responsibility that  
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harbors the secret of sociality, the total gratuitousness of which, though it 
be ultimately in vain, is called the love of one’s neighbour, love without 
concupiscence, but as irrefrangible as death (1999: 30). 
 
For Levinas, transcendence compels a pluralistic understanding of intersubjective 
relations (Hyat, c.f. Levinas, 1999: xiv-xv).  From this, I argue that it brings into 
focus a basis for thinking through the ‘transformative’ (or transcendent) impact 
of intersubjective relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
for non-Aboriginal people. Moreover, because Levinas is concerned with 
exploring the imperative for ethical relations between individuals, he provides a 
basis for thinking through and cultivating non-Aboriginal peoples’ ethical 
obligations towards Aboriginal people, as we engage in intersubjective and 
intercultural dialogues.  Once we come face-to-face with the other and recognise 
their alterity as subject (rather than object) we are compelled to affirm their 
status as first nations’ peoples and, in the face of this, name, define and affirm 
our alterity as non-Indigenous peoples. It is because Levinas recognises that face-
to-face, intersubjective exchange brings into reality the possibility of loving 
those previously feared or hated, we are presented with an antithetical position 
for relating to, or connecting with the Other.   Love of the Others’ alterity is 
antithetical to race hatred.  Love of the Others’ alterity induces an affirmation of 
our own.  We can substantiate this affirmation by naming our alterity as non-
Aboriginal.  I continue this discussion below. 
 
Naming non-Aboriginality: 
In this section, I explore ‘naming’ as a political strategy.  I argue we are able to 
invest non-Aboriginality with overt anti-colonial meaning when we situate it 
within the locus of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  The political advantages of my  
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proposal are threefold.  Firstly, it extends the logic of white race deconstruction 
theory, which posits that naming whiteness is a critical first step in destabilising 
the power whiteness assumes through its supposed normativity and neutrality.  I 
argue we must look beyond the deconstruction of white power and toward the 
construction of an identity formed within an antithetical space to whiteness; that 
is, the space of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  I argue any attempts to name identities 
with a view to undermining various manifestations of power must be directly 
responsive to the nature and causes of that power, otherwise, we risk 
perpetuating the very power we seek to undermine.  In this context then, naming 
non-Aboriginality situates non-Aboriginal identities within the dynamic of 
ongoing (neo)-colonial power relations and articulates a refusal to comply with 
them.   
 
Secondly, naming non-Aboriginality within Aboriginal Sovereignty extends the 
notion that ‘naming’, as a political strategy, identifies the dialectic relationship 
between oppressed and dominant groups.  It does this by identifying the ways 
oppressed groups speak back to the centre by reappropriating names previously 
used in a pejorative sense, or devising new ones that challenge their legitimacy. 
Naming, in this context, asserts self-defined labels as examples of “self-
determination, strength, progress and control” (Martin, Krizek, Nakayama and 
Bradford, 1996: online).  I argue that this definition resonates with the logic of 
post-colonialism, and that it is necessary to reinterpret this analysis of self-
naming by oppressed groups as an assertion of their Sovereignty.  Thus, while 
naming does speak back to the dominant group, it is also a profound declaration 
of a different centre: a centre that pre-exists that which is imposed by the  
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dominant group and which can inform the ways members of the dominant group 
self-name. 
 
Thirdly, naming non-Aboriginality also takes its impetus from ‘naming’ as an 
Indigenist epistemological priority.  ‘Naming’, in this context, refers to 
(re)claiming names that declare Indigenous Sovereignty, as it relates to being 
Sovereign owners of a specific territory and Sovereign Subjects within that 
territory.  Reinstating Indigenous names for children, the landscape and sites of 
significance are all examples of this (see Smith, 2001: 157). So too, are those 
moves to diminish the potency of colonialist labels such as Aborigine, 
Indigenous, native, Black and so on by investing them with anti-colonial 
meaning.  I argue that naming non-Aboriginality within this paradigm similarly 
indicates an affirmation of Indigenous Sovereignty.  In other words, when 
members of an invader society declare their non-Aboriginality they not only 
declare their affiliation and support for Indigenous Sovereign claims, they 
articulate a political identity that is distinct from those who do not share this 
affiliation or offer this support.    
 
In the following discussion, I provide an overview of some of the critical 
interventions Aboriginal people make into colonialist naming conventions which 
continue to be in common usage.  I argue that such interventions are ‘anti-
colonial’ because they re-appropriate the names constructed through colonial 
discourses and subvert them by investing old terms with new meanings that are 
self-empowering and signal their commitment to self-determination.  In this 
discussion, I draw specifically on the work of Jackie Huggins (1993), Wendy  
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Brady (Brady and Carey, 2000) and Eve Fesl (1993).  In developing the case that 
such interventions are declarations of Aboriginal peoples’ status as Sovereign 
subjects I then refer to the work of Collard, Harben and van den Berg (2004), 
who write specifically from their Nyungar perspective, and Karen Martin/Booran 
Mirraboopa (2003), who, in turn, writes from her position as a Quandamooka 
woman.   
 
My purpose for pursuing this discussion is to highlight the ways invader/settler 
peoples can learn from such interventions.  I argue that Aboriginal people can 
make critical intercessions into our own self-naming and similarly position ‘non-
Aboriginal’ as an anti-colonial naming convention.  In elaborating my argument, 
I seek to define non-Aboriginality as a political strategy that identifies non-
Aboriginal peoples’ relationship with Aboriginal Sovereignty in a dialogic 
relationship with Aboriginal people and their political aspirations.  Thus, naming 
non-Aboriginality also positions those who actively self identify as non-
Aboriginal in political contradistinction from those who continue to identify as 
‘white’ Australian.  
 
In elaborating this part of my argument, I firstly turn to the book Being 
Whitefella, a compendium of essays published in 1994 and edited by Duncan 
Graham.  Specifically, I draw on contributions by Veronica Brady, Myrna 
Tonkinson and Ted Egan. Working from these texts, I argue that anti-colonial 
constructions of non-Aboriginality must extend beyond the simple descriptors of 
black and white, thereby disrupting the discursive arrangements through which 
Aboriginality and non-Aboriginality are usually defined.  I also argue that non- 
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Aboriginal belongings must be predicated on a knowledge of the unique 
relationship Aboriginal people have with their country.  I caution that this 
knowledge should not be presumed to constitute evidence of our Indigenisation. 
Thus, I argue that anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality must be self-
consciously located within a history of invasion and colonisation; identify the 
original ‘immigrant’ status of those who are the decedents of the initial invaders 
and also those who continue to share in the benefits of the original acts of 
colonisation and the ongoing dispossession of Aboriginal people.   
 
As I progress my argument for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality, I 
turn towards some of the literature produced by self-identifying Pakeha New 
Zealanders, specifically, the work of Michael King and Paul Spoonley.  This 
literature is instructive because the debates around self-naming conventions for 
members of the colonising society in Aotearoa/New Zealand are more advanced 
than they are locally, and have played a significant role in influencing the limited 
literature produced in Australia (see for example, Duncan, 1994: 17-19; Tilbury, 
2000).  Although I only refer to King’s work in passing, it is important to 
recognise that his autobiographical text Being Pakeha: An Encounter with New 
Zealand and Maori Resistance (1985) is a seminal text in the field.  With this 
acknowledgement given though, I note that my concern with King’s work lies in 
the fact he conceives ‘Pakeha’ as a new type of Indigenous identity (King, 1991: 
19).  Thus, his theoretical objectives are different to my own.   Therefore, the 
theoretical thrust of my argument is informed by the work of Paul Spoonley, who 
configures Pakeha as a political identity that exists in relationship to Maori 
Sovereignty.  By way of applying Spoonley’s analysis to the Australian context, I  
  256 
draw on the work of Farida Tilbury, who, following from Spoonley, theorises 
Wadjula as a political identity in relationship with Nyungar Sovereignty.  I then 
extrapolate on Tilbury’s argument to configure non-Aboriginality as a political 
identity, which, like pan-Aboriginality, collectivises the political identities of 
those non-Aboriginal Australians who affirm Aboriginal Sovereignty and 
construct their identities accordingly. 
 
The process of surveying Aboriginal interventions into colonialist naming 
conventions is not straightforward.  The epistemological violence colonialist 
naming conventions inflict on Aboriginal people, and their ways of self-knowing 
and articulation is such that it can be easier to identify discontinuity, rather than 
continuity, in the ways Aboriginal people respond to the imposition of these 
names.  Given what we know about the etymology and application of names such 
as ‘Aborigine’, it is easy to agree with Brabazon when she writes “[t]he very 
terms ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Aborigine’ are, in a way racist” because they constitute 
“[a] singular Aboriginal identity [that] was invented by European colonisers to 
control, define and dispossess a people” (2000: 54).  However, I have also heard 
an old man demand to be referred to as an ‘Aborigine’ because, for him, it was 
preferable to the number, that people running the mission where he lived when 
he was young, used to identify him.  Similarly, despite the increasing trend to 
refer to Aboriginal people as ‘Indigenous’, there are those who reject this new 
imposition.  For example, the authors of Binaŋ Goonj: Bridging Cultures in 
Aboriginal Health explain: 
Some will argue that the term ‘Aboriginal’ is ‘outdated’ and should be 
replaced with ‘Indigenous’.  The Aboriginal co-authors of this text do not 
agree.  They consider themselves Aboriginal people who are descendents of 
specific Aboriginal nations.  They do not identify with the generic term  
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‘Indigenous’, although they recognise that it describes people across the 
world, who have strong ties with their land, were colonised and continue to 
follow cultural traditions different from those of the colonisers.  
Consequently, in Binaŋ Goonj, the term ‘Aboriginal’ will continue to be 
used to identify the traditional owners of this country (Eckermann et al, 
2006: ix). 
 
In conversation, I have also heard others staunchly refuse the term ‘Indigenous’, 
insisting they are ‘not a tree’.  Indigenous, in this context, represents a return to 
the bad old days of Aboriginal people being designated as part of the flora and 
fauna and must be resisted because of this.  I have also heard similar arguments 
made about the term ‘native’.  David Palmer also writes that in his experience, 
‘Indigenous’ is a legalistic and bureaucratic term. Therefore, he uses the name 
‘Aboriginal’ and other regionally specific names, because this is the way he 
hears Aboriginal people refer to themselves (1999: 31). 
 
The purpose of the following discussion is not to suggest uniformity or 
consensus amongst Aboriginal people in the ways they make interventions into 
colonialist naming conventions.  Rather, my purpose is to alert invader/settler 
peoples to conversations and processing of ideas and life experiences between 
and amongst Aboriginal people.  In the following outline of this dialogue, I 
represent a chronology of ideas as they have been represented by Aboriginal 
people in some scholarly works.  The examples I draw on highlight the shifting 
focus from critiques of those naming conventions as they are contrived and 
imposed through colonialist discourses, towards those more recent interventions 
that stand as overt statements of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  The aim of this 
discussion is to provide a point of departure that underscores the comparative 
lack of dialogue between and amongst invader/settler peoples about making  
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equivalent interventions into our own self-naming conventions.  Further to this, 
in drawing attention to those examples that speak to Aboriginal Sovereignty I 
seek to provide clear examples of the basis from which we can formulate and 
define our non-Aboriginality. 
 
I begin this discussion with reference to the ways Jackie Huggins plays with the 
syntax of the word ‘Aborigine’, in her 1993 article, Pretty Deadly Tidda 
Business.  Here, she makes the discretionary decision to use the word as both an 
adjective and a noun.  She writes: 
My political statement and preference is for the term ‘Aboriginal’ as both 
noun and adjective.  While it is grammatically correct to use ‘Aborigines’ 
as a noun these are playing to white people’s rules – the good Queen’s 
English.  Are we therefore playing ‘their’ games to define ourselves?  Is it 
better to be grammatically or politically correct? (Huggins, 1993: 71). 
 
Underscoring her point, Huggins also writes Aboriginal and Black with a capital 
‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively, while making the corresponding decision to spell 
Australian, European and white with a lower case ‘a’, ‘e’, and ‘w’ (as in 
australian, european and white).  In explaining this decision, Huggins writes: 
I note that the Black American activist, Audre Lorde, has a distinctive 
consistent style in her spelling of america; ‘for to survive in the mouth of 
this dragon we call america we have to learn this first and most vital lesson 
– that we were never meant to survive’ (Sister Outsider, 42).  This 
establishes a principle that while the oppressed are still the oppressed, the 
country in which they live has been nullified by the small ‘a’, thus 
rendering it less significant.  This empowers the writer and in many, if not 
all, of my future works, I will be adopting her style as a political statement 
(1993: 70-71). 
 
 
Similarly, Wendy Brady has employed Destiny Deacon’s notion of Blak, to 
subvert both the pejorative connotations associated with Blackness, as it is  
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constructed within colonialist paradigms, and essentialised notions of 
Aboriginality that rely on blackness for authenticity.  As Brady writes: 
Blak and Blakness denote specifically indigenous Bla(c)kness; you could 
say that Blakness is contextual – to do with being Black in Australia – 
Aboriginality plus history (Brady and Carey, 2000: 280). 
 
Thus, it is my understanding that Blakness describes Aboriginality without 
describing ‘blackness’:  The colour of one’s skin does not denote Aboriginality 
or Aboriginal culture, although it will inform the relationship Aboriginal people 
have with white Australia.  Blakness then, as a self-referent, is a way of speaking 
back to this relationship.  It is a way of claiming Blakness in defiance of the 
ways both blackness and whiteness are shaped and informed in colonialist 
discourses. 
 
Others also work to subvert the homogenising effect of words such as 
‘Aborigine’ by recasting it to represent ‘pan-Aboriginal’ interests.  In an 
Australian context, the construction of pan-Aboriginality is an identity formation 
process that gained momentum during the 1970’s.  The construction of pan-
Aboriginality recognised that despite the regional, cultural and linguistic 
differences between Aboriginal people, it was possible and desirable to construct 
a political identity that galvanised the commonly shared experiences of 
colonisation and dispossession and demand social justice and land rights with a 
unified voice.  Thus, pan-Aboriginality represents the mediation of personal and 
political identities that are products of pre-invasion and post-invasion cultures, 
the evolving nature of culture and its capacity for change in order to survive.  
Simply, pan-Aboriginality, as it is articulated in this context, inverts the  
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colonisers’ labelling process to produce a powerful, unified political voice
110.  
Similarly, pan-Aboriginality and/or Indigeneity collectivises first nations’ 
peoples political interests on a global level.  
 
During the late 1980’s and early1990’s there were local attempts to take the logic 
of pan-Aboriginality a step further by seeking out an Aboriginal word that 
collectively named Aboriginal people and distinguished them from other, non-
Indigenous Australians.  For example, Eve Fesl used the word, ‘Koorie’. Like the 
notion of ‘pan-Aboriginality’, Fesl intended ‘Koorie’ to express the collective 
interests of Indigenous peoples while still accommodating regional, geo-political 
names and modes of self-representation.  Fesl explains this in her 1993 
publication, Conned! 
At the national level I see myself as a Koorie (which means “our people”), 
and I shall use Koorie in this national sense throughout this book to replace 
the label [Aborigine/Aboriginal].  When speaking of a specific group of 
Koorie people I shall use their name. (When speaking of the general area 
from which I come, I refer to myself as a Murrie; when I am with my 
father’s people I am a Gangulu; and I am Gubbi Gubbi when with my 
mother’s kin.) (1993: n.p.). 
 
However, it seems that many Aboriginal people deemed a naming convention 
from the south-eastern parts of Australia as inappropriate and inaccurate and 
resisted this movement (see, for example, Egan, 1994: 77). Thus, it was short 
lived. It is more likely that Aboriginal people generally refer to themselves as 
Aboriginal or Indigenous or through their geo-political names.  Most certainly, 
when many Aboriginal people make themselves known to each other they do so 
through their respective kinship groups and country. 
 
                                                 
110 I would like to thank Denise Groves for her input into this understanding.  
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Indeed, these continuing naming practices (re)connect Indigenous people and 
communities to place, and in so doing, work to (re)state Indigenous realities, 
cosmologies, epistemologies, ontologies and axiologies as they are connected to 
the land and communicated by and through the people belonging to the land.  For 
example, Collard et al (2004) use the notion of a ‘Nyungar Trilogy’ to explain 
the intricate relationship between boodjar (land), moort (family) and katitjin 
(knowledge) for Nyungar people.  Further, the authors rely primarily on stories 
on and about Nyungar country as they are told by Nyungar elders and keepers of 
the stories and  Nyungar language is also privileged over English.  Although the 
authors note that colonial intervention in Nyungar language makes it difficult to 
represent the language variations amongst different Nyungar groups (2004: 12), 
the fact remains that privileging of Nyungar language enables them to retain as 
much control as possible over the meaning of their work.  Indeed, as Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith writes, “for communities there are realities which can only be 
found in the indigenous language; the concepts which are self-evident in the 
indigenous language which can never be captured by another language” (2001: 
157-158). 
 
In a similar vein, Karen Martin/Booran Mirraboopa explains the connections 
between Quandamooka ways of knowing, being and doing as they are informed 
by her relationship to country, respect for her elders and commitment to cultural 
survival.  She writes: 
Our Ways of Doing are a synthesis and articulation of our Ways of 
Knowing and our Ways of Being.  These are seen in our languages, art, 
imagery, technology, traditions and ceremonies, land management 
practices, social organisation and social control.  Again, these are life stage, 
gender and role specific….Our Ways of Doing express our individual and 
group identities, and our individual and group roles.  Our behaviour and  
  262 
actions are a matter of our subsequent evolution and growth in our 
individual Ways of Knowing and Ways of Being.  We become tangible 
proof of our ontology and its construction of our Ways of Being and Ways 
of Knowing.  That is, we are able to show (Do), respectfully and rightfully 
(Being) what we know (Knowing)…. Although our worlds are now 
historically, socially and politically imbued with features of western 
worldviews and constructs, we never relinquished, nor lost the essence of, 
our ways of Knowing and ways of Being and this is reflected in our Ways 
of Doing (Martin/Mirraboopa, 2003: 210-211). 
 
A post-colonial analysis of Collard et al and Martin/Mirraboopa encourages us to 
interpret Indigenous forms of self naming and knowing as examples of 
Indigenous people speaking ‘back to the centre’; politicising Aboriginal 
existence, identity, needs and aspirations to the invader/settler group whose 
knowledge on and about Aboriginal people is otherwise informed by colonialist 
knowledge paradigms.  Indeed, there is some truth in this.  Such declarations 
challenge the presumption of white sovereignty by identifying Indigenous people 
as Sovereign people with Sovereign relationships with the land, which, in turn, 
comprises their ways of self-knowing, self-articulation and subject-hood. 
 
However, I argue that an anti-colonial reading of such texts enables us to extend 
this analysis because it refuses compliance with the belief that colonialist 
knowledges constitute the centre.  The impact of this is twofold:  firstly, it 
enables a more profound understanding of the fact that Indigenous forms of self-
knowing and naming are innate to the needs of Indigenous individuals and 
communities, and therefore serve a cultural function that is internal unto itself.  
Secondly, and in corollary to this, this radical displacing of that which constitutes 
the centre of knowledge production not only challenges colonialist knowledge 
paradigms, it fundamentally destabilises them by subverting the presumption that 
they should occupy the centred position.  Karen Martin/Booran Mirraboopa  
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alerts us to this when she argues that her Quandamooka forms of self-knowing 
informs her work practice in such a way that it constitutes more than just 
resistance to dominant modes of knowing.  She writes: 
My belief as an Aboriginal researcher is that I actively use the strength of 
my Aboriginal heritage and do not position myself in a reactive stance of 
resisting or opposing western research frameworks or ideologies.  
Therefore, I research from the strength and position of being Aboriginal 
and viewing anything western as ‘other’, alongside and among western 
worldviews and realities (Martin/Mirraboopa, 2003: 205). 
 
Thus, I argue that it is this recognition of ourselves, and our worldviews as Other 
in the context of Indigenous Sovereignty that underpins the reasons for naming 
ourselves non-Aboriginal. I argue that naming non-Aboriginality represents non-
Aboriginal people speaking back to our own centre from a newly defined centre, 
that of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  It is a naming process that distinguishes ‘us’ 
from ‘those’ other invader/settlers who do not claim their non-Aboriginal status.  
In this sense then, non-Aboriginality problematises the initial us/them binary, 
forcing realignment between those living in Indigenous Sovereignty, and those 
who do not. As such, I argue that non-Aboriginal anti-colonial naming practices 
provide a way for members of the dominant group to define their political 
identity in such a way that it distinguishes them from the ideological affiliations 
of others within the dominant group. It communicates their critical engagement 
with, if not defiance of, dominant, white, nationalist, ideology and identity 
construction and realigns their political and ideological objectives with 
Aboriginal peoples’ political aspirations. 
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Defining the non-Aboriginal Subject: 
Coming to think of yourself as a non-Aboriginal person is not a new idea, but it 
is an underdeveloped one.  In 1994, Duncan Graham
111 brought together 16 
eminent Australians to discuss their self-conception and realisation as 
‘whitefellas’ in a series of autobiographical essays.  Inspired by Michael King’s 
work on Being Pakeha (1985) and Pakeha Now (1991), Graham asked the 
essayists to consider, amongst other things, their use of land; the self-naming of 
non-Aboriginal people; whitefella relations with Aboriginal people; and, 
whitefella representations of Aboriginal people and Aboriginality (1994: 21-22).  
The generosity of the authors’ essays reflects the optimism and the political 
priorities of the early days of the reconciliation movement and a genuine desire 
for equitable relations between Aboriginal people and other Australians.  Farida 
Tilbury’s analysis of the text also shares this understanding: 
The book has an explicit agenda to promote understanding and 
reconciliation.  It contains a recognition that what makes us distinctly 
Australian is our relationship with Indigenous people, and that other aspects 
of Australian identity which in the past have been more important, such as 
the myths of Gallipoli, mateship, the outback, our colonial and convict 
origins, and more recently, multiculturalism, are giving way to this more 
binary relational identity (2000: 81). 
 
The essays in Being Whitefella are aspirational.  They indicate a moment in time 
in the early 1990’s when some non-Aboriginal people were beginning to publicly 
‘own’ white Australia’s history of the dispossession of Aboriginal people and 
make the first tentative steps to situate white Australian identity within this 
context.  As such, the definitions given to being a whitefella reflected this.  
Duncan Graham, in his Introduction to the text, defines whitefellas as “outsiders” 
and “alien” to Australia: our presence generating caution because “whitefellas 
                                                 
111 Duncan Graham is an Australian award-winning journalist.  
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too often mean trouble” (Graham, 1994: 23).  One of the contributors, Veronica 
Brady
112, also makes the point that building a healthy, coexistent society means 
moving beyond “denial”, “guilt” and “confrontation” for the “offences of the 
past”, and moving to a place where non-Aboriginal Australians accept 
“culpability” and take responsibility for our shared history (Brady, 1994: 141-
142).  This, she argues, will enable us to envision a new place where identity is 
structured differently.  She writes: 
…the question of relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australians is a matter of our recovering our sense of a world beyond 
ourselves.  It means shifting out of the narrow confines of merely utilitarian 
values and a worldview based on struggle and survival, and moving into a 
larger sense of reality.  The walls between us are real but they are not 
necessarily permanent (Brady, 1994: 144). 
 
Myrna Tonkinson’s
113 contribution takes a different tack.  She alerts us to the 
fact that relationships between Aboriginal and invader/settlers are not merely 
relationships between black and white.  An anthropologist of Afro-Caribbean 
decent, Tonkinson remembers with surprise her first experience working in 
Jigalong in 1974 (the Pilbara region of Western Australia) and being referred to 
by an angry Mardu man as a ‘Walyabala’ (whitefella) (Tonkinson, 1994: 162).  
In being designated as a walyabala, Tonkinson suggests that she was not so much 
having her colour observed by Mardu people (1994: 166), but rather her lack of 
cultural knowledge and the presumed privileges she had access to because she is 
not Aboriginal.  As she explains: 
                                                 
112 Associate Professor Veronica Brady is a Senior Honorary Research Fellow in English and 
Cultural Studies at the University of Western Australia. 
113 Myrna Tonkinson is an Honorary Research Fellow in Anthropology in the School of Social 
and Cultural Studies at the University of Western Australia.  Her current research focuses on 
social trauma and its effects on identity, worldview, risk-taking and other aspects of the lives of 
Indigenous Australians.  Tonkinson has worked among Indigenous people in the Western Desert 
since 1974.  
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Apart from such obvious differences in material conditions, being a 
‘whitefella’ has other meanings.  For the Jigalong Mardu, it implies a lack 
of cultural knowledge which renders most persons in that category 
unequipped to deal appropriately with certain situations.  Being whitefella 
in Jigalong meant being protected, because of assumed ignorance, from the 
consequences of some actions and from many kinship obligations.  It also 
excluded most outsiders from participation in the supremely important 
ritual life in the community.  Those in the whitefella category were often 
assumed to have limitless access to resources and expected to be available 
at anytime to provide certain services such as medical assistance or dealing 
with the dead (Tonkinson, 1994: 167). 
 
Unlike Graham, Tonkinson does not seem to experience the same sense of being 
an ‘outsider’, or being ‘alien’ to the Mardu people with whom she lived.  While 
she acknowledges cultural difference, she, along with her husband (who had 
worked in Jigalong previously and has been given a place in the Mardu social 
structure) is welcomed and invited to share stories about her own country and her 
people.  Indeed, this sharing of information is critical to developing meaningful 
diplomatic relationships between individuals and communities
114. What is more, 
when Tonkinson does, her stories are met with curiosity, compassion, generosity 
and empathy.  As she writes: 
…I was never able to persuade them that my skin colour signified any 
special link with them, although on other grounds, I developed many close 
relationships.  One elderly man was visibly moved after my account of how 
my ancestors had been taken from Africa as slaves, forced to relinquish 
their language and traditions and work under brutal conditions.  He 
concluded that I had suffered a great loss and should be taught as much as 
possible about his people’s culture as a kind of a compensation.  However, 
I had no inkling of any shared oppression on his part (Tonskinson, 1994: 
166).
115 
                                                 
114 See page one of my Introduction. 
115 As an aside, this account makes a useful juxtaposition to Greer’s story of being adopted by her 
Kulin sisters, being given a skin name and being taught how to hunt and so on.  Greer capitalises 
on this generosity to substantiate her thesis that we should all become ‘Aboriginal’.  In other 
words, her exploitation of this generosity is unashamedly and unreflectively self-serving.    
However, Tonkinson’s experience reminds me of the importance of Aboriginal networks of 
obligation and reciprocity and the efforts taken to incorporate and teach invader/settler peoples so 
that we may conduct ourselves in culturally appropriate ways in our relationships with Aboriginal 
people and in respect of their Sovereignty.  These processes of intercultural learning are not so 
much evidence of white ‘aboriginalisation’, but rather, lessons in actualising our non-
Aboriginality in culturally and politically useful ways.  
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Observations such as those offered by Graham, Brady and Tonkinson are 
important, and provide critical substance to what it means to be non-Aboriginal.  
In particular, Tonkinson’s analysis reminds us that meaningful relations between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people must be inclusive of those who are not 
decedents of the early invaders/settlers and therefore must transcend the usual 
boundaries demarcated by black and white.  Dipesh Chakrabarty makes a similar 
point with reference to the reconciliation movement.  He argues that too often 
reconciliation is cast “in terms of a black white conquest” and this dichotomy 
locks immigrants, or those who are “not the conquerors” out of reconciliation 
processes (2001: 7). Thus, he writes: 
We now live in an Australia in which the Aboriginal, the descendent of the 
European settler, and the post-war immigrant are all present.  
Reconciliation – the acknowledgment of the special rights and situations of 
the First People – has to involve us all (Chakrabarty, 2001: 13).   
 
However, I also argue that they do not go to the heart of thinking through self-
naming practices as an opportunity to undermine the power relationships as they 
manifest between Aboriginal and the invader/settler community.   This is 
revealed most clearly in Ted Egan’s
116 contribution to Being Whitefella when he 
writes: 
And what do we call ourselves? It’s a bit stupid referring to people other 
than Aboriginal people as ‘non-Aboriginal people’. I certainly don’t feel 
non-Aboriginal. Or ‘European’.  I suppose ‘Aboriginal people and other 
Australians’ is okay.  We don’t have any nationally accepted terms like 
Maori and Pakeha, and attempts in some quarters to impose words like 
‘Koori’ on a national level are already bringing stern opposition from 
various Yolngu, Anangu, Wongais, Nungas, Noongars and Murris around 
the country who say, ‘Hang on, don’t call us Kooris’.  Similarly the word to 
describe non-Aboriginal people is hard to achieve. We get called gubs, 
gubbas, murantawi and balanda, with gadiya being about the widest-spread 
                                                 
116 Ted Egan AO is the Administrator of the Northern Territory.  Early in his career he worked 
with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs as a Patrol Officer, Reserve Superintendent, Teacher 
and District Officer.   He has a Master of Arts (History) and was awarded an Honorary Doctorate 
from the Northern Territory University in 2002.    
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term for whitefellas, but again, away from the particular regions where the 
terms apply, we can’t expect national acceptance…. Officially we can be 
referred to as Australians and they as Aboriginal Australians.  Despite its 
colonial overtones, I just love the old New Guinea term whereby old hands 
were dubbed ‘Befores’ (1994: 77, emphasis added). 
 
I suggest here that Egan’s response to non-Aboriginal self-naming practices 
typifies the post-colonial conundrum of validating Indigenous forms of self-
knowing and naming and recognising, in corollary, that Indigenous people know 
and name us.  The rub is, however, that while he is able to identify the ‘colonial 
overtones’ of New Guinea naming practices, he shows less insight when it comes 
to identifying and claiming the colonial overtones in our own self-naming 
practices, and indeed suggests that non-Aboriginality is a ‘stupid’ idea, unable to 
substantiate the feeling that presumably the name ‘Australian’ provides for him.  
 
Taken at face value, I understand Egan’s point because a literal reading of the 
word ‘non’ communicates a deficiency in personal, cultural and national identity.  
Indeed, this is the view taken by New Zealand author and scholar, Michael King. 
In his contemplation on Being Pakeha (1991: 9-22) he writes: 
To me…[Pakeha] is the obvious word to describe…[us].  ‘New Zealand’ is 
too general a term, because there is not a single coherent culture that gives 
all New Zealanders a shared vision of themselves and their place in the 
world. ‘European’ is inadequate because…many of the things called 
Pakeha are several generations removed from Europe.  ‘Caucasian’ is 
inaccurate and inappropriate.  ‘Tauiwi’ means a strange tribe or foreign 
race, aliens, a truly offensive term for people who have been here for over 
one hundred and fifty years.  And ‘non-Maori’ is a negative definition, 
indicating what something is not, rather than what it is (King, 1991: 16, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
 
However, I suggest that there are two critical problems associated with 
perceiving non-Aboriginality as a marker for cultural deficiency.  Firstly, it 
establishes the preconditions necessary for justifying the appropriation of  
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Aboriginality, such as those discussed in the previous chapter.  That is, it enables 
a logic whereby we imbue our ‘non’-Aboriginality with Aboriginality in order to 
provide our identity with cultural content. 
 
Secondly, and notwithstanding the fact that in Australia we do not have an 
equivalent, nationally accepted term like ‘Pakeha’
117, I suggest that conceiving 
non-Aboriginality as lacking meaningful cultural content bears some similarity 
with broader understandings of whiteness as being culturally neutral.  According 
to critical whiteness studies theorists, not only is white not culturally neutral, the 
presumption of neutrality is critically linked to the maintenance of power.  That 
is, it is argued, if whiteness is neutral, then it must stand as a human norm to 
which others must comply, and the imperative to comply with whiteness is the 
articulation of white power.  As Marcia Langton notes:  
[t]here is no more powerful position than that of being ‘just’ human.  The 
claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity.  
Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race.  But non-
raced people can, for they do not represent the interests of race (2001: 
online).   
 
Similarly, in Australia, there is no more powerful position than that of being ‘just 
Australian’.  This is evidenced by the proliferation of hyperbolic references to 
‘un-Australian-ness’, which have infiltrated Australian public discourse in recent 
times (McKay, 2005: online).  Those who employ this discourse purport to 
defend the social, economic and moral interests of the nation.  Consequently, 
                                                 
117 One might assume however, that Graham’s use of the word ‘whitefella’ is an attempt to work 
within a distinctly Australian colloquial framework to forge a nationally accepted term for non-
Aboriginal people.  As to the etymology of the word, it is interesting to note that whitefella is not 
listed in the Australian Macquarie Dictionary Book of Slang (www.macquariedictionary.com.au 
accessed, 26.9.2005), nor is it listed in The Macquarie Concise Dictionary: Third Edition (1998).  
However, Eve Fesl notes that historically, the word whitefella was used by Koories (Aboriginal 
people) “who had no previous contact with European people” (1993: 21-22), but still had learnt 
enough of the English language and of the British to need a word to describe them.  
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those who find that their identities are not represented within the accepted 
construction of Australianness are estranged from its purview. One particular 
manifestation of the tension this produces amongst differently positioned migrant 
Australians are the Cronulla riots, In December, 2005.  Wendy Brady writes with 
regard to this event: 
At the end of 2005 there were race riots in Sydney in which mostly young 
men laid siege to beachside suburbs.  It was a battle between the 
descendents of European colonisers proclaiming ‘Aussie rights’ and men of 
Arabic descent over who were the ‘real’ Australians.  What saddened me 
most is that both groups are part of the Australian nation and neither could 
lay claim to being the first nations of this country.  I know what it is to be 
an Aboriginal Australian and know that my ancestry goes back thousands 
of years, and they cannot see that they are part of an inheritance that dates 
back less than 220 years.  This is a result of that common denial by the 
dominant society about what the history of British imperialism gave birth 
to: a nation founded by peoples without a common identity other than that 
of belonging to that make-believe state of being Australian (2006: 226). 
 
In my early attempts to describe non-Aboriginality I defined “non-
Indigenous/Aboriginal people as those belonging to the group of people who 
have migrated, or who are descendents of anyone who has migrated to Australia 
since 1788 and does not identify as Indigenous. The term non-Indigenous is not 
exclusive to white looking people.  Rather the term refers to the millions of 
people who have benefited and continue to benefit (although some 
disproportionately to others) from the fact that we live in an invaded land.   
 
I argue that identifying and claiming this ‘immigrant’ status is the first step to 
constructing anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality.  Fundamentally, 
this necessitates constituting our Australian identities within the context of 
colonisation and the violent dispossession of Aboriginal people from their land. 
We are not, as our national mythology tells us, either ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Native’ to  
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Australia.  Moreover, non-Aboriginality does not rely on the physical presence of 
blackness and whiteness or need to be physically discernable.  The term non-
Aboriginal is therefore (and also) inclusive of those non-Aboriginal people 
whose ethnic and cultural origins are not ‘white’.   
 
Thus, I argue that non-Aboriginality as a marker for identity is historically 
located within an understanding of colonial power relations and a profound 
awareness of their contemporary manifestations and implications for both 
Aboriginal people and ourselves.  It is formed in relationship with Aboriginal 
people, in fulsome acknowledgment of their status as first nations’ peoples, and 
in support of their cultural and political objectives including formal and ongoing 
recognition of their Sovereignty.  Non-Aboriginality is a political identity that 
recognises that non-Aboriginal people’s legitimate belonging in this country is 
necessarily conjoined with Aboriginal people achieving substantive human 
rights, land rights and social justice.  It is through claiming our non-Aboriginality 
that the belongings of those who are decedents of the original invaders and 
settlers, and those who have arrived more recently and share in the benefits of the 
original invasion, may be negotiated.  
 
In developing the case for non-Aboriginality as a political identity for non-
Aboriginal Australians, I refer firstly to the work of Paul Spoonley, a Pakeha 
New Zealander scholar who problematises the politicisation of Pakeha identity in 
relationship with Maori New Zealanders.  I then turn to the work of Farida 
Tilbury, who, inspired by Spoonley, configures Wadjula identity as a political 
identity in relationship with Nyungar people and land in the south-western region 
of Western Australia.  
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Before I begin this discussion however, I must note that both Spoonley and 
Tilbury situate their respective analyses within post-colonial frameworks.  For 
Spoonley, the name ‘Pakeha’ signifies the dialectic relationship between Pakeha 
as the colonisers and Maori as the colonised.  Thus, it represents a critical 
intervention by those “who have been the agents of colonialism and, who, once 
colonialism has lost its legitimacy, find themselves without strong ethical and 
ideological support” (1995: 97).  In this ‘post-colonial’ context, Pakeha 
articulates the formation of an identity within new ethical and ideological 
frameworks; in relationship with Maori influences; and, which, holds at its core 
or its political commitment “a continuous engagement with the effects of 
colonial occupation” (1995: 97).  Similarly, Tilbury writes the term post-colonial 
“is not necessarily an assertion that the colonial project is over”, but rather, 
“involves attempts to subvert that project by resisting hegemonic structures and 
ideologies which continue to oppress Indigenous peoples” (2000: 77).  Naming 
the ‘Australian’ self as Wadjula constitutes such a subversion. 
 
I have already offered my critique of post-colonialism in the Introduction, so I 
will not repeat it here.  Suffice it to say that I regard Spoonley and Tilbury’s 
respective theses as complimentary to the broader anti-colonial intent of this 
project and incorporate their thinking into my work in this light.  Indeed, I 
venture to say that both Spoonley and Tilbury’s work has more in common with 
anti-colonial frameworks as I have outlined them in my Introduction than they do 
to post-colonial paradigms as I understand them.  I take this position because 
they both reveal a commitment to situating the subjectivities of the colonising 
group within Indigenous Sovereignty; undermining the hegemony of colonialist  
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ideology and the ways this informs relationships between Indigenous peoples and 
ourselves; and acknowledge the importance of dialogic intersubjective and 
intercultural relationships in reconstituting identities.  Moreover, they both speak 
to a vision whereby the settler ‘nation’, as it is constructed in continuum with 
colonialist ideologies, is re-imagined within aspirations for its eventual 
decolonisation
118. 
 
With this in mind, I must make one more caveat before I embark on this 
discussion.  That is, conversations involving the relationship between Pakeha and 
Maori people in Aotearoa/New Zealand take place within a political context 
where the ongoing recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi (signed between the 
British and Maori in 1834) supports and informs an official policy of 
biculturalism.  While there continues to be some disputation between Maori and 
Pakeha on how to interpret the Treaty, in principle it underpins a public and 
political culture where matters of Sovereignty are discussed and the negotiation 
partners within this dialogue are identified and named. It is necessary to refrain 
from idealising the outcomes biculturalism produces for Maori people, but 
notionally, the success of biculturalism depends “on the powerful giving up some 
authority” (Brabazon, 2000: 52).  Conversely, in Australia, there is no Treaty 
between Aboriginal and the invader/settler community.  While the High Court’s 
1992 Mabo decision overturned the myth of terra nullius, arguably this has not 
been converted into a general public awareness that Aboriginal people have not 
                                                 
118 I appreciate that Langton argues that actual decolonisation is unobtainable and my comments 
on aspirations for decolonisation can be read as either a misunderstanding or an idealisation of 
Langton’s position.   However, I also note the optimism in Langton’s argument that “we can try 
to find ways to undermine the colonial hegemony” (Langton, 1993: 8).  It is my position that we 
undertake this challenge because we ‘aspire’ to ‘decolonisation’, however unobtainable it may 
actually be.  
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ceded Sovereignty or offered consent for invader/settler occupation of their 
lands.  Moreover, in Australia, the official policy of multiculturalism valorises 
the diversity of Australia’s migrant communities and yet excludes awareness of 
Aboriginal peoples’ needs and agendas (see Vasta, 1996: 50-52; Hage, 1998: 24, 
Curthoys, 2000). Consequentially, some, such as Duncan Graham, query whether 
Australia should consider being “bicultural before becoming multicultural” 
(1994: 21).  However, I argue that this question oversimplifies multifaceted 
issues.  As Brabazon argues with reference to the New Zealand experience, 
biculturalism delineates complex social, cultural and political issues in terms of 
black and white, which, as I have already argued is a return to colonialist modes 
of identification.  Further, she argues, that biculturalism “suggests that two 
monocultural societies are resident in a single, geographical entity” (2000: 52).  
Not only does this assume Maori unity in issues relating to Maori issues, it also 
means that New Zealand has been under-equipped to negotiate the cultural and 
social needs of newly arrived migrants and other disempowered groups within 
the New Zealand community (Brabazon, 2000: 63).  However, Brabazon also 
concedes that to imbue biculturalism with multicultural sensibilities potentially 
undermines the unique status of Maori people, rendering them but another 
minority group within Aotearoa/New Zealand and deflecting “attention away 
from their claims to justice” (2000: 63).   
 
Indeed, this is presumably what Graham is alluding to when he asks, “[c]an 
Aboriginal culture survive in a multicultural society?” (1994: 21).  In response, I 
argue that the central problem with this question is its premise.  What it fails to 
acknowledge is that Australia was a ‘multi-cultural country’ long before  
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multiculturalism became a policy devised to manage the diversity of migrant 
groups living in Australia. Thus, I argue that the resolution to this conundrum 
lies not in debating the various merits of one system of political, social and 
cultural administration over another, but acknowledging the fundamental fact of 
Aboriginal Sovereignty and constituting the identities of those who are not 
Aboriginal accordingly.  One of the possible advantages to this is that it promotes 
the position from which non-Aboriginal people will negotiate a Treaty with 
Aboriginal people and devise the terms for our co-existence with them on their 
lands. 
 
According to Spoonley, Pakeha is a contemporary process of identity formation, 
born out of the specific social and political milieu of 1980’s New Zealand.  In 
part, adopting the name ‘Pakeha’ reflects the needs of those New Zealanders 
wanting to forge a unique, post-colonial identity that is neither British nor 
European, and acknowledges Maori influences.  It is also a response by socially 
liberal, middle-class New Zealanders to the nationalist and “populist 
authoritarianism” of the Muldoon era, and is consistent with the socially 
progressive politics of the anti-war and green movements of the 1980’s. Finally, 
it is a political counter-point to the new politics of Maori identity that emerged at 
the time.  Pakeha, as a political identity recognises, that in the politics of 
biculturalism, it is necessary to name a cultural and political identity that speaks 
to and galvanises the cultural and political objectives of those who seek to 
negotiate genuine post-colonial relations with Maori people.  
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As a naming convention, ‘Pakeha’ relocates processes of identity development in 
two key ways.  Firstly, it insists that post-colonial identities be discursively 
positioned away from old colonialist/New Zealand paradigms and within 
Maori/Aotearoa paradigms.  Thus, it is significant that Pakeha is a Maori 
word
119.  Drawing on Yeatman, Spoonley argues: 
It [Pakeha] is the term of the colonized for the colonizers.  Thus its 
reclamation by the postcolonial colonizers is indeed a political 
act…reclamation signals the decision of members of the 
dominant/oppressor group to give ethical and political support to the 
postcolonial struggles of the colonized Maori.  When members of a 
dominant group accept that they are racially and ethnically specified within 
a specific context of relations they are demonstrating that preparedness to 
give up privilege as the unmarked term.  Of course, this positions them in 
opposition to their fellows who do no want to give up this privilege 
(Yeatman, c.f. Spoonley, 1995: 98). 
 
Secondly, Spoonley argues, naming Pakeha identity responds to the post-modern 
imperative to decentre and deconstruct traditional processes of identity formation 
(such as class and ethnicity), by insisting on the construction and recentring of 
identity politics within a new post-colonial discursive paradigm.  I argue that this 
observation resonates with one of my salient concerns with whiteness studies. 
While the deconstruction of whiteness enables the dissection of various 
manifestations of power, it offers little for those who seek to recast their 
identities in ways that are politically and syncretically co-existent with the 
political identities and objectives of others; in this case, first nations’ peoples.  
Thus, as Spoonley argues, innovative processes of identity development, such as 
Pakeha, open up new political spaces for exploration.   
 
                                                 
119 Pakeha is a Maori term, however its precise meaning is unknown (King, 1991: 15-16).  
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For Spoonley, the political advantages to naming oneself Pakeha are threefold: In 
the first instance, self-identification as Pakeha inspires greater self-reflection and 
examination of personal agency in transforming the pre-existing social, economic 
and political order.  Secondly, it creates a new political space for mutual 
recognition amongst self-identifying Pakeha and the basis for political 
collectivisation and action.  Thirdly, this collective political action is critically 
interconnected with Maori political objectives.  As Spoonley writes: 
[Pakeha is] a contemporary identity that has been formed by interaction 
with iwi and a sympathy for their aspirations.  It is an identity informed by 
an understanding of both iwi histories and a self-aware and self-critical 
appreciation of the ethnic history of Pakeha.  The significance of this 
position is that it affirms the centrality of biculturalism and the ambition of 
tino rangatiratanga for iwi…. Pakeha, in their affirmation of Maori 
autonomy and the critical nature of such autonomy for a reordering of 
national priorities, can help transform the political agenda and culture of 
Aotearoa.  It serves to emphasise the interconnectedness of Maori/iwi and 
Pakeha as well as constitute a basis for an equitable system (1995: 105 and 
111). 
 
By way of locating Spoonley’s thesis closer to home, Farida Tilbury’s 
examination of Wadjula Self-labelling and the Process of Reconciliation (2000) 
provides critical insight into the significance of constructing non-Aboriginality as 
a political identity. 
 
By way of explanation, it is firstly worth noting that the word ‘Wadjula’ is a 
Nyungar transliteration of the word ‘whitefella’ and is the name by which 
Nyungar people (the Sovereign people of south-west Western Australia) know 
white people.  As Tilbury explains, there are a small but growing number of 
people in this region who actively self-identify as Wadjula.  Usually, those who 
do have inter-personal relationships with Nyungar people and share a  
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commitment to Nyungar self-determination objectives (Tilbury, 2000: 73 and 81; 
also see Arthur, 1996: 173). 
 
As a political statement, declaring oneself as Wadjula works on a number of 
critically interdependent levels.  Firstly, it locates the construction and naming of 
identity squarely within Nyungar Sovereignty.  On one hand, this signals an 
active disengagement with colonialist naming conventions and their propensity 
to homogenise discrete groups of Aboriginal people.  Being Wadjula identifies a 
relationship with Nyungar people as Wadjulas as opposed to a relationship with 
‘Aborigines’ as Australians.  Thus, just as Pakeha demarcates a relationship with 
Maori in Aotearoa, Wadjula asserts non-Aboriginal peoples’ “interdependence 
with Indigenous people” within this specific region (Tilbury, 2000: 80). 
 
Secondly, being Wadjula disrupts uncritical belief in white nationalism and the 
colonialist knowledge paradigms and mythologies that maintain them.  Critical to 
this is a profound commitment to undermine the prevailing logic of terra nullius.  
In this context, being Wadjula means “[t]erra nullius becomes terra Nyungar, 
and we become Wadjula in relation to this land and those people” (Tilbury, 2000: 
87, emphasis in the original).  Thus, in corollary, being Wadjula locates the 
formation of white Australian identity within a history of Aboriginal 
dispossession and ongoing physical, epistemological and ontological violence.  
Moreover, it signals personal non-compliance with the nationalist imperative to 
dis-remember that violence and makes a clear distinction between those who 
choose to persist in the active denial that this violence exists (which is, of course, 
a critical element of the ongoing violence committed against Aboriginal people).   
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In short, it designates a group of people “with a particular politics and vision for 
the future of race relations in this country” (Tilbury, 2000: 85) that is radically 
different from what we currently have.  
 
Thirdly, the name ‘Wadjula’ valorises Nyungar language and epistemologies of 
the Wadjula Other over and above the colonialist knowledges of the Self and 
Other we produce within our own “imperial language” and ideological 
paradigms, for our own purposes.  This demonstrates a cognisance that the ‘gaze 
is returned’ from Nyungar people towards Wadjulas.  Implied in this is a 
recognition of Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects (as opposed to colonised 
‘objects’), and it is within this intersubjective and intercultural relationship that 
Wadjula is constructed.  This radical decentring of the ways non-Aboriginality is 
conceived is consistent with the anti-colonial paradigm for identity construction 
that I advocate. 
 
Finally, because Wadjula is a political identity constructed within a “set of 
beliefs and practices in relation to the Indigenous people” (Tilbury, 2000: 85), it 
is not dependent on whiteness, “bloodlines”, ethnicity or cultural identity in order 
to have political substance.  Rather, it serves as a basis upon which Wadjulas can 
mutually identify and collectivise.  Through this, Wadjulas can “convince others 
of the importance of recognising Indigenous claims and…play a crucial role in 
transforming the political agenda” (Tilbury, 2000: 85). 
 
Tilbury’s understanding of Wadjula self-naming illuminates my 
conceptualisation of non-Aboriginality in that it clearly places the construction of  
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non-Aboriginality within Indigenous Sovereignty, and in dialogue with 
Aboriginal people’s cultural and political objectives.  Indeed, I must concede that 
to some extent she extends my analysis, because she identifies the significance of 
naming non-Aboriginal identities within specific geo-political regions as they are 
known and named by Aboriginal (in this case, Nyungar) people. In so doing, she 
subverts both the political and discursive dynamic that is in play when we refer 
to ourselves as ‘Australians’ and Indigenous people as ‘Aborigines’ or 
‘Indigenous’.  As she writes, “The move from Australian to Wadjula identity is 
one from pan-nation/state identity, an identity which leaves out Indigenous 
people entirely, to naming ourselves in relation not just to ‘Aborigine’ as ‘other’, 
but to the particular language group on whose land we reside” (2000: 86).  The 
radical recentering of the process of identity formation for non-Aboriginal people 
is anti-colonial because it unequivocally rejects the colonialist logic of terra 
nullius and affirms the construction of non-Aboriginal identities within the locus 
of this specific geo-political Aboriginal group: Nyungars. 
 
I also argue, however, that Tilbury’s argument does not mitigate the anti-colonial 
possibilities that arise out of self-identifying as non-Aboriginal.  As we have 
seen, Aboriginal people problematise the use, meaning, syntax, spelling and 
applicability of words such as ‘Aborigine’ and ‘Indigenous’ all the time.  Even 
though these problematisations are not overtly cast as anti-colonial, they are 
‘anti-colonial’ in the sense that they do not subscribe to, or offer consent for, the 
original colonial meanings.  Rather, they work as collective nouns demarcating 
shared historical and contemporary experiences, worldviews and political  
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interests that are not white Australian.  They have spoken, and continue to speak, 
against the ongoing exercise of colonial power relations in Australia.   
 
By stark contrast, equivalent non-Aboriginal engagement with non-Aboriginality 
is practically non-existent.  In everyday terms, ‘non-Aboriginal’ passively 
denotes one who is not Aboriginal.  It is in this context that I argue that we make 
our own critical interventions and recast our non-Aboriginality as an overtly 
political, anti-colonial marker for identity. 
 
Therefore, I argue that just as pan-Aboriginality does not negate regional, 
geopolitical Aboriginal identities, pan-non-Aboriginality provides an umbrella 
discourse for multiple expressions of anti-colonial non-Aboriginality on a 
national level.  It is a way of unifying non-Aboriginalities as they stand in 
relationship with distinct geopolitical Aboriginal groups and in contradistinction 
to notions of the white Australian.  Just as there is political value in pan-
Aboriginality, there is political value in pan-non-Aboriginality.  To put it simply, 
there is strength in numbers. 
 
Conclusion: 
In this chapter, I have argued creating the non-Aboriginal subject is an integrated 
three part process involving recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginality; 
naming the non-Aboriginal self as ‘non-Aboriginal’; and, defining non-
Aboriginality as political identity formed in the locus of Aboriginal Sovereignty. 
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In making a case for recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginal, I contrasted 
Homi Bhabha’s third space with Marcia Langton’s third domain. While I argued 
Bhabha’s working of the third space alerts us to the importance of recognising 
difference over diversity and conceding our investment in the ‘sovereign self’, I 
also argued application of the third space in the Australian context is limited 
because of its commitment to hybridity and because it privileges the migrant 
experience vis-à-vis the colonial centre.  In contradistinction, Langton’s third 
domain promotes dialogic relationships between Aboriginal people and members 
of the invader/settler community.  Therefore, the third domain also enables 
identity formation processes in the locus of Aboriginal Sovereignty.   
 
By way of elaborating my understanding of an ontology of non-Aboriginality I 
also provided an autobiographical account of how I came to learn my own non-
Aboriginality. 
 
In developing my argument for naming non-Aboriginality, I provided examples 
of some of the interventions Aboriginal people have made into colonial naming 
practices.  I argued a post-colonial analysis suggests Aboriginal interventions 
into these naming conventions are a marginal claim for self-identity vis-à-vis the 
colonial centre.  However, an anti-colonial analysis enables Aboriginal self-
naming to be understood as a declaration of Sovereign subjecthood.  Naming 
non-Aboriginality in this context constitutes an affirmation of this declaration 
and a relational repositioning of invader/settler naming conventions that support 
the authority of the colonial centre.  The name ‘white’ is one example of this. 
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Finally, in order to define non-Aboriginality, I drew on the work of Paul 
Spoonley who problematises Pakeha identity in relationship to Maori 
Sovereignty, and Farida Tilbury who works with Wadjula identity in relationship 
to Nyungar Sovereignty.  I argued non-Aboriginality is a political identity, 
formed in dialogue with Aboriginal people and rejects other nomenclature for 
identity such as race and colour.  I argued non-Aboriginality is constituted within 
a history of colonisation and speaks to the responsibilities invader/settler 
Australians have to Aboriginal people.  Non-Aboriginality articulates support for 
Aboriginal sovereign claims, social justice and self-determination.  As the 
Mirrawoong author and scholar, Stephen Kinnane reminds us: 
[we] are asking non-Indigenous peoples to do no less than we do everyday, 
consider where we are from, who we belong to, what is our history, 
how…we negotiate our pasts into our future, and always, to recognise who 
speaks for which country.  Just as there are Indigenous countries in the 
civic state of Australia, there are desires that a more just and meaningful 
relationship between the older and newer structures be negotiated 
(Kinnane, 2002: n.p). 
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Conclusion 
 
On the 19
th of September 2006, the Nyungar people of Western Australia won 
recognition of their Native Title in Perth.  Justice Wilcox handed down the 
decision in the Australian Federal Court.  Although the recognition of Nyungar 
Native Title cannot be confused with the recognition of Nyungar Sovereignty, 
Nyungar people are the first Native Title claimants to have their Native Title 
recognised in an Australian metropolis.   
 
The Nyungar peoples’ success brought about the predictable hyperbolic backlash 
from many Australians.  Both the Western Australian and Federal Governments 
seek to appeal Justice Wilcox’s decision in the Australian High Court.  Despite 
Justice Wilcox’s assurances that no one would ‘lose their backyards’ (a familiar 
refrain amongst Australians whenever Aboriginal people have their Native Title 
acknowledged), media outlets queried the impact of the decision on property 
values in Perth (the Perth real estate market has experienced unprecedented 
growth over the last couple of years because of the mining boom).  Various 
media outlets gave credence to the specious claim, put forward by politicians 
from both political parties, that West Australians would have to pay for access to 
public spaces such as parks and beaches.  In fact, section 212 (2) of the Native 
Title Act gives provision for State Governments to make laws protecting public 
access to public areas.  In the 1990’s, the Western Australian State Government 
“enacted legislation which specifically guaranteed public access to beaches, 
parks, open spaces, river banks” (Insight transcript, October, 2006, accessed 
20.12. 2006). 
  
  285 
On the 31
st of October, SBS’s Insight program, a discussion based current affairs 
show, broadcast a special on the Nyungar peoples’ victory.  The program 
gathered a forum of interested parties including Nyungar Native Title claimants 
(Ted and Richard Wilkes and Dolcie Donaldson amongst others); the Federal 
Attorney General, Philip Ruddock; Graeme Neate, President of the National 
Native Title Tribunal; the Nyungar human rights lawyer, Hannah McGlade; 
Warren Mundine, the Federal President of the Australian Labor party; Eric 
Ripper, the Deputy Premier of Western Australia; Ross Lightfoot, Liberal 
Senator for Western Australia; Laura Longley; and, Glen Kelly and Ted Hart 
from the South-West Land and Sea Council in Western Australia.  
Representatives for the Yugambeh people (Queensland) who are claiming Native 
Title in Surfers Paradise and the Gold Coast were also present. 
 
The ensuing conversation was wide ranging.  The program’s host, Jenny Brockie, 
sought clarification on the difference between Native Title and land-rights; the 
emotional and political significance of Native Title to Nyungar people; the 
impact of Native Title recognition for mainstream Australia; the imperative for 
State and Federal Governments to negotiate with Nyungar people; the 
significance of the Yorta Yorta
120 case in interpreting Justice Wilcox’s decision 
and Native Title generally; the dynamism of Nyungar culture; Nyungar 
resistance to white invasion/settlement since 1829; the bearing Justice Wilcox’s 
decision will have on  the Yugambeh peoples’ claim in Queensland; the impact 
of Native Title on economic development in areas such as mining and tourism; 
                                                 
120 The Yorta Yorta people were unable to achieve recognition of their Native Title because it 
was determined that the impact of colonisation was such they were unable to satisfy the criteria 
that they had ongoing connection to the land.  Subsequent to this Native Title ruling, the Yorta 
Yorta people have negotiated with the Victorian State Government to have their Native Title 
recognised under the Victorian Heritage Act.  
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financial compensation to Aboriginal people for loss of land; the expediency of 
exploiting mainstream anti-Aboriginal sentiment for political gain; and the 
relationship between universal citizenship rights and Aboriginal peoples’ Native 
Title rights.  In the course of the discussion, one non-Aboriginal woman 
(unnamed), towards the back row, spoke up.  She said: 
I am a Wadjula
121 woman like the woman who’s been speaking there who 
fears her citizenship.  I want to live in a country and be a citizen in a 
country that’s really fair and just.  I was not fearful with the native title 
claim.  I was delighted because I felt for a chance now Noongar people can 
negotiate in an equal way.  So I have no fear.  And I actually also think that 
given the richness I have got from the dispossession of Aboriginal people, 
if there is a compensation claim then I am willing for that to happen as well 
(Insight transcript, October, 2006, accessed 20.12. 2006). 
. 
 
I draw attention to this quote to make the point that declaring one’s own non-
Aboriginal (Wadjula) identity may not be a mainstream idea, but occasionally it 
is an idea that makes its way into the mainstream.  This woman’s declaration, in 
the context of this forum discussion, serves to distinguish her identity and 
political priorities away from those other Australians who resist and deny 
Aboriginal claims to justice.  Rather, declaring a Wadjula (non-Aboriginal) 
identity works to support Nyungar (Aboriginal) political interests and social 
justice objectives in the face of mainstream antipathy and hostility.  While this 
woman articulated a minority opinion and occupied a small amount of time in the 
overall discussion, she never the less revealed an important third alternative to 
the anticipated, dichotomised positions between Aboriginal and invader/settler 
people. 
 
                                                 
121 In the SBS transcript of this program, ellipses appear where the woman says ‘Wadjula’.  It is 
possible that the person doing the transcription was not familiar with the word or it’s spelling.  
However, I have watched this program and the woman clearly says ‘Wadjula’.  
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In this thesis, I have argued that claiming non-Aboriginality is a process of 
identity development formed in profound recognition of being in Indigenous 
Sovereignty.  Identifying as non-Aboriginal is an innately political act.  Claiming 
non-Aboriginality forces a distinction between Australians who continue to 
invest in the power of their white sovereignty and those who seek an alternative 
path. I have argued that claiming non-Aboriginality is integral to achieving 
substantive reconciliation between Aboriginal and invader/settler peoples. 
 
In this thesis, I have situated my argument for non-Aboriginality as a response to 
recent work in critical whiteness studies and post-colonial ‘belongings’ in 
invader/settler societies.  I have drawn a connection between these two fields of 
scholarship to underscore the importance of whiteness to achieving belonging in 
Australia.  I have argued both fields of scholarship continue to operate within, 
and support colonialist paradigms, and this in turn, perpetuates the relationship 
between whiteness and belonging in Australia.   
 
In Chapter Two, I oriented my critique of critical whiteness studies around New 
Race Abolitionism, specifically the work of John Garvey and Noel Ignatiev.  I 
argued hitherto there has been little critical engagement with the New Race 
Abolitionists from an Australian perspective, and given the influence of 
American scholarship (including New Race Abolitionism) in Australia, 
substantive critical engagement was necessary. In my discussion, I identified one 
of the strengths of Abolitionism is that it makes critical interconnections between 
the study of whiteness and anti-whiteness activism. In acknowledging this unique 
feature of Abolitionism I was able to place my political position and subjectivity  
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within the framework of this thesis.  I recognise the personal (and political) 
reasons New Race Abolitionism might appeal to those of us who define our 
political positions as ‘left’ of centre, and find their radical methodology for social 
change seductive.  However, in my analysis, I identified serious limitations with 
the Abolitionist doctrine.  I have argued against the New Race Abolitionists 
proposal that whites should ‘cross over’ into blackness, claiming this misguided 
expression of political solidarity is an act of power; a (re)colonisation of the 
black body that keeps the epistemological centredness of whiteness in play.   The 
means by which this occurs are through universalising the definition of 
whiteness, thus conflating the exercise of ‘strategic whiteness’ with the 
successful assimilation of Aboriginal people and concealing the effects of 
cultural racism on ‘cosmetically white’ Aboriginal people.  Further, I have 
argued that crossing over from whiteness into blackness dissociates whiteness 
from historical memory and context.  I argued this ahistoricity is at odds with the 
foundational objectives of reconciliation and my proposal for substantive 
reconciliation.  Moreover, it supports the neo-colonial objectives of ‘practical 
reconciliation’.  Finally, I argued against the proposal that Abolitionists should 
form strategic alliances with pro-whiteness and race hate organisations, asserting 
this is at odds with the anti-colonial intent of this thesis.  I argued such alliances 
profoundly jeopardise intersubjective and intercultural dialogues between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people and shifts the locus of political activism 
and identity formation away from Aboriginal Sovereignty towards those who 
would see violence committed against Aboriginal people for their own political 
gain. 
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In Chapter Three, I focused my discussion on belonging with reference to five 
pivotal texts.  They were, Germaine Greer’s Whitefella jump Up: The Shortest 
Way to Nationhood (2003); Anthony Moran’s As Australia Decolonizes: 
Indigenizing Settler Nationalism and the Challenges of Settler Indigenous 
Relations (2002); David Tacey’s Edge of the Sacred: Transformations in 
Australia (1998a); and, John Moloney’s The Native Born: The First White 
Australians (2000).  In this chapter, my primary concern was to deconstruct the 
ways Indigeneity and/or Aboriginality are appropriated into white Australian 
national identity formation processes.  In developing my argument, I argued 
there are polarised positions between those who advocate an ‘Aboriginalisation’ 
of white Australian identity, and those who warn against the (re)colonisation of 
Aboriginal identity so that settler belongings can be assured.  In the ‘cut and 
thrust’ of this debate, Aboriginal people are positioned as pre-colonial, traditional 
and primordial beings.  They have also been positioned as the barrier to settler 
belongings.  I argued such positionings of Aboriginal people function as a 
discursive mechanism through which invader/settler Australians deny the 
violence of colonisation and dispossession of Aboriginal people.  Further, I 
argued this denial is made possible by the appropriation of Aboriginality which 
in turn enables the appropriation of Aboriginal dispossession by invader/settler 
Australians.  In a gross inversion of colonial history, this then positions 
Aboriginal people as the dispossessors of the invaders.  Moreover, this 
substantiates the need for settler belongings and validates the allegorical co-
option of the primordial native as a means to legitimise invader/settler 
belongings through original, permanent and ongoing connection to place. 
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My argument for anti-colonial constructions of non-Aboriginality constitutes a 
disruption to the relationship between whiteness and belonging, and suggests that 
non-Aboriginal belongings must be predicated on alternative, anti-colonial 
criteria that are formed and operate in dialogue with Aboriginal people as 
Sovereign peoples and simultaneously undermines the colonialist imperative for 
‘white sovereignty’.  As an anti-colonial process of identity development, non-
Aboriginality works to support the cultural, social justice and human rights 
objectives of Aboriginal people.   
 
In this thesis, I have cast my argument for the creation of the non-Aboriginal 
subject within an anti-colonial framework.  In so doing, I have made specific 
reference to Marcia Langton’s (1993) argument that anti-colonial representations 
of Aboriginality in film and television are constructed out of meaningful dialogic 
relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.  I have 
extrapolated on Langton’s position to argue that anti-colonial constructions of 
non-Aboriginality are similarly created out of dialogic relationships between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, in the context of Aboriginal Sovereignty.   
 
My preference for anti-colonialism is offered in juxtaposition to post-colonial 
theorisations of Indigenous and invader/settler relations and processes of identity 
development.  Throughout this project I have acknowledged the importance of 
some post-colonial work to the development of this thesis.  In my Introduction 
Edward Said’s (1985) seminal text Orientalism, forms the backdrop to the 
direction of my argument, and leads to my critique of Bain Attwood’s (1992) 
Aboriginalism/post-Aboriginalism.  In Chapter Three, Terry Goldie’s (1997)  
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Representations of the Indigene; Hodge and Mishra’s (1990) ‘bastard complex’; 
and, Gelder and Jacobs (1998) Uncanny Australia inform my discussion on white 
Australian ‘belongings’.  Further, in Chapter Four, Paul Spoonley’s (1991 and 
1995) and Farida Tilbury’s (2000) post-colonial analysis of Pakeha and Wadjula 
identity is instructive in my working on the construction of non-Aboriginality as 
an anti-colonial marker for identity. 
 
In broad terms I have argued that post-colonialism is conservative and divisive 
and alienates many Aboriginal people who reject the idea that Australia can be 
described as a post-colonial nation.  I have also argued the paradigmatic structure 
of post-colonialism insists that Aboriginal people speak from the periphery, 
thereby maintaining the centredness of colonialist epistemologies, ontologies and 
axiologies.  Thus, I argue the solipsism of post-colonialism is that while it 
professes to embrace the challenge Indigenous worldviews and life experiences 
pose, it simultaneously works to hold these challenges at bay.  Therefore, my 
preference for anti-colonialism is that it positions Indigenous views, knowledge 
and experiences at the centre of epistemological, ontological and axiological 
development (Rigney, 1999).  I have argued this in turn repositions non-
Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies and axiologies in relationship to this 
(newly) defined centre.  Non-Aboriginality then, is a mode of self-identification 
born out of this (new) site of identity construction, in dialogue with Aboriginal 
people as Sovereign subjects.   
 
I developed my argument for the construction of non-Aboriginality in Chapter 
Four.  Here, I argued the creation of the non-Aboriginal subject is an integrated  
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three-part process, including recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginality; 
naming the ontological experience as ‘non-Aboriginal’; and defining non-
Aboriginality as a political identity constructed in commitment to achieving an 
anti-colonial process of identity development.  The first part of my discussion 
drew a distinction between Homi Bhabha’s ‘third space’ and Marcia Langton’s 
‘third domain’.  I argued Bhabha’s third space focuses on the relationship 
migrant and diasporic communities have with the colonial centre, whilst 
Langton’s third domain allows for situating the construction of non-Aboriginality 
within the locus of Aboriginal Sovereignty.  I supported this claim with reference 
to Ian Anderson’s critique of hybridity and Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s working 
on Aboriginal belongings as an ontological relationship with land.  I also argued 
recognising an ontology of non-Aboriginality brings with it ethical obligations to 
work towards developing a discourse of non-Aboriginality and non-Aboriginal 
peoples’ relationship with Aboriginal Sovereignty.  In elaborating this point, I 
provided an autobiographical account of how I came to understand my own non-
Aboriginality, and connected the idea of ‘transformation’ with Levinas’ notion of 
‘transcendence’.  I argued ‘non-Aboriginality’ identifies the alterity of the non-
Aboriginal subject in relationship to Aboriginal people as Sovereign subjects.  
 
Finally, in making my case for naming and defining non-Aboriginality, I drew on 
examples of Aboriginal interventions into colonialist naming practices and 
argued similar interventions were required from other Australians.  In defining 
non-Aboriginality as a political identity, I drew on examples from Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, where there is a corpus of work problematising Pakeha identity in 
relationship to Maori identity.  Paul Spoonley’s work was particularly instructive  
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here, as was Farida Tilbury’s, which draws on Spoonley, to theorise Wadjula 
identity in relationship with Nyungar Sovereignty.  In positioning non-
Aboriginality as a political identity I have rejected colonialist modes of 
identification that are dependent on false taxonomies such as black and white.  I 
have also argued that just as ‘Aboriginality’ is historically constituted, ‘non-
Aboriginality’ acknowledges both the ‘immigrant’ status of non-Aboriginal 
people and the dispossession of Aboriginal people through invasion of their lands 
and the colonisation of their bodies.  Non-Aboriginality affirms our ethical 
obligations in establishing the terms of our co-existence with Aboriginal people 
in dialogue with them, and that our legitimate belonging is contingent upon all of 
the above occurring.  
 
The coda to this project is the documentary Whitefellas and Wadjulas.  In the 
spirit of ‘yarning’ I offer this documentary as an example of some of the ways a 
group of non-Aboriginal people talk about the importance of being whitefellas.  
The documentary is a contribution to a dialogue I hope more whitefellas take part 
in, both between ourselves, and importantly, with Aboriginal people. 
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